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During Reagan's Gubernatorial Years
MARK NEAL AARONSON*
Justice, justice shall you pursue ...
-Deuteronomy 16:20
* The author's biography immediately follows the Appendix.
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INTRODUCTION
"Welfare reform" was Ronald Reagan's preeminent political issue
as California's governor from 1967 until 1975. His views on the welfare
system were also a pivotal feature of his campaigns for the presidency,
unsuccessfully as a candidate for the Republican nomination in 1976 and
successfully in I98o.' As governor, he focused mainly on public assistance
programs benefitting poor families. Later, as president, he used the
mantle of welfare reform, especially its emphasis on welfare fraud, as an
ideological wedge to curtail a broader set of New Deal and Great Society
social welfare programs.
This Book's empirical focus is the contentious political and legal
battle over California welfare reform in the early 197Os. It is an extended,
multifaceted case study of a kind not much found in the literature on social
I. For brief overviews of Reagan's political attention to and promotion of welfare reform, see
Lou CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN: His RISE TO POWER 348-62 (2003) [hereinafter CANNON, GOVERNOR
REAGAN]; LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 74-75, 156, 517-19 (991)
[hereinafter CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN]; EDMUND MORRIS, DuTcH: A MEMOIR OF RONALD REAGAN
368-76 (s999).
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cause lawyering. From an analytical perspective, my purpose is to examine,
within the context of American pluralism and constitutionalism, the
professional and institutional character of group legal representation for
the poor as a strategy for political empowerment and social change. While
grounded in political and legal history, this study primarily draws on ideas
from political science and political theory about representation and from
writings in legal ethics and legal education on professional role
responsibilities.
The ideas presented here focus on the tangible, not just symbolic,
representation of socially vulnerable groups. The principal thematic
points are: (i) Social cause lawyering is a systemic necessity for the
democratic and equitable functioning of our governing institutions;
(2) the constraints on the role of lawyers for groups or causes have
more to do conceptually with understandings about the nature of
representation than the applicability of ethical or procedural rules;2
and (3) the political consequences of such legal advocacy are variable
and potentially contradictory. The availability of legal representation for
the poor structurally serves dual purposes: On the one hand, having legal
representation contributes to reductions in political inequities; on the
other, because such representation conveys a sense of procedural or
institutional fairness, it enhances the legitimacy of governmental actions
no matter how limited their effectiveness.
Part I sets the methodological and conceptual framework for this
work. In separate subsections, it addresses the contemporary relevance
of the case study conducted, discusses arguments against and in support
of public funding of policy-based lawyering for the poor, calls attention
to several key issues regarding lawyer role morality and self-discipline
when representing groups, and provides an initial framework for thinking
theoretically about democratic representation and the representational
role of lawyers.
Part II presents the lengthy case study narrative along with historical
and sociological background information on American political ideology,
social welfare policy, and legal assistance programs for the poor. The
2. On the lack of fit between standard ethical rules and professional dilemmas in providing
collective representation and counseling, see Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied:
Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyer's Representation of
Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community
Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (2ooo); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, ioi
HARV. L. REV. I083 (1988); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged:
Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449 (i999); Paul R. Tremblay,
Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 389 (2O00). For an analysis of the limitations of
individualistic, democratic, and expert-based ethical or procedural approaches for resolving conflicts
among group members in civil rights litigation, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, Io6 YALE L.J.
1623 (1997); see also Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. U. REV. 1 183 (1982).
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narrative highlights the forceful presence of Ronald Reagan and the
pivotal role in representing the welfare poor carried out by Ralph Santiago
Abascal, a government-funded legal aid lawyer? To counter Reagan's
welfare policy ambitions, Abascal with other legal services lawyers relied
on court litigation not in isolation but as part of an overall strategy that
also involved legislative and administrative actions and consultations with
recipient-led welfare rights organizations.
Part III draws conclusions from the case study narrative and employs
ideas earlier presented about lawyer role responsibilities as representatives
to develop a concept of group legal representation that addresses both
professional and political issues. From a professional perspective, lawyers
for the poor often have considerable autonomy when acting as policy
advocates. Because formal accountability mechanisms tend to be weak, the
nature and extent of lawyer responsiveness to client preferences and goals
become especially salient. From a political perspective, American
governance presumes the pluralistic participation of all affected groups in
the development and implementation of public policies.4 In a nation which
centrally values governing under the rule of law, efficacious participation
also involves having competent legal representation.
I. PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
A. THE CASE STUDY AND ITS CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE
Almost four decades ago, I submitted my doctoral dissertation in
political science on the changes then occurring in public assistance policy
and administration, which in part were in response to aggressive legal
advocacy on behalf of welfare recipients.5 While the dissertation
incorporated background perspectives on national developments affecting
welfare policy and government funding of legal services for the poor, its
empirical focus was on changes in welfare policy and administration at the
beginning of Reagan's second term as California's governor. In this Book,
the empirical thrust of the narrative is to examine the role and
effectiveness of group legal representation at that time as a policy
advocacy strategy for protecting and advancing the interests of the
welfare poor.
3. Throughout this work, I use the terms "legal aid" or "legal services" lawyers generically as a
shorthand for lawyers who represent poor clients but are not directly paid by them. In the 1970s, most
of these lawyers worked for nonprofit organizations largely funded by the federal government. Much
more of this work is now done with funds received from charitable contributions, foundation grants,
and other nonfederal sources.
4. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMocRATIc THEORY (956).
5. Mark Neal Aaronson, Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform: Continuity and Change in Public
Relief (975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) [hereinafter Aaronson,
Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform].
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In conducting the original research, I relied heavily upon open-ended
interviews with legal services attorneys, federal, state, and county public
officials, and others actively engaged in welfare lobbying or organizing. A
little more than half of the interviews were with former or then current
California officials. All together, over a two-year period, I conducted
interviews with thirty individuals. Among those whom I interviewed was
Ronald Reagan.
6
The person most critical in facilitating my research was Ralph
Santiago Abascal. From 197o until 1975, he headed a welfare policy
advocacy unit as Director of Litigation at the San Francisco Neighborhood
Legal Assistance Foundation. Working with a network of other
antipoverty attorneys and in alliance with grassroots welfare and
disability rights organizations, Abascal functioned during this period as
the key representative for the welfare poor in clashes over Reagan's
proposals for welfare reform. He was the lead lawyer and primary
strategist for welfare recipient interests in state and federal court
litigation, in lobbying and working with California legislators, and in
various administrative proceedings and interchanges. In numerous hours
of discussion, Abascal guided me through the ins and outs of welfare law
and politics including some explication of the tactical considerations and
legal and political objectives that he had in mind at different junctures.7
There are a number of reasons for my now revisiting and augmenting
the dissertation's case study. The first has to do with a shift in narrative
perspective. When I wrote the dissertation, Abascal was my primary field
research contact and informant. I was not then focusing on issues of
representation. In this reworking, his direct role as the chief architect of
the counter-campaign to Reagan's welfare reform measures is the
narrative's linchpin. I now look to Abascal as a role model for today's
6. The interview took place in Oakland, California, on March 6, 1975, shortly after Reagan left
office as California's governor. To arrange the interview, I did nothing more than write Reagan
requesting an interview to talk about his welfare policies. One of his aides contacted me and arranged for
me to meet with him immediately before a luncheon speech at a downtown Oakland hotel. I spent
approximately forty-five minutes with Reagan sitting across a table with no one else present most of the
time. He had good recall of specific events and the reasons for his actions. Throughout, he was
exceptionally gracious and charming. The written transcript of this tape-recorded interview is included as
an appendix at the end of this work.
7. Abascal began practicing law in 1968 when he was thirty-four. He was a graduate of the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Prior to law school, he had been a graduate
student in economics at the University of California, Berkeley, where he had previously earned an
MBA. He spent two years in the U.S. Navy in his early twenties. He was twenty-seven when he
obtained a B.S. degree from San Jose State University in i96I. Abascal had a formidable intellect
continually honed by extensive reading in the social sciences and liberal arts as well as in the law.
Rumpled and unpretentious in manner, he carried himself in a way that exuded legal and political
wisdom beyond his years. He spent most of his career at California Rural Legal Assistance ("CRLA"),
initially as a staff attorney and then returning as the long-time General Counsel. Abascal died of
stomach cancer in 1997 at age sixty-two.
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activist lawyers concerned about social justice, as he was for those with
whom he worked when he was alive.
What Abascal had was good practical judgment. At the nub of his
character and style as a lawyer was his sense of presence and his ability to
be responsive and flexible, not formulaic and absolutist, in how he
worked with and for clients as their representative. Judgment, a subject
about which I have written elsewhere, is contextual.' It requires broadly
drawing on knowledge and experience while tailoring actions to meet
specific circumstances. Context is especially critical in understanding the
opportunities and limitations in pursuing strategies for social change,
especially the roles undertaken and the choices made by lawyers.'
Abascal's actions in countering Reagan's welfare agenda serve as a
lengthy example of what it means to exercise good lawyering judgment in
challenging political times.
The second reason for reconsidering the case study has to do with
academic discourse. In the intervening decades, a body of literature both
in the social sciences and in law has been produced that questions the
appropriateness and effectiveness of a largely lawyer-executed approach
to social advocacy for relatively weak demographic groups. It was this
type of strategy that was in play during the battle over welfare reform in
California in the early 197Os.
In the social science literature on law and social change, the
predominant tendency has been to describe and then dismiss policy-
oriented litigation strategies for the poor, minorities, or ordinary citizens
as largely shortsighted, counterproductive, or ineffective.'" These studies
mainly criticize the effectiveness of public policy litigation viewed in
isolation. In other words, these critiques take social cause lawyers and
courts to task for being overly confident about what can be expected
from litigation alone and as not being sufficiently attentive to
institutional limitations and consequences. A few studies have shown,
8. Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment in
Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247 (I998) [hereinafter Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider]; see Mark
Neal Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of Good Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L.
REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox].
9. "The real issue is, what kind of lawyers, in what kind of relationships with community groups
or movements, using what sorts of strategies, makes sense in which contexts?" JENNIFER GORDON,
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 281 (2006).
io. E.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALIrY (20O4); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (2d ed. 2oo8). In a review of Rosenberg's book written shortly after its
initial publication, Malcolm Feeley provides a thoughtful and nuanced analysis of why this extensively
cited work is both important and wrong. Malcolm M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 745 (1992). For works still critical of group legal advocacy but more attentive to
circumstantial differences, variations, and consequences when relying on judicial intervention to achieve
social change, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw (2OOI), and
GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAw's ALLURE: How LAw SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2000).
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however, that this now conventional position is overblown." Having
some faith in the utility of litigation does not mean that the involved
lawyers were unmindful of other considerations and the importance of
companion strategies, such as grassroots mobilization, legislative
lobbying, and media campaigns.'2 Recently, some of the social science
critiques themselves have begun to be criticized as not taking into
account enough specific historical contexts. The criticism is that the
thesis-driven nature of these works results in a failure to fully appreciate
the complexity of the circumstances, variability, and impacts of litigation
strategies for social change. 3
In the legal literature on the role of lawyers, there has been a strong
emphasis on client-centered and collaborative lawyering." These theories
of professional practice underscore the importance of direct client
involvement in the decisions made and actions taken by lawyers. The
formative perspectives that underlie these theories derive from concerns
about how lawyers interact with and treat clients when providing
individual representation. When the subject is policy impact group
representation, this literature criticizes the use of litigation in isolation
and without meaningful client engagement in a collective push for social
change.'" In the works on group representation, the examples of lawyers
acting most responsively in interactions with clients usually involve social
change struggles at the local level. 6 Not much attention has yet been paid
to examining shifts and variations in the role responsibilities of lawyers and
their relationships with client groups when the causes require concerted
and protracted engagement at state and national levels of involvement.
My empirical case study presents a multidimensional, detailed story
of a kind still not much found in published form. The actions undertaken
I I. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORMS AND THE PoLITIcs OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION (1994); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996).
12. See Michael W. McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurements": A Relational
Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILmES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,1998);
see also Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 509 (1999) (concluding, based on sixty-nine semistructured interviews with
Chicago civil rights and antipoverty lawyers in 1993 and 1994, that the lawyers "used litigation as part
of an arsenal of strategies for securing favorable direct and indirect benefits for clients").
13. See Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights
Movement: Review of Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the
Civil Rights Movement, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1oi8 (2012).
14. E.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (3rd ed.
2012); GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VIEW OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE
(1992); Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2ooo).
15. For an extensive compilation of these writings, see Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of
Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 1383-84 n.I (2009).
16. E.g., Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study
of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927 (2007).
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did not involve just litigation but a sophisticated mix of legislative,
administrative, and judicial advocacy along with grassroots organizing.
Aggressive legal representation is neither a panacea nor appropriate in
all situations. But when employed astutely, it can play a significant role in
the empowerment of vulnerable groups. My hope is that the complexity
of the study's story will spur others to develop or refine their own
analyses about the competing considerations and perplexities inherent in
social cause or policy-directed lawyering.
My third and last reason for turning back to this case study is analytic.
The theoretical emphasis in my dissertation was on changes in welfare
policy and administration. Here, the analytic focus is different. The case
study provides instead a factual context for examining the concept of legal
representation when external mechanisms for holding lawyers accountable
to clients are weak or nonexistent. In framing the issues, I borrow and
modify ideas about democratic political representation and apply them to
social cause lawyering where the representatives are not elected public
officials but lawyers who are not paid by the clients represented.
Typically, these situations involve lawyers who work for nonprofit
organizations funded variously by the government, foundations, and
individual donors. Such circumstances also may involve law school clinics
and lawyers in private practice. The latter may be volunteering their
services for free or taking a risk that statutorily or judicially authorized
fees paid by an opposing party will be forthcoming. 7 In the voluminous
literature on legal professionalism over the last several decades, there is
scant attention paid to rethinking the concept of representation when, as
with Abascal, lawyers not financially dependent on clients engage in
social advocacy on their behalf. What does representation entail when
those being represented do not have the usual controls for influencing
and constraining the actions of representatives?
Before preliminarily approaching this question, I want to address
the continuing controversial nature of government-funded group legal
representation that involves development and implementation of public
policies. To clarify what is at stake analytically, I turn first to what
distinguishes group representation from individual representation
functionally. I then address several politically significant but for the most
part shallow criticisms of antipoverty policy impact lawyering.
17. For an overview regarding funding of public interest litigation, see Scott L. Cummings &
Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 603 (2009).
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B. THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSY OVER POLICY IMPACT LEGAL ADVOCACY
FOR THE POOR
Legal advocacy for the poor encompasses both individual
representation and group representation. The former mainly involves
providing direct assistance to an individual in resolving disputes, such as
a landlord-tenant problem or a denial of Social Security benefits, and in
planning for future events, such as preparing a will, a tax filing, or an
application for housing. One-on-one representation is what most legal
aid lawyers do most of the time and usually is not controversial. Group
representation covers various collective activities, such as legislative
lobbying or class action litigation, that are utilized to advance the shared
interests of the poor or a segment of the poor. These efforts have
continually been mired in controversy.
The distinction between individual and group advocacy becomes
blurred when a series of individual actions also are intended to generate
systemic pressure for institutional change. In the late i96os, for example,
welfare rights groups aided by legal aid attorneys initiated campaigns to
encourage the mass filing of individual claims for special needs
allowances as a pressure tactic to increase benefits across-the-board for
impoverished families. An important part of the campaigns was the filing
of administrative fair hearing appeals when initial special allowance
requests were denied for items such as school clothing for children or
furniture destroyed because of a fire.'8 Though the distinction between
individual and group representation breaks down at the margins, it is
useful for underscoring this Book's focus on group representation, not
individual assistance.
i. The Functions of Group Legal Representation
The major functions of group legal representation are (i) influencing
policymaking; (2) policing compliance with law; and (3) empowering
represented groups. In practice, these functions are not independent of
one another but are complementary. They overlap and in the best of
circumstances reinforce each other.
Influencing policymaking has constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory aspects. While judicial strategies to advance the constitutional
rights of the poor are part of the policymaking mix, the social welfare
policies that are the focus here are overwhelmingly statutory in origin.
Landmark constitutional cases are rare. The bulk of policy advocacy
concerns the enactment and interpretation of fairly specific, often
i8. FELICIA KORNBLUrH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN
AMERICA 63-87 (2007); MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
1960-1973, at 41-49 (1993).
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technical legislation and regulations. The interpretative work is carried
out within administrative agencies and by the courts.
Closely related to the policymaking function is the policing function.
It is an especially crucial but often overlooked component of effective
group representation, particularly with respect to social welfare
programs that seek to redress inequities within society and the economy.
The implementation of such programs usually entails considerable public
costs and relies on bureaucratic processes and procedures. There are
recurring opportunities for the exercise of administrative discretion. Such
discretion is often subject to political, bureaucratic, and fiscal pressures.
Adherence to and implementation of a legislative enactment or court
ruling are rarely straightforward in practice. Indeed, the opposite-
bureaucratic disentitlement-is a more likely phenomenon. 9 Involved
lawyers need constantly to monitor and enforce administrative agency
compliance with the law.
Together, the policymaking and policing functions involve first
obtaining and then securing tangible public benefits for a particular
group. The benefits themselves seek to improve the life circumstances of
the group and may be substantive or procedural. An example of the
former would be an expansion in public aid eligibility for families with
children to include two-parent as well as one-parent households. An
example of the latter would be the recognition of a right to a fair hearing
before the termination of someone's public aid benefits.
The empowering function is analytically difficult to describe and to
assess. It has both sociological and psychological dimensions.
Sociologically, the key questions concern the extent to which specific
representative actions enhance the political competence of the represented
group-that is, its ability to shape and to protect favorable political and
legal gains and to prevent and to limit adverse political and legal
developments. Psychologically, the issues pertain to states of consciousness
and feelings about one's experience and efficacy when acting in a public
way as a member of a constituent group. The reality and sense of
participation in group advocacy run the gamut from intense engagement of
the sort generated by directly planning and participating in public
demonstrations to relatively unengaged and passive involvement, such as
being a named representative in class action litigation.
Active participation in public affairs in and of itself adds an important
dimension to one's life experiences." When widespread, it can contribute
significantly to the effectiveness of a constituent group. Yet empowering
19. See Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc. SERV.
REV. 3, 20 (1984) (describing "bureaucratic disentitlement" as practices and decisions made at low
levels within the bureaucracy that negatively impact welfare recipients).
20. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
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individuals is not just the result of what they do directly for themselves.
There is an important and necessary place for representation, especially
in a society as populous and institutionally complex as ours. While
knowing how to fish is valuable and pleasurable, the fundamental need is
to eat well whether the food on the table comes from one's own labor or
that of others.
2. Separating Political Rhetoric from Serious Analysis
Twenty-five years ago, David Luban confronted head-on the main
political attacks against legal services for the poor as part of a far-ranging
and thought-provoking discussion of professional legal ethics and the
pursuit of justice.2 Luban's ideas regarding ethical reasoning are starting
points for my own discussion of the role responsibilities of lawyers when
collectively representing clients in policy impact advocacy. I turn to them
in the next Subpart. In this Subpart, I track his thought to separate out
largely politically motivated, rhetorical arguments against group legal
services for the poor from serious analytic and practical concerns about
lawyering practice in policy advocacy situations.
Staunch critics of group legal advocacy for the poor have used two
main arguments when seeking to condition and defund federally supported
legal services. The first argument is that there is something wrong in
allowing public funds to be used to support lawyers who advocate for
social causes and challenge government actions." This contention, while
not without political appeal, is an overly simplistic critique of the
legitimacy of utilizing legal advocacy as a form of political action to
advance public policy objectives. The second argument is that lawyers for
the poor act on their own agendas and not the agendas of those
purportedly represented.23 This assertion, though often employed glibly,
raises potentially troubling but resolvable concerns regarding constituent
and client control over representatives and representational
responsiveness to client interests.
Luban initially characterizes the government funding argument as the
taxation objection-that is, public funds should not be used to pay lawyers
to represent only one side in hotly contested policy matters. 4 He regards
the thrust of this objection as not so much about the expenditure of
government funds supporting one side rather than another, as about how
the money is spent and who benefits. In Luban's view, the hostility
expressed mainly is directed at the positions taken by antipoverty lawyers,
which often are contrary to majority preferences and reactions, and which
21. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
22. Id. at 302.
23. Id. at 303.
24. Id. at 304.
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typically benefit relatively weak, non-mainstream or minority interest
groups. 5 Such criticism has been especially strong when legal services
lawyers have relied on courts to check legislative and executive actions.
Not surprisingly, the most persistent opponents of federally supported
legal services have been political conservatives, who rail against what they
characterize as "a radical political and social agenda" carried out by
government-funded lawyers with the complicity of an activist liberal
judiciary. 6
The argument emphasizing funding per se has been largely a pretext."
Luban contends that it is the perceived frustration of majority will, not any
unfair use of federal dollars, that is the main motivating factor for
conservative opposition to the federal legal services program. The
taxation objection is primarily about majoritarian disdain for policy
measures that favor the poor. Accordingly, it devolves to what Luban
terms an objection from democracy, an objection which he considers
profoundly misguided. As he puts it, "the objection from democracy
misunderstands the nature of democracy" in the United States.28
American governance is not just about majority rule and
accountability. The Constitution establishes three coequal branches of
25. Id. at 305-06.
26. Id. at 297-302; see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NYU LAW SCHOOL, HIDDEN AGENDAS: WHAT Is
REALLY BEMND ATrACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS? (2001).
27. Compared to overall federal expenditures, which for fiscal year 2011 were estimated at
around $3.8 trillion, the amount spent on federally supported legal services for the poor has been and
remains a relative drop in the bucket. This is not to say, however, that the advent of federally
supported funding for legal services through the Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO") as part of
President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty has not made a difference in the availability of civil legal
aid for the poor. In the early i96os, civil legal aid societies nationally employed the equivalent of 400
full-time lawyers and had a combined annual budget of about $4 million, mostly from private charities.
EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM 9 (1974). By 1970, the annual budget for OEO Legal Services was $53 million. That year 265
separately funded private nonprofit agencies operated 934 neighborhood offices, employed 2,000
attorneys, and served 900,0oo clients. "Historical Data: Office of Legal Services," Appendix to the
Statement by Donald Rumsfeld, OEO Director, Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 9ist
Cong. (197o). But federal funding for legal services has not appreciated much in real terms over the
years. The fiscal year 2011 budget for the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), the entity established
in 1974 as the successor agency to OEO Legal Services, is $404 million. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, NYU
Law School, Legal Services E-lert (Aug. 1, 2011) (on file with author). As part of the FY 2012 budget
process, one House subcommittee has proposed a $300 million annual LSC budget, a 26% cut from
the previous year. Id. The $300 million figure barely accounts for a more than 450% increase in the
overall rate of inflation between January 1971 and January 2011, let alone increases in the poverty
population eligible for such assistance, which in 2Oi was at an all-time high of 63 million people. Id.
"In 20O, LSC-funded programs closed 932,406 civil legal aid cases, including 321,000 cases involving
family law issues, such as domestic violence, and more than 235,000 cases involving housing matters,
such as evictions." Brennan Ctr. for Justice, NYU Law School, Legal Services E-lert (July 26, 2011)
(on file with author). While clients served and cases closed are different metrics, it does appear that
the LSC-funded caseload overwhelmingly involves providing individual assistance and at a case level
not much different than forty years ago.
28. LUBAN, supra note 21, at 304.
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government and a complicated multitiered federal system. This
constitutional framework is specifically designed to protect minority
interests from the tyranny of the majority. 9 Such protection, as envisioned
and in reality, importantly depends on the independence of the judiciary
and an overarching commitment to the rule of law as a governing political
as well as legal principle. Constitutional values and limitations affect how
government operates in virtually all circumstances. There is an
interweaving of law and politics without clear separation, and, as a result,
courts wind up exercising political as well as legal functions.
No one questions that wealthy individuals and corporations are able
to use lawyers to represent their policy interests in courts, before
legislative bodies, and in administrative proceedings.3" The idea of policy
impact legal advocacy for the poor is entirely consistent with American
constitutional democracy, especially if one takes seriously the notion of
"equal opportunity" as a paramount legal and governing principle.
Indeed, the absence of such representation distorts and undermines the
basic operation and essential fairness of this nation's commitment to
political pluralism and an adversarial system of justice.3
Yet critics of legal services for the poor, mainly from the right, have
been very effective in imposing and retaining restrictive conditions on the
receipt of federal funding. Initially, the focus was on hot-button political
issues like abortion, school desegregation, and the military draft." In 1996,
Congress enacted a highly onerous and sweeping set of conditions, which
included prohibitions on attempting to influence rulemaking or
lawmaking, participating in class actions, requesting attorneys' fees under
applicable statutes, challenging welfare reform measures, and using
nonfederal funds on federally restricted activities.3 After President Barack
29. THE FEDERALIST No. io (James Madison) ("The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against
Domestic Faction and Insurrection").
30. For a classic, historical study on the role of corporate lawyers in support of the policy agenda of
major American corporations, see BENJAMIN J. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ
FAiRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942). For a discussion of how corporate interests have shaped the
Supreme Court since the 97os, see Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAO., Mar. 16, 2008,
at 38; see also Confidential Memorandum: Attack on the American Free Enterprise System, from Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Snydor, Jr., Chairman, Education Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(Aug. 23, i97i), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources.document13.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
31. See David Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 209 (2003).
32. Id. at 221.
33. Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a) (2)-
(4), (7), (13), (i6), (i9)(d), ito Stat. 1321-54 (1996); 45 C.F.R. §§ 16io.i-.9 (1997); Cummings &
Rhode, supra note 17, at 620; Luban, supra note 31, at 221. In a reelection year for President Bill
Clinton, his Democratic administration had no interest in taking on a Republican-controlled Congress
over legal services for the poor. Generally speaking, issues directly affecting the poor and not also
other constituencies are of no salience to most voters and legislators. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2oo8).
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Obama's election, there was briefly some movement in Congress to
remove these restrictions.34 The political will to remove such restrictions
has now largely faltered.
Practically speaking, there is little question that the attachment of
such strings adversely affects opportunities for the poor to participate in
policymaking. The restrictions on the appropriation of funds compounded
by continued underfunding have serious detrimental effects on the ability
of the poor to raise political and legal claims. Whether framed as a
taxation objection or an objection from democracy, the first argument
against government-funded group advocacy for the poor overlooks
structural barriers and ignores reasonable aspirations regarding effectively
participating in the American political system.
The second argument against legal services programs for the poor
questions the connection of the issues being raised to those being
represented. Its roots lie in the discretion exercised by lawyers in
determining what cases to handle and how to handle them. The first
component of this argument focuses on agenda setting and decisions
about resource allocation. The second component looks to the role of
clients in making specific case decisions.
Luban describes the concern over agenda setting as the equal access
objection because its proponents have emphasized that the time spent on
impact work operationally diverts attention from meeting the needs of
individual clients, who otherwise might receive legal assistance and
improved access to the legal system.3" Underlying this argument are
contentions that legal services lawyers should only take individual cases
that clients bring them, and that supporting policy impact work gives
lawyers too much autonomy. Since inevitably there will be limits on the
number of cases taken by legal services programs, the core of the objection
is the supposed lack of boundaries on attorney discretion. Luban proceeds
to show that the real concern is not about access to legal assistance but the
autonomy of legal services attorneys in case-acceptance decisionmaking.
6
Tradeoffs regarding what work to undertake occur in all legal
practices. There are always financial, expertise, time, and resource
considerations to take into account. Exercises of discretion over which
clients to represent and what cases to take are not unique to antipoverty
law. For most private practitioners, client and case selection decisions are
34. As part of the LSC budget for FY 2010, Congress lifted the restriction that had barred LSC
grantees from seeking court-awarded attorneys' fees from opposing parties. President Barack Obama
also had urged Congress to repeal the restrictions on participating in class actions and using non-LSC
funds on LSC-prohibited activities. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, NYU Law School, Legal Services E-lert
(Feb. 5, 2010) (on file with author). With a Republican majority having taken control of the House of
Representatives in 2011, any further removal of restrictions in the near future is unlikely.
35. LUBAN, supra note 21, at 303.
36. Id. at 3o6-i6.
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presumed to be within their prerogative, even though the choices made
have individual and societal consequences.37 In determining whom to
represent, private practitioners are free to establish their own business
plans. The issue here is what is different about case selection decisions in a
legal services practice.
The most obvious difference is the source of funding. Poor people
do not personally pay for the legal services received so that there are not
the usual free-market, client-choice checks on what lawyers undertake.
In terms of financial pressure affecting agenda setting, a legal services
program's main concerns are satisfying the requirements or appealing to
the interests of public agencies, private foundations, or individual donors.
The conditions imposed by external funding agencies do constrain
program discretionary management of cases and projects. But going after
funds is not an end in itself in most legal services practices. It generally
reflects something larger than the specific matters undertaken.
The real difference in case selection decisions for legal services
programs-as compared to private practice-is the importance of mission,
which affects both what funding to seek and what services to offer. While
financial viability is crucial, legal services programs for the poor are
primarily mission driven, not business driven.
In promoting a nationwide program while seeking to affect local
agenda setting, the initial administrators of federally supported legal
services had a twofold mission: expand the availability of individual legal
services and cultivate law reform work."' The latter when originally
coined was an intentionally open and malleable concept.39 The notion of
law reform has since served as a shorthand reference for various forms of
policy impact advocacy and supportive community organizing. In 1967, a
Senate committee report acknowledged and endorsed the high priority
37. There are ethical rules covering the avoidance of conflicts, declining and terminating
representation, and a lawyer's undertaking of law reform activities. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.7-.12, I.s6, 6.4 (2002). However, no specific ABA ethical rule governs how a lawyer chooses and
shapes a practice area.
38. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 132-34. Earl Johnson, Jr., was the deputy director and then director
of OEO Legal Services during its early years. He later became a California Court of Appeal Justice. For a
nonparticipant's perspectives on the various factions and interests involved in the establishment and
development of OEO Legal Services, see Richard M. Pious, Policy and Public Administration: The Legal
Services Program in the War on Poverty, i POL. & Soc'Y 365 (197i), and Richard M. Pious, Congress, the
Organized Bar, and the Legal Services Program, 1972 Wisc. L. REv. 418.
39. In a never officially issued draft instruction (#614o) from the late 196os, OEO's Office of Legal
Services described law reform activities as follows: "Law reform.., means appellate litigation, legislative
change, innovative action at the trial level, group development and representation, economic
development and other creative or innovative concepts designed to make a substantial impact on more
than an individual client and the cycle of poverty." Aaronson, Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform,
supra note 5, at 56 n.Io.
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placed by Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO") administrators on
law reform along with individual service delivery.4'
Nonetheless, questions have been raised from the beginning about
the feasibility and consequences of such a dual focus. Some critics feared
that the involvement of government-funded lawyers in policy impact
activities would negatively affect real grassroots participation because
short shrift would be given to directly empowering client groups.' Others
doubted the organizational capacity of legal services programs to do both
and disputed the need for and effectiveness of engaging in law reform
activities."
There are always practical implementation issues regarding the
competing responsibilities of legal aid lawyers. How wisely a dual focus
on individual service and law reform gets carried out is one thing; calling
into question the legitimacy of lawyers acting on their own mission-
driven agenda is quite another. The thrust of Luban's position is that
criticisms of law reform as a legal services program priority should not be
taken as presenting credible arguments against the institutional
legitimacy- constitutionally, pluralistically, or ethically-of providing
full-service representation to poor people on policy issues as well as
individual matters.
Considerations of mission no less than financial considerations are
well within the professional autonomy accorded lawyers to determine
their own practice area and case priorities. For legal services programs,
the extent to which clients participate in such decisionmaking is a
prudential not ethical matter. Without ethical grounding, the equal
access objection loses most of its force. The fundamental administrative
dilemma, whether in providing national funding or in managing service
delivery programs, is always about how to best use limited legal
resources for what purposes, for which there is no single pat answer.
Looking ahead to the narrative section, nothing done by Ralph
Abascal and his legal services colleagues in confronting Ronald Reagan's
state welfare reform initiatives was very different from what privately
paid lawyers typically do when representing clients with political issues.
40. "[Tlhe legal services program can scarcely keep up with the volume of cases in the
communities where it is active, not to speak of places waiting for funds to start the program. The
committee concludes, therefore, that more attention should be given to test cases and law reform."
S. Rep. No. 563, at 40 (1967), as cited in Johnson, supra note 27, at 133.
41. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE I.1. io49 (ig7o); see also Harry Brill,
The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assistance, 31 THE PuB. INEREST 38 (1973).
42. See Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 699 (1969);
Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Law Reforming in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 242 (97o) (arguing
that remedying legal wrongs suffered by the poor may benefit individuals but is not a strategy for the
alleviation of poverty). For later arguments why legal services lawyers should do individual client work
only and not policy or law reform directed work, see CHARLES K. ROWLEY, THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE: TnE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
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The only unusual development in the story to be told is the breadth and
extent of representation provided the welfare poor, which was at a level
typically available only to wealthy and corporate interests. Like the
taxation and democratic objections, the equal access objection reflects a
distorted understanding about the role and functions of legal advocacy in
a representative democracy.
To the extent there are troubling issues to be addressed, Luban finds
that they fall under what he calls the client control objection.43 The worry is
that in policy impact work, "lawyers rather than clients are calling the
shots."' An integral related concern is the correspondence between what
lawyers consider to be in the client group's interest and how group
members perceive their interests. 5 The critical issues are the terms and
mutual expectations that circumscribe lawyer and client relationships when
advocating for groups. In the next Subpart, I address Luban's response to
the client control objection by highlighting and explicating his perspectives
on lawyer role morality and the dynamics of group representation.
C. ON LAWYER ROLE MORALITY AND SELF-DISCIPLINE IN REPRESENTING
GROUPS
At the heart of the client control objection are fears about unbridled
attorney discretion. In tempering such concerns, Luban places a heavy
emphasis on lawyer self-awareness and self-discipline. He is confident that
if legal services and other similarly situated lawyers "take proper
precautions, the client control objection disappears." 6
I share much of his optimism that with increased lawyer self-
awareness, the client control objection loses much of its force as an
objection to the broad discretion potentially wielded by attorneys in
social cause lawyering. That is not to say, however, that the absence of
meaningful client participation is not a matter of concern. The relative
43. LUBAN, supra note 21, 303.
44. Id.
45. This latter concern is central to revisionist critiques of the desegregation litigation strategy
used by the NAACP especially in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE. L.J. 470 (1976). Such critiques question African-American
grassroots support for the NAACP strategy of integrating public schools. A recent exhaustive
historical study of the civil rights movement in Atlanta indicates that the views of affected African
Americans reflected differing interests and were not of one mind. TOMIKo BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO
DIssENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2O 1). Black middle-class
teachers and principals feared the loss of teaching, administration, and clerical jobs held by African
Americans at segregated schools, and also viewed the teaching of African-American children by only
white teachers at integrated schools as further "white domination." Poor black parents, however,
viewed desegregation as a way to get a better education for their children. Id. at 346-58, 370-71. The
picture on the ground for lawyers representing any large group is often riddled with competing
concerns and objectives that are not neatly reconcilable.
46. LUBAN, supra note 21, at 304.
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passivity of a represented group may well be indicative of situational
circumstances that do have an effect on the extent to which legal
advocacy contributes to a group's empowerment.47
In developing his ideas about lawyer self-discipline, Luban has a
strong concept of professional role morality as being different from
ordinary private morality but as requiring careful justification."' He
rejects what he considers the dominant picture of role morality, which is
that a lawyer's societal role and duties within an adversary legal system
alone are sufficient to excuse professional actions contrary to common
norms and expectations.49 Provocatively, he forcefully defends lawyers
who engage in policy impact advocacy even when they recruit and
manipulate clients, take actions opposed by a majority of those
represented, and handle cases in light of their own political theories. °
Because such advocacy is a form of political action, Luban underscores
that lawyers may have to get their hands dirty-that is, to say and do
things that are distasteful and questionable. He also emphasizes,
however, that they should do so only under appropriate conditions and
within bounds. For Luban, lawyer role morality is not amorality. Moral
aspirations and constraints have a place, but a lawyer's mandates and
proscriptions are different from ordinary morality. The critical factor is
the quality of one's moral reasoning in specific circumstances.
As a general framework applicable to all lawyering situations,
Luban sets forth a four-step process of reasoning to determine whether
there is a sufficient excuse for departing from ordinary morality. This
system of reasoning involves explicitly considering, sequentially as
appropriate, logical linkages between (i) the importance of the role act to
carrying out role obligations; (2) the essentiality of the role obligations to
the role being performed; (3) the critical nature of the role for the
operations of an institution or in support of a cause; and (4) ultimately the
moral goodness of the institution or cause itself."1 The professional
legitimacy of the conduct in question depends on the centrality and
worthiness of what is at stake at each level in the analysis. To illustrate
how to apply this method of reasoning, I provide first an example
involving individual representation. I then discuss the relevance of Luban's
framework to group representation.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 446-48.
48. Luban's thought draws on a philosophically sound though not stereotypical interpretation of
Machiavellian political theory. For a thought-provoking interpretation of Machiavelli with respect to
the special morality required of political actors, see SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION:
CONTINUrrY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLmCAL THOUGHT 200-05 (expanded ed. 2004).
49. LUBAN, supra note 21, at xix-xx.
50. Id. at 317.
55. Id. at 131.
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An example of a morally debatable role act in the context of
individual representation would be the harsh, incriminating questioning of
a rape victim by defense counsel for an accused rapist. To justify the
damage that might be done to the victim's psychological well-being and
reputation, one would first analyze the necessity of such questioning as a
cross-examination technique-the pertinent role obligation. If a sufficient
justification could not be determined at that level, one would move to the
next level, where one would address the critical value of cross-examination
in the defense of a client. If even further justifications were necessary, one
then would consider the importance of defense lawyers to the functioning
of an adversarial legal system. The last appeal for morally justifying what
would ordinarily be reprehensible behavior, especially if there were little
factual basis to support insinuations of the witness' sexual history, would
be to the capacity of the particular adversary system for resolving disputes
justly. Keep in mind, however, that at each stage such justifications for
departing from broadly shared moral values may be insufficient. A legal
regime that systematically oppressed women would not have the overall
moral credibility to provide a counter institutional interest to a devastating
legal attack on a female victim in a specific case.
As applied to lawyering for social change, Luban's overall framework
draws attention (i) to specific role act dilemmas in representing groups or
constituencies, (2) to the kinds of role obligations typically assumed by
lawyers in policy impact actions, (3) to the weightiness of the roles played
by lawyers in interest group advocacy within the American system of
governance, and (4) to the moral worthiness of American constitutionalism
and pluralism including the capacity to encourage and support broad
political participation.
With respect to the client control objection, the main focus is on steps
one and two and the linkages between them. The issues mostly concern the
kind of role dilemmas that arise in group representation and how their
resolution comports with a lawyer's responsibilities and allegiances as an
advocate in different policy arenas.
Luban specifically addresses two recurring dilemmas. The first
dilemma, which is typical in social cause lawyering, has to do with the
split loyalty of mission-driven legal services programs. The attorneys
involved usually are committed to both clients and a cause. The second
dilemma, which occurs in other representational circumstances as well, is
that within any group represented, there are likely to be conflicts among
its members regarding what to do. Luban describes the first issue as the
double agent problem and the second as class conflicts -a framing which
covers class action conflicts in a strict legal sense and other differences
and divisions within a group or entity collectively represented.
Luban finds nothing wrong in being committed to a cause as a
lawyer. Ethically, lawyers have a strong duty of loyalty to their clients,
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but they are never just hired guns. As set forth in the Preamble to the
ABA Model Rules, they have additional obligations as officers of the legal
system and as public citizens." The latter specifically includes seeking
improvement in "the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession."53
Acting on a mission to serve the interests of the poor is consistent with
what is expected of a lawyer as a public citizen, but it also complicates
decisionmaking and raises difficult issues of professional discretion. In
such circumstances, the ABA Preamble admonishes lawyers to exercise
"sensitive professional and moral judgment."54 Working out what this
requires in practice is very much what Luban sets out to do when he
discusses the double agent problem. The approach he takes involves
recognizing and satisfying three tests as integral to one's role obligations
as a social cause lawyer."
The key factors for Luban concern the terms on which lawyers act in
joint cause with their clients. His objective is to reduce the occurrence of
double agent conflicts. His example is a worst-case situation, where
lawyers in the interest of the cause manipulate clients, even betraying
them by going against what they specifically express as a preference.5 His
method is to impose three major conditions: "(I) the clients also are
committed to the cause; (2) the outcome of the manipulation represents
the will of the political group; [and] (3) the manipulative behavior is not
itself abhorrent to the political group.
Adhering to these constraints is vitally important, and compliance
needs to be genuine, not ritualistic. The first condition requires that a
lawyer be clear with individuals in the group about the lawyer's own
allegiances and the kind of representation being undertaken, while the
remaining two place a heavy emphasis on a lawyer's responsiveness to
the group's overarching interests and sensibilities regarding tactics and
strategy.
With respect to the first point, clients cannot be unaware participants
in the effort to achieve policy objectives. They may have an interest in an
individual remedy, but they need to realize that the representation they
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities [i] (2002). The
Preamble is for the most part aspirational. It describes values, principles, and obligations that should
be adhered to in carrying out professional role responsibilities.
53. Id. at Preamble [6).
54. Id. at Preamble [9].
55. For an approach to what it means to exercise professional and moral judgment that also
emphasizes contextual reasoning and a lawyer's public obligations but is not so problem specific, see
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACrTIcE OF JusTIcE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998).
56. For a critique of Luban's argument justifying lawyer manipulation of clients to further a
cause, see Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 16,
176-89 (990).
57. LUBAN, supra note 21, at 340.
April 20131
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
receive is not constrained to only them and that the , are joined with
others in seeking certain changes in policy or practice.' In other words, a
bargain of sorts has been struck between the lawyer and the client that
the lawyer will act in the interest of the cause over the individual
preferences of the client when there is a conflict. As to the second
condition, the purpose of the action taken has to reflect some kind of
group-based consensus. It cannot be the personal or idiosyncratic
concern of the lawyer alone. Regarding the last condition, not all means
are permissible. There has to be some common understanding that what
the lawyer proposes to do tactically is acceptable to the members of the
group being represented.
As a double agent acting in joint cause with a client group, the
lawyer in essence has permission to make discretionary decisions on
behalf of the group, so long as the group members realize that the
lawyer's overriding commitment is achieving the group's goals, the
intended result of the action is not objectionable to the group, and the
means used are acceptable to the group. These conditions function as
constraints on an attorney's discretion. When satisfied, they free lawyers
to exercise their independent judgment to determine what courses of
action to take to advance the causes and protect the interests of the
group represented. In sum, for Luban, to the extent legal services lawyers
with dual commitments to clients and causes abide by certain role
conditions, they have role-justifiable grounds for acting with a high
degree of independence relatively free of direct client control.
In his discussion of class conflicts, Luban begins by emphasizing
what he calls the own-mistake principle-that is, in a democracy groups
are permitted to make their own mistakes provided that those decisions
do not violate the rights of others or sound morals.59 In an idealized
representative democracy, representatives adhere to the views of their
constituents. In practice, however, a constituency may be insufficiently
mobilized, its members may be inadequately informed, there may be
considerable uncertainty regarding the consequences of different actions,
and there may be conflicting views among existing members and conflicts
of interest between present and future generations.
Given that in practice representative relationships fall short of a
single idealized version, Luban presents four different conceptions of
58. In discussing social cause lawyering, Luban points in the direction of the importance of
informed consent from clients but without using such terminology and without elaboration.
Comparing social cause litigation to medical research where patients must give their informed consent
before allowing their individual case to be used in a research project, Kevin McMunigal criticizes
Luban for not addressing sufficiently the need for informed consent in policy litigation and how
obtaining such consent might occur in practice. Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Cases: Two Tales
of Roe v. Wade, 47 HASTINS L.J. 779,817-18 (1996).
59. LUBAN, supra note 21, at 344.
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representation applicable to lawyering.6° Each in turn embraces a
successively less direct structure of accountability. The first is direct
delegation, where the lawyer acts on the actual wishes of class members.
In the context of group representation, the group needs to be small
enough to consult regularly, which is a rare case in social cause
lawyering. The second conception is indirect delegation, where the lawyer
acts on the preferences of individuals who have been selected by the
group as a whole. For this to occur, the group needs to be sufficiently
mobilized to choose its own representatives, and there have to be
minimal conflicts among those representatives. The third is interest
representation, where the lawyer consults with class members, for
example, named plaintiffs in a consumer class action, whom the lawyer
may well have recruited because they seem adequately representative of
class interests. A main presumption here is that the interests of present and
future generations are not in conflict. The last conception, which Luban
terms best-world representation, involves lawyers making unilateral
decisions and value choices in the best interest of present and future
members of a client class in court proceedings or other decisionmaking
arenas, where other participants have sufficient institutional reasons for
viewing the lawyers as appropriate representatives.i
Luban considers best-world representation a form of representation
because it is part of a process of responsible representation, where
lawyers exercise self-restraint to bind themselves to the choices of their
clients to the greatest extent possible. 6 In his theoretical framing, one
defaults to best-world representation as a last resort when conditions are
not present to support the other conceptions of representation.
Reflective of his approach to role morality generally and the double
agent dilemma specifically, Luban regards the deficiencies in client
control over attorney actions as minimal and tolerable only when lawyers
are highly self-conscious and systematic in how they deliberate about
their role commitments. The decisions to be made require attorneys to
exercise considerable judgment.
Although not emphasized by Luban, it is implicit in his sense of
responsible representation that when lawyers do act on their own, they
strive to be empathetic and to account for the views of those represented
from their perspectives. Following client wishes consistent with the own-
mistake principle is always a reference point. But unlike in a typical case
with one person as a client, it is challenging, even practically
unrealizable, to obtain consensus directions from client groups, as
individual members often have divergent interests and concerns. In most
6o. Id. at 351.
6i. Id. at 352.
62. Id. at 353.
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group representation situations, lawyers need to utilize a good deal of
their own critical thinking to determine what needs to take priority. In
doing so, however, they still have an ongoing obligation to consider
actual group preferences beforehand, whether directly, indirectly, or
through surrogates.
In confronting the client control objection to social cause lawyering,
Luban concedes that external mechanisms holding attorneys accountable
to client groups are weak. Instead, he builds an argument regarding the
legitimacy of attorney independence on the need for lawyers to have
heightened self-awareness and self-discipline in their interactions with
and on behalf of client groups. In my view, Luban overdevelops his ideas
regarding role morality to justify actions contrary to the wishes of clients.
Actual incidents of betraying members of client groups and acting
contrary to their stated preferences are not the norm." Far more
common is the erratic mobilization of client groups and the passivity of
individual group members. Conversely, he leaves underdeveloped his
concept of representation. Drawing on ideas from contemporary
normative political theory, I next present some modifications and
refinements to Luban's approach to group legal representation as a
collective form of political action.
D. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT GROUP LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AS DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ACTION
. Pitkin on Democratic Representation
In a seminal book published forty-five years ago, Hanna Fenichel
Pitkin comprehensively examines the meaning of representation in a
modern democratic state.64 The book is neither an historical study nor an
empirical examination of the behavior of contemporary political
representatives or voter expectations about them. Instead, she draws on
ideas from traditional normative political theory, most notably from the
works of Thomas Hobbes, Edmund Burke, and John Stuart Mills, and
utilizes techniques from ordinary language philosophy, to present a
63. Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An
Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIics IioI (1996). Southworth interviewed
sixty-nine Chicago lawyers in 1993 and 1994. Regarding lawyer dominance of clients in group
representation, she wrote, "While it is possible that these lawyers withheld information suggesting that
they had manipulated clients in order to avoid implicating themselves in violations of the ethics codes,
a plausible alternative explanation is that these lawyers sought to avoid stark conflicts, as they
reported, by reaching front-end compromises between their commitments to clients and to causes-by
recruiting clients whose interests coincided with the lawyers' plans and by deferring to clients when
their interests diverged." Id. at 1144-45.
64. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCErT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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conceptual analysis. For Pitkin, "[l]earning what 'representation' means
and learning how to represent are intimately connected." 6'
In developing her concept of representation, she directs attention
not to "what causes people to have a psychological feeling of being
represented, but [to] what reasons can be given for supposing someone
or something is being represented." 66 Her approach is not to focus on
issues of agency but to look expansively at what supports or legitimates
why someone should be viewed as a representative of another. Though
not aimed at lawyering, Pitkin's concept of representation provides,
analogously, a suggestive framework for examining those features of
group legal representation for the poor that appear to be at odds with
conventional suppositions about lawyer-client relationships, particularly
those emphasizing client control and accountability.
Toward the end of the book, Pitkin summarizes her understanding
of the key elements involved in providing representation to a political
constituency as follows:
The formulation of the view we have arrived at runs roughly like this:
representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a
manner responsive to them. The representative must act
independently; his actions must involve discretion and judgment; he
must be the one who acts. The represented must also be (conceived as)
capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being taken
care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between
representative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict
must not normally take place.67
Her conceptualization highlights five characteristics of democratic
representation. First, the representative acts in the interest of a constituency.
Second, the representative acts in ways that are responsive to the wishes
and concerns of a constituency, which involves understanding and
accounting for the perceptions of its members. Third, the representative
has the autonomy to use discretion and judgment. Fourth, members of the
constituency have the capacity and competence to act independently and
to exercise judgment. And fifth, notwithstanding the ever-present
prospect of conflict between a representative and the represented, actual
occurrences of conflict over what to do are unusual.
Pitkin's methodology in developing her concept of representation is
to analyze themes. She avoids formalistic definitions. She also de-
emphasizes the importance of conceptual problems regarding
representational authentication and ratification. Specifically, she
downplays the centrality of such issues as how a representative obtains
authorization to act, what causes a person to feel represented, and how a
65. Id. at i.
66. Id. at io.
67. Id. at 209 .
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person represented holds a representative accountable. The notion of
responsiveness is pivotal but not easily determinable because so much
depends on how representatives interact with their constituencies and
how they understand and react to conflicting pressures. Representation
for Pitkin is neither a simple delegation nor a paternalistic guardianship.
It involves real not sham relationships that are not without tensions.
68
Put succinctly, Pitkin's theoretical approach to representation
revolves around the institutional role performed by the representative.
Like Burke, she stresses the wisdom of the representative, not the will of
the represented.(" Practical judgment is critical. As with Burke, the
preferred reasoning intertwines intellectuality and morality. In real-
world application of her thought, both the mind and character of a
representative matter a great deal in determining whether there is truly a
representative relationship.
Pitkin's conceptual choices have to be understood in light of her
main project, which is to develop a concept of representation that
distinguishes representative democracies from other forms or claims of
representative government, particularly those associated with totalitarian
or authoritarian regimes. Her focus is on identifying what reasons can be
given for supporting a conclusion that a group of individuals is actually
being represented in public matters. "'
Such a focus shifts attention to how a representative functions within
a system of representation. In particular, it opens up discussion for
considering factors other than method of selection as a source of
democratic legitimation. With respect to interest group representation, a
serious additional or even alternative factor is a political body's
institutional commitment to having a broad range of representational
participation in policy deliberations. If the opportunity for representation
is largely symbolic, its worth has very limited practical value for a
particular constituency.
From my standpoint, the distinctions Pitkin draws between what lies
at the core and what is peripheral in democratic representation provides
a roadmap for examining parallel concerns regarding the legitimacy of
policy actions undertaken by antipoverty lawyers. While not intended as
such, her ideas about representation capture much that is distinctive
about policy-impact legal advocacy for the poor.
In looking at policy advocacy lawyering, Pitkin's five basic
characteristics of democratic representation can be grouped into three
68. For an insightful discussion of inherent tensions and potential conflicts in the lawyer and
client relationship, see GARY BEi .ow & BF.A MOULTON, TimI LAWYERING PROCESS: MAIFRIAI.S FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCIJON IN ADVOCACY 153-156 (1978); see also Gary Blasi, Lawyers, Clients, and the
Third Person in the Room, 56 UCLA L. Rrv. Disc. I (2oo8).
69. PrrKIN, supra note 64, at 169.
70. Id. at io.
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thematic considerations of defining significance. The first goes to an
understanding of group legal representation directed at protecting and
advancing the interests of a class or constituency, where the role of a
representative is to prioritize and act on the concerns of the group as a
whole, not the specific preferences of its individual members. The second
has to do with the character and quality of legal representation when
lawyers have considerable independence and discretion, where what
happens largely depends on their responsiveness and judgment.
Responsiveness involves how representatives listen to others, how they
additionally learn about the needs and desires of a group, and, most
importantly, how they internalize and use what they have learned on
behalf of the group. Judgment requires practical, critical, morally sound,
and non-formulaic thinking and decisionmaking. Pivotal to both
responsiveness and judgment is the development of empathy and the
ability to garner and maintain trust. The third theme jointly addresses the
autonomy of those represented and the avoidance of representational
conflict. It involves always keeping in mind that group legal advocacy is
not only about achieving substantive objectives, but that the ultimate
goal is increasing the legal and political competence while furthering the
empowerment of those represented. Accordingly, in responsible group
legal practice as in democratic political representation, attorneys need
both to respect and account for the capabilities of group members and to
act in ways that minimize the occurrence of actual conflicts with them.
Interestingly, much of what Pitkin de-emphasizes corresponds to
what is central ethically in the representation of individual clients but what
is likely attenuated in the representation of group clients. In individual
practice, the extent of representational authorization, the focus on client
consultation and control, the need for formal accountability, and the
avoidance of internal conflicts of interest among represented clients all are
central concerns.7' Whether they are also similarly central as ethical
imperatives for group policy representation is far from clear. Yet, formal
rules of professional conduct make little to no distinction between the
ethical responsibilities applicable to conventional one-on-one lawyer-client
relationships and those applicable to policy impact practice on behalf of
groups.
71. E.g., MODIL RULFS O PROF'L CONoUCr R. 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of
Authority between Client and Lawyer), 1.7 (Conflict of Intercst: Current Clients) (2002). For a discussion
of ethical parameters as traditionally conceived in representing individual clients, see BI LlOW &
MoUuroN, supra note 68, at 52-69.
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2. Applying Pitkin's Thought to Luban's Ideas About Group
Representation
To an important extent, Luban's professional role arguments in
Lawyers and Justice are directed at compensating for the differences
between individual and group representation. One of his key premises is
that lawyers, as group representatives, typically have to exercise greater
independence of judgment than when they represent individuals. Though
his style of moral reasoning is similar in both instances, he frames the
justifications and constraints regarding specific role acts differently to
reflect the circumstances and the purposes of the representation
undertaken. His classification of different types of group representation
also presumes that such representation is a distinctive lawyering
phenomenon with its own role requirements and ethical boundaries.
The part of Luban's approach that is least developed conceptually is
his default claim that best-world representation is a legitimate form of
group representation. What is most striking initially is that his description
of best-world representation lacks any theory of accountability. Further, he
fails to spell out what considerations might serve as substitute constraints
on attorney behavior. His main proposed check on attorney discretion in
such circumstances is a commitment to a method of reasoning as a way to
encourage self-discipline and self-restraint. But his method of reasoning
is incomplete. There need to be additional guideposts.
Pitkin's multitextured, thematic analysis helps to fill the void in
Luban's inquiry. She explicitly emphasizes that in representing the
interests of others the important touch points are a representative's
responsiveness and judgment, a constituency's autonomy and competency,
and conflict avoidance between representatives and represented. These
factors or conditions are the ones that need to be examined most closely.
Pitkin downplays the conceptual relevance of empirical deficiencies
regarding representational authorization, direct client participation, and
formal accountability, which are integral to agency conceptions of
representation but are attenuated in social cause lawyering.
Where Luban and Pitkin merge is in their shared sense that whether
actions of a representative are considered justifiable and legitimate has
more to do with the societal importance of the role performed by the
representative, and the actual performance of the role, than the extent of
delegation and control initiated by the represented. For Luban, this
conclusion derives primarily from his ideas about lawyer role morality,
while for Pitkin, the conclusion rests on her delineation of what it means
to be a democratic political representative.
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3. Four Types of Representation as Derived from Empirical
Findings
Both Luban and Pitkin support their theoretical arguments with
examples, but they do not ground their ideas in broad empirical analyses
of representation. Jane Mansbridge, a Harvard political scientist, takes a
different tack. Though similarly theoretical, she draws on increasingly
sophisticated descriptions of how American legislators relate to their
constituents to support her own conceptual rethinking of representation. 2
Her conclusions mainly derive from empirical studies that collectively
examine both voter expectations about their representatives and the
perceptions of representatives about what they need to do to please their
constituents. She also references theoretical works on representation.73
A major premise of Mansbridge's thought, which she attributes to
Pitkin among others, is that "representation is, and is normatively
intended to be, something more than a defective substitute for direct
democracy."74 She further explains: "Constituents choose representatives
not only to think more carefully than they about ends and means but also
to negotiate more perceptively and fight more skillfully than constituents
have either the time or the inclination to do. ' 75 As do Luban and Pitkin,
Mansbridge stresses the importance of expectations about the
institutional role performed by a representative.
Mansbridge uses findings from various empirical studies to revamp
contemporary normative understandings of what constitutes "good"
political representation. 6 In developing her ideas, she distinguishes four
different types of representation. The first type describes a traditional
model of representation, one which has much in common with what
Luban, in his fourfold categorization, termed "direct delegation." As
applied to electoral politics, this traditional model focuses on the idea
that during campaigns representatives make promises to constituents,
which they either keep or fail to keep. Mansbridge calls this promissory
72. Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 515 (2003) [hereinafter
Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation]. For other works by Mansbridge on political representation,
see Jane J. Mansbridge, Living with Conflict: Representation in the Theory of Adversary Democracy, 91
ETsICS 466 (i98i) (examining two archetypal forms of representation-a unitary statesman model that
focuses on common interests and an adversary model that seeks acceptable outcomes to particular
interest group conflicts); Jane Mansbridge, A "Selection Model" of Political Representation, 17 J. POL.
PHIL. 369 (2o09) (positing a "selection model" rather than a "sanctions model" of representation when
a representative as an "agent already has self-motivated reasons for doing what the principal wants");
Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent
"Yes", 61 J. POL. 628 (I999) (viewing "descriptive representation" as part of a deliberative process and
as requiring a contextual weighing of benefits and costs).
73. For a comprehensive list of Mansbridge's empirical and theoretical references, see
Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, supra note 72, at 526-28.
74. Id. at515.
75- Id.
76. Id.
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representation. She then integrates several decades of empirical work
about variations in the actual relationships between elected
representatives and constituents to identify three additional types, which
she calls "anticipatory," "gyroscopic," and "surrogate" representation.
Though the analytical purposes and consequent framing are different,
these three types of representation, when viewed in relationship to one
another, parallel Luban's three other conceptions of group legal
representation, which he distinguishes by a progressive lessening in direct
client control and engagement. For Mansbridge, however, the relationship
between representatives and constituents is not so dependent on a single
feature. Her emphasis is on the variable and multidimensional nature of
the representational relationship.
Mansbridge's capsule descriptions of the three less theoretically
acknowledged forms of representation are as follows:
Anticipatory representation flows directly from the idea of retrospective
voting: Representatives focus on what they think their constituents
[based on their legislative record] will approve in the next election, not
on what they promised to do at the last election. In gyroscopic
representation, the representative looks within, as a basis for action, to
conceptions of interest, "common sense," and principles derived in part
from the representative's own background. Surrogate representation
occurs when legislators represent constituents outside their own
districts.'
Mansbridge regards these four types of representation each as a
legitimate form of democratic representation, although only promissory
representation follows a classic principal-agent format and meets a
conventional notion of democratic accountability. In assessing the
legitimacy of representative behavior, she looks to systemic criteria
appropriate to the circumstances, not just dyadic accountability criteria
that emphasize direct constituent delegation and control. Among the
different types, there are important distinctions in the underlying power
relation, the role of deliberation, and the applicability of appropriate
normative criteria. She readily acknowledges that while highlighting the
differences is useful analytically1, representative behavior in practice
often mixes several of the forms.7
In actual situations, different voters may have different expectations
about their relationship with their representative, and representatives
may view their relationship to constituents in multiple ways.
Furthermore, these expectations and perceptions may change over time
depending upon the policy at issue, changes in the political landscape,
and what is at stake. Representational relationships are variable and
fluid.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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In promissory representation, the normative criteria track
traditional agency norms. The focus is on the will of the represented and
a representative's duty to keep promises made in an authorizing election.
The underlying conception of power is linear and emphasizes a
constituency's ability to get representatives to do something they might
not otherwise do and to sanction them if they do not.79 Promissory
representation is consistent with the notion of aggregative democracy,
where majority citizen preferences in their aggregate determine what
social policies to adopt. The criteria for assessing the other three forms of
representation are more complicated and expansive.
In anticipatory representation, there is a temporal reorientation
from promises made in a past election to a representative's beliefs about
voter preferences in a future election. In Mansbridge's view, this shift in
orientation opens up space for increased deliberation and communication,
much of it instigated by the representative.8' Furthermore, it prompts
attention to underlying interests, not just preferences, and encourages
viewing voters on the upside as educable but on the downside as
manipulable. The implicit notion of power is reciprocal and dynamic
since it mainly involves mutually influencing future beliefs and predicting
anticipated reactions. As characterized by Mansbridge, the incentive
structure of anticipatory representation redirects normative focus from
the morality of individual promise keeping to an assessment of
prudential considerations regarding the quality of deliberation within a
representational system. These considerations include minimizing
coercive power, equalizing opportunities for access to political influence,
addressing interests rather than preferences, discouraging manipulative
communication from a legislator, and facilitating quality mutual
education between a legislator and constituents.8 ' In short, anticipatory
representation promotes a more deliberative and less aggregative form
of representational democracy.
Gyroscopic representation applies to electoral situations where
traditional external mechanisms of accountability are much less relevant.
Mansbridge writes,
In this model of representation, voters select representatives who can
be expected to act in ways the voter approves without external
incentives. The representatives act like gyroscopes, rotating on their
own axes, maintaining a certain direction, pursuing certain built-in
(although not fully immutable) goals.... [They] act only for "internal"
reasons. Their accountability is only to their own beliefs and
principles."'
79. Id. at 516.
8o. Id. at 517.
8i. Id. at518.
82. Id. at 520.
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The democratic legitimacy of this type of representation derives from
voter confidence in the commitments and judgment of the
representative.
While Mansbridge's choice of metaphor initially sounds odd, the
real-life circumstances this concept covers are not unusual. She notes that
there are several forms of gyroscopic representation. The narrowest
version is the decision of a voter to elect a representative based on a
single issue, such as support for or opposition to the legalization of
abortion. This narrow conception taps into a broader conception, where
the underlying characteristics of the representative that most resonate
with constituents have to do with a perceived sharing of similar policy
and value preferences. The broadest version is voting for "a person of
integrity with a commitment to the public good."8 A close variation is
when voters express nothing more than a preference for a "good type" as
in, "He's a good man," or "She's a good woman. ''84 As several writers
referenced by Mansbridge point out, voters seek representatives they
believe are honest, principled, and sufficiently skilled." In all these
circumstances, those being represented want someone whom they can
trust.
To support her conceptualization of gyroscopic representation as a
political phenomenon, Mansbridge cites empirical findings on the
congruence of voter and elected representative preferences. One study
found that in approximately 75% of congressional districts, no conflict
existed between what a majority of the voters wanted and the personal
attitudes of their member. This congruence probably reflects the large
number of safe Democratic or Republican districts not infrequently due to
gerrymandering. Within truly contestable congressional districts, other
empirical findings reported by Mansbridge indicate that the crucial factors
are perceptions about an incumbent's anticipated future legislative
record. 7 In these districts, it is the external dynamics of anticipatory
representation, not the internal dynamics of gyroscopic representation,
that matter most.
In gyroscopic representation, predictability -not accountability- is
the pivotal concern. Voters seek representatives who share their values
and interests and are trustworthy and reliable. The initial authorizing
election is most important. It is the time when voters and representatives
establish their relationship. For the relationship to work, representatives
need to be truthful about their commitments. Direct communication and
joint deliberation are less important in subsequent elections. The voter's
83. Id. at 521.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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dominant interest is placing someone in the legislature who can be counted
on to be an effective advocate for those matters about which the voter
cares most. As long as actions are not inconsistent with the initial
commitments made, the representative has considerable discretion to act
in self-propelled fashion. The voter's goal is to have power within the
system, not over the representative. The back-up assurance needed is the
ability of voters to reenter the system to replace representatives who fail to
adhere to their professed commitments. In sum, according to Mansbridge,
the main normative criteria for evaluating the legitimacy of gyroscopic
representation are good systemwide deliberation at the time of first
selection and relative ease in maintaining or removing representatives
subsequently. 88
Surrogate representation, Mansbridge's fourth type, applies to
situations where there is no direct voting relationship with the
representative."' The representative comes to be identified with interests
or causes mainly defined and promoted by nonconstituents. Surrogate
representation can be a source of political inequality, or it can be a check
on inequity within the political system. The former occurs when the
representative is overly responsive to large financial contributors or well-
organized, already powerful interest groups. The latter occurs when a
representative reaches out to a relatively weak political constituency or
takes a stand in support of an unpopular cause. A concern about power
within the relationship is an issue with respect to the influence exercised
by financial and other contributors, for example, the impact of large
monetary or in-kind campaign contributions from a particular industry or
labor union on policy positions advocated by a representative. The power
dynamic is not so relevant when, as with gyroscopic representation,
legislators act on surrogate constituency perspectives and interests
consistent with their own convictions, consciences, and identities.' An
example would be a congressional representative who took a strong early
position against the Vietnam or Iraq wars, when it was unpopular to do so.
In assessing the democratic worth of surrogate representation, the key
criteria focus on the degree to which such representation facilitates the
influence of otherwise unrepresented or underrepresented interests,
whether in the aggregate by affecting votes cast or deliberatively by
introducing fresh or unconventional insights and perspectives. As
summarized by Mansbridge, normative scrutiny regarding the legitimacy
of surrogate representation shifts from determining constituent-oriented
accountability to a concern for redressing systemic inequities in
representation. 9'
88. Id. at 522.
89. Id.
9o . Id. at 524.
91. Id. at 525.
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Based on empirical findings about how constituents and legislators
relate to each other, Mansbridge rejects using a single normative
criterion for assessing democratic legitimacy. Representative democracy
is not just about legislators conforming to the preferences of voters in
their districts. Instead, she articulates plural and variable criteria for
determining when real-world political relationships conform to
democratic norms. Getting a full picture of the relationship involves
accounting for variations in orientations and expectations of voters and
legislators and acknowledging different ways in which systemic
commitments to equitable participation and quality deliberation actually
might be met.
Analyzing group legal advocacy when attorneys have considerable
discretion about what to do invites a similar shift in normative focus. The
client control objection assumes a single criterion-an agency model of
accountability -for determining the legitimacy of legal representation.
While this model fits well standard situations involving individual dispute
resolution or transactional planning, it does not capture the circumstances
and relationships that typically characterize policy impact advocacy,
especially on behalf of relatively weak groups or constituencies.
4. Drawing Parallels and Amalgamating Ideas
Traditional ethical concerns about client control and accountability
are too narrow a framework for judging the performance of legal services
lawyers as policy advocates. One also needs to grapple with developing
an appropriately sophisticated conception of group legal representation
as a form of political action, both as a component of the professional role
discipline expected of attorneys and as a lens through which to assess the
democratic legitimacy of such representation from a systemic perspective.
Luban broaches this matter; the writings of Pitkin and Mansbridge help to
take his analysis further.
Luban's elucidation of group legal representation builds on his ideas
about the special role morality of lawyers. He views mission-driven legal
services as systemically justifiable and as requiring considerable attorney
self-control. Role morality as a conceptual perspective for guiding and
evaluating attorney performance looks both outward to social and
cultural context and inward to an individual's capacity for intellectual
and moral growth.
Contextually, expectations about attorney behavior reflect the
specifics of particular problem or issue settings. They also reflect the
interplay of various structural factors, such as the relevance of deeply
and broadly held ideological beliefs, the distribution of economic and
social resources, and the openness and responsiveness of governing
institutional arrangements.
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Attorney competence in responding effectively to role expectations,
in turn, hinges not only on appropriate knowledge and skill acquisition
and an ability to think critically but also on character development. In
confronting dilemmas in legal practice, Luban argues for a heightened
level of attorney self-awareness and self-discipline that for him involves
adopting a particular approach to reasoning morally and institutionally
about one's responsibilities as a lawyer. His primary objective is to
facilitate the kind of lawyering judgment needed to exercise discretion
responsibly. His secondary objective is to provide reasoned justifications
for why and under what circumstances actions initiated by lawyers on
behalf of client constituencies are a legitimate and necessary aspect of a
constitutional democracy.
Luban provides a logical prescription for how to think through role
responsibilities, but his analysis lacks a sufficiently strong conceptual
middle. His defense of attorney independence falls analytically short in
large part because he has trouble breaking away from a fairly
conventional notion of representation. He is too wedded to an agency
formulation of accountability that classifies types of representation along
a continuum marked by stronger to weaker versions of client control. His
concept of best-world representation, the weakest, leaves lawyers with
virtually unencumbered discretion. The main justification articulated is
that such representation is a last resort. Ironically, best-world
representation is a worst-case scenario. A lawyer defaults to such a
position when accountability to clients, whether direct, indirect, or
through surrogates, is not feasible. In policy advocacy circumstances, the
absence of client control is for Luban a necessary exception to be
forgiven. The legitimacy of legal representation, in principle, still
depends on the primacy of client control.
The respective views of Pitkin and Mansbridge offer a different
perspective. Their conceptual and normative insights mainly derive from
their focus on popular legislative representation, but their specific ideas
need not be confined solely to electoral relationships. Their conclusions
have general relevance for understanding the routine operations and
underlying institutional structure of American political pluralism-that is,
who gets represented by whom in what ways and to what extent in
legislative and administrative lobbying and in judicial advocacy.
A constitutional democracy is not just about cyclical elections. It
requires having effective representation in the everyday deliberations of
governing institutions, whether they be legislative bodies, executive
agencies, or courts. Voting is but one avenue for exercising influence. To
further meaningful political participation on a broad and continuing basis,
a constituency definable by similar interests also needs its own lobbyists
and lawyers. In American politics, interest group pluralism and the
independent role of courts in constitutional governance set the backdrop
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for social cause lawyering, just as such structural conditions have long been
utilized by resource-rich special interests to affect public policy outcomes.92
Pitkin's and Mansbridge's respective rethinking of political
representation opens up new ways of understanding the dynamics of
primarily lawyer-executed strategies for social change. Like Luban's
discussion of attorney role dilemmas, they describe and evaluate the
performance of representatives with one eye on context, in particular
systemic characteristics and constituent long-term interests, and the other
on personal attributes, such as character, skill, judgment and self-
discipline. Each of their approaches to the situational nature of
representative relationships in a pluralistic society involves a mix of
conceptual themes for determining what constitutes responsible
democratic representation. Because neither Pitkin nor Mansbridge relies
on a single measure for assessing democratic legitimacy, the lack of
ongoing client accountability is much less of a problem for them than for
Luban. Together they provide an expanded vocabulary and conceptual
framework for apprizing the different roles and relationships of legal
services lawyers in social policy advocacy.
Pitkin supplies the broad contours of a democratic representative's
role. She directs attention to a representative's commitment to advancing
a group's interests, not individual preferences of its members, and the
importance of having those interests represented in public deliberations.
She assesses the quality of representation in terms of a representative's
responsiveness and judgment. Responsiveness involves respecting and
accounting for the autonomy and competence of those represented and
requires genuinely understanding the concerns of others from their
points of view. But acting on those concerns is not a straightforward
proposition. It calls for judgment, since important policy impact decisions
depend on having relevant expertise and contextual experience and
repeatedly raise competing considerations that are difficult to reconcile.
To make decisions effectively and responsibly, one needs appropriate
knowledge, skill, empathy, and wisdom. One also needs sound character.
Moral virtues such as integrity, courage, moderation, and fairness are
components integral to the development and exercise of good judgment.
Pitkin's last general theme is to focus on actual conflicts between a
representative and the represented and their relatively infrequent
occurrence, unlike the potentiality of conflict, which is ever present.
Assessing the democratic legitimacy of representation does not turn on
whether a representative acts on his or her own agenda but how well that
agenda corresponds with the substantive and strategic interests of those
represented.
92. See supra note 30.
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Mansbridge's explication of four sometimes overlapping models of
democratic representation builds on Pitkin's core themes. In setting forth
various telling conceptual details, Mansbridge rejects a traditional agency
model of representation as the exclusive normative standard for
determining the legitimacy of the positions and actions taken by a
representative in public policy arenas. Promissory representation captures
but one form of the relationship between representatives and their
constituencies and in electoral politics is frequently the least characteristic.
The same discordance is true with respect to policy impact legal advocacy
on behalf of the poor, despite dominant across-the-board presumptions
about clients acting as principles and lawyers as agents.
In the legal representation of individual clients, promissory
representation is the standard ethical model. Encouraging and enforcing
client control and accountability and avoiding conflicts with others lie at
the heart of professional rules of conduct. The problem has been that the
usual rules often do not fit the realities-the dilemmas and the
purposes-of group legal representation.
Luban succinctly makes this point when he discusses the Supreme
Court's Primus decision.93 The case involved a volunteer lawyer for the
ACLU, who received a public reprimand from the South Carolina state
bar for soliciting as a plaintiff a mother who had been sterilized by a
doctor against whom the ACLU wanted to file suit. The Court
recognized "litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and
association" and that "the efficacy of litigation ... often depends on the
ability to make legal assistance available to suitable litigants."94 Viewing
Primus's letter of solicitation as "within the generous zone of First
Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms,"'95 the Court
found the state bar's antisolicitation regulations, which were intended to
prevent "ambulance chasing," were applied too broadly without
sufficient precision. 6 The Primus decision extended to the lawyer-client
relationship the Court's analysis developed in previous cases regarding
the First Amendment protection afforded legal strategies undertaken by
labor unions and civil rights organizations.' As Luban comments, all
these cases, including Primus, "mark a dissonance between the agency-
centered ethic of individualized service on which bar codes are
predicated and law practice as political action for collective ends."
98
93. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (977); LUBAN, supra note 21, at 326-28.
94. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 431.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 437-38.
97. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (i97i); United Mine Workers v. Ill.
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of Railway Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (t964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
98. LuBAN, supra note 21, at 328.
April 2013]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Such dissonance does not occur only in social cause lawyering or
antipoverty law practice. Issues of who is the client and what are the
respective role boundaries of attorney and client arise in legally recognized
processes and settings ranging from various forms of aggregate litigation to
corporate law. California law, for example, provides a number of
relatively malleable procedural options for filing civil causes of action
aimed at remedying collective or public wrongs that otherwise might go
unaddressed legally.' The availability of such legal remedies challenges
conventional notions about lawyer and client role relationships and
responsibilities.'" In corporate law, American jurisprudence employs a
fiction that a corporation is a person both for litigation purposes and in
defining to whom a lawyer is ultimately responsible in transactional
counseling.'"' Nonetheless, the reality is that a corporation is a collection
of individuals, who may disagree with one another and may have
conflicting interests. Even with a defined hierarchy for making corporate
decisions, a lawyer's deference to any single individual or a board of
directors as the voice of the client may not be warranted.0 2 What is
needed is a more expansive and flexible conception of what it means to
provide responsible legal representation to a collective client, whether it
be in a formal class action, when advising and bargaining for a corporate
entity or, as is my focus here, in advocating comprehensively for a
specific constituency.
In theorizing about electoral politics, Mansbridge extracts from
various empirical studies normative differences in mutual expectations
about the relationship of voters and elected representatives. The least of
her interests is in promissory representation -the keeping of promises
made in the last election. The most suggestive features of her rethinking of
representation are her descriptions of anticipatory, gyroscopic, and
99. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 382 (class action), 526a (taxpayer injunction), io85 (writ of mandate)
(Deering 2013). California also has a private attorney general provision for awarding attorney's fees to any
successful plaintiff bringing a civil suit resulting in enforcement of a right affecting the public interest. See id.
§ 1021.5.
oo. For a comprehensive reform proposal regarding various forms of aggregate litigation, see Am.
Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation: Proposed Final Draft (Apr. 1, 2009).
i01. Reflective of the legal recognition accorded corporations and the corresponding notion of
corporate entity representation, professional responsibility doctrine tends to presume common interests
for investors and managers organized as a corporation and conflicting interests requiring separate
representation for individuals not as formally affiliated. William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 469,477 (984). The effect is to establish a double standard that works against
the collective representation of the poor.
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13 (Organization as Client) (2002). For an
interesting rethinking of how to reconcile competing allegiances when representing a formal
organizational client, see William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. RaV. 57 (2003). Simon urges lawyers to
take into account substantive norms as well as authority norms when determining the merits of an
intra-corporate dispute. He terms his approach for resolving internal entity conflicts the Framework of
Dealing and likens it to Louis Brandeis's notion of "counsel for the situation." Id. at 86-89.
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surrogate representation. Her delineation of four models of representation
emphasizing their contextual circumstances brings a fresh, multitextured
perspective on the conditions and elements relevant for assessing the
democratic legitimacy of representation, not only with respect to electoral
politics but also, as I see it, when examining policy impact legal advocacy.
As an across-the-board matter, Mansbridge highlights the importance
of professional knowledge and experience. She addresses the need for
expertise, substantively and in what she terms "ends-means thinking." By
the latter, she means how to plan and solve problems strategically to
achieve one's objectives. There is also an expectation of expertise. Those
represented look to their representatives to negotiate and advocate more
skillfully than they might otherwise on their own. Furthermore, they count
on representatives putting in the time and staying motivated in ways and to
an extent often not practically feasible for them personally. Even when
activist groups emphasize the value of direct participation in public affairs,
almost any strategy for reform has need for responsible representatives as
part of an ongoing process to influence the setting of policy agendas and to
achieve favorable outcomes. In a democratic and constitutional republic,
having reliable, effective representation is an important indicator of
individual and group empowerment and a recurring measure of political
and legal competence.
Mansbridge's concept of anticipatory representation covers the
prospective orientation of elected officials when their concerns are
primarily about getting reelected. Compared to the traditional agency
relationship underlying promissory representation, the representative's
incentives in relating to constituents focus not on accountability for
promises made and the power and will of voters as expressed in the last
election but on prudential considerations regarding the education of
voters, especially the quality of deliberation, in clarifying interests and
justifying positions taken. 3 The most important retention factor during
reelections is how constituents respond to the representative's record in
office, which is unlikely to be confined to only a determination of
whether promises made were kept.
In examining policy impact legal representation, Mansbridge's
treatment of anticipatory representation does not offer much to borrow
descriptively. The main insight is the importance of one's deeds, not
promises, on whether a particular group is apt to continue to work with
an attorney on an ongoing or new matter. Normatively, however, her
discussion of the dynamics of anticipatory representation puts at issue
standard agency conceptions of control and accountability as universally
necessary for good representation. As applied to group lawyering, the
importance conceptually is a shift of attention from the centrality of
103. Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, supra note 72, at 520.
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clients formally directing their attorneys to a heightened emphasis on
evaluating the quality of attorney-client deliberation and attorney
responsiveness to client interests.
What is most striking in Mansbridge's thought is her notion of
gyroscopic representation. In comparing it to promissory and anticipatory
representation, she writes,
In all versions of gyroscopic representation, the voters affect political
outcomes not by affecting the behavior of the representative..., but
by selecting and placing in the political system representatives whose
behavior is to some degree predictable in advance based on their
observable characteristics. Whereas in promissory and anticipatory
representation the representative's preferences are induced, in this
model the representative's preferences are internally determined.
Whereas in promissory and anticipatory representation the voters...
cause changes in the representative's behavior, in gyroscopic
representation the voters cause outcome changes first in the legislature
and more distantly in the larger polity not by changing the direction of
the representative's behavior but by placing in the legislature and
larger polity (the "s~stem") the active, powerful element constituted by
this representative.
For the representative to be entrusted with such independence of action
while in office, Mansbridge underscores the normative importance of
good deliberation at the time of an initial authorizing election and
relative ease in maintaining or ending the relationship."5
There are parallel analytic considerations when examining mission-
driven legal advocacy and its purposes. Luban's characterization of the
relationship between antipoverty lawyers and their clients on policy
impact matters as a joint commitment to a cause captures much that is at
the heart of Mansbridge's concept of gyroscopic representation. Under
such circumstances, the model is that attorneys will act in self-propelled
fashion on their own initiative. There are, however, normative criteria to
be met. For Luban, attorneys are free to exercise considerable discretion,
but only insofar as they seek to advance collective client interests on terms
consistent with likely client objectives and concerns. The responsiveness
and judgment needed is not very different from what is anticipated of
elected representatives who are selected based on voter confidence in their
character and talent or their commitment to especially salient issues.
For the analogy to work, however, one has to confront a striking
institutional difference between social cause lawyering and electoral
politics. In group legal representation, there is not the equivalent of
periodic elections, where representatives initially and thereafter present
themselves to those being represented for approval. In fact, in policy
litigation, it is not uncommon for lawyers to recruit clients as plaintiffs. In
104. Id. at 521.
io5. Id. at 522.
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effect, the representatives choose the represented, not the opposite. Such
relationships can be even more attenuated in legislative and administrative
arenas, where there are virtually no formal procedures circumscribing who
appears as a representative, and opportunities always exist for self-
appointed representatives to come forward with little connection to real
constituencies. As a countermeasure, lawyers themselves have to assume
heightened responsibility for reaching out to and encouraging deliberation
with those whose interests are being represented. It may be that the
contacts are with organizers or other intermediaries, not the actual
beneficiaries. The point is that in the absence of externally imposed checks
on attorney behavior, internally generated relational dynamics have to
take hold. How lawyers in such circumstances cultivate and sustain
relations with client groups becomes a crucial factor in appraising
whether they have acted responsively and with good judgment.
The bottom line is that clients in some meaningful way have to be
attuned to the nature of the representation. For both Luban and
Mansbridge, the relative independence of the representative has to
match the expectations of the represented.
With respect to policy impact advocacy, these expectations include
understanding that an overarching purpose of the representation is
structural-that is, to have in place in a targeted legal or political body
knowledgeable advocates who can give expert and special voice to
shared group interests. As an example, when individual public assistance
recipients step forward to be named plaintiffs in a class action challenging
state welfare policy or practice, they need to be informed, if they do not
appreciate already, that their participation is systemically necessary, quite
apart from whatever personal stake they have in the outcome.
Accordingly, just as Mansbridge emphasizes the quality of
deliberation in authorizing elections, there have to be honest discussions
beforehand about the character and circumstances of the legal
representation to be undertaken. Thinking ahead, those discussions need
to address not only the nature of the representation but also the
opportunities for affirming or ending it. A major aim of such initial
interviewing and counseling sessions is reasonable client awareness about
the purposes, tactics, and terms of representation, with the expectation
that the occurrence of actual conflicts warranting termination of the
representation are to be avoided and would be unusual.
The troublesome prospect is that the attorney-client relationship is
not and never becomes sufficiently genuine. The risk is that the lawyer
views the client group as little more than a pretext, where there is no
interest in meaningful consultation nor in interacting with a group that
has the capacity to exercise independent judgment. The seriousness of
this risk depends upon the character of the lawyer. The very purpose of
developing a concept of representation reflective of the realities of policy
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impact advocacy is to increase attorney self-awareness and ultimately
self-restraint about how to behave in such situations. While there is no
way to eliminate the prospect of a sham representational relationship,
there is also no reason to assume that the vast majority of mission-driven
lawyers intend to act in bad faith and without integrity.'° The need is to
arrive at additional guideposts on what it means to be a responsible and
responsive representative.
In social cause lawyering, a continuous nexus between the attorneys
involved and those represented is necessary to provide ethical and
political credibility, especially when attorneys have recruited the clients
and are acting in significant part on their own agendas. A strong agency
relationship, while the standard lawyering norm, is often not practicable.
But obtaining client assent in some meaningful form while engaging
periodically in genuine client consultation is entirely feasible. These tasks
are especially important when representing groups not themselves able
to pay for legal help. Members of such groups typically lack options
regarding who to retain and have only weak formal ways of holding
lawyers directly accountable to them. They pretty much have to ally
themselves with whoever from the bar steps forward. Their principal
choice usually involves not choosing among lawyers but deciding how
much they care about being legally represented systemically.
In such circumstances, it falls to the attorneys to demonstrate their
own responsiveness, which is likely to be intricately tied to how well they
deliberate with group members. A major concern when determining the
legitimacy of largely lawyer initiated and executed group legal
representation is the quality of deliberation between the representatives
and the represented both at the outset and ongoing. As with gyroscopic
political representation, there are sound conceptual and practical reasons
for applying different or modified normative criteria to mission-driven
group legal advocacy.
Surrogate representation covers circumstances even further removed
from conventional presumptions about democratic representation. In this
model, individuals in public office, without regard to whether they have
formal electoral ties to those most affected or interested, take on causes
that otherwise might not be raised or pushed. The causes themselves often
reflect the associational interests or demographic connections of the
representative. From a democratic normative perspective, surrogate
representation compensates for structural barriers or inequities that
preclude or significantly limit the participation of relatively weak interest
groups in the development and implementation of public policies.
Consistent with egalitarian principles, the main systemic purpose is to
give presence and voice to the interests of all relevant parties.
io6. See Southworth, supra note 63.
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For elected officials who function as surrogate representatives, their
relationships on certain specific issues are primarily with nonconstituents,
but voters who put and keep them in office still exert checks on what they
do. As part of their overall public obligations, such representatives develop
simultaneous representational responsibilities to electoral and surrogate
constituencies.
Applying surrogate representation to social cause lawyering works
differently. While lawyers as members of a public profession have an
obligation to act in the common good, their retention or dismissal is
always client specific. There are not general mechanisms, like elections,
that periodically legitimate how an attorney has performed overall.
Rather than being construed as a full-blown alternative theory of legal
representation, surrogate representation as a lawyering phenomenon
makes most sense conceptually when viewed in time-limited terms, as
one stage in providing group legal assistance.
Surrogate representation for lawyers, in my usage, covers
circumstances when relationships with individuals sharing common
interests or organizational clients have not yet coalesced during a
preliminary period, or have become quiescent at intermittent and follow-
up junctions. The surrogate's function is to fill resource and personnel
gaps as part of interest group efforts to shape policy agendas, influence
decisionmaking, police outcomes, and enforce results. The activities
specifically undertaken need to respond to and reflect the capabilities
and extent of mobilization of the potential or actual client group at a
particular time. For example, lawyers who have expertise or an interest
in a specific policy area are often in the best position to monitor political
and legal developments of likely concern to a particular interest group.
Such work might lead to publicizing an emerging problem generally,
activating the organizing of a community coalition, or recruiting clients
for a class action to be filed in court.
What needs to be done, and when, depends on institutional context.
Policies and practices regarding recognizing someone as representing an
individual or group vary considerably. The rules governing representation
in court are the most restrictive and formalistic. Lawyers need clients with
legal standing and then have to file pleadings and make official
appearances to participate as a representative in litigation. By contrast,
being recognized as a representative in legislative lobbying and in
executive agency policymaking is usually determined by the
decisionmakers. While a lawyer may have to register as a lobbyist, there
are not usually formal tests and conditions that have to be met regarding
who qualifies as a representative. As a consequence, it is not uncommon
for legislators and administrators to identify on their own knowledgeable
individuals whom they consider representative of a particular group or
policy perspective for advice and assistance on matters of concern. This
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practice can be informative and helpful, but it also can be manipulated
and abused by calling on individuals whose main interests are not
meaningfully aligned with those purportedly being represented.
With respect to policy impact legal advocacy, surrogate
representation is best seen as a temporary or transitional phenomenon,
even when it broadens democratic participation. In lawyering, nothing in
the idea of surrogate representation is sufficient to offset a lack of direct
client checks on attorney discretion. Furthermore, from the standpoint of
social change activism, there is a danger that such representation actually
does more to legitimate symbolically the existing system than to advance
meaningfully the interests of directly affected constituencies. The degree
to which someone's participation is both truly representative and
practically influential cannot be fully determined ahead of time, as so
much hinges on what is said, what gets done, how matters unfold, and
what are the consequences.
In rethinking the nature of group legal representation for the poor,
the most intriguing idea is that of gyroscopic representation. There are
also, however, situations and times when there is a systemic need for
surrogate representation to establish and uphold group presence. With
both these conceptualizations especially in mind, I now turn to
examining the efficacy and legitimacy of the multipronged strategy
undertaken by Abascal and his legal services colleagues in response to
Reagan's campaign for welfare reform in the early 197os.
II. LAW AND POLITICS IN WELFARE POLICYMAKING
Law and politics are overlapping public spheres of interactions and
discourse that involve the ordering of social life, the resolution of disputes,
and the setting of aspirations. How much law and politics overlap varies
among cultures and over time. In practice, law and politics start and end
with human agency. In writing about law, the prominent legal realist Karl
Llewellyn famously said, "[W]hat these officials do about disputes is, to
my mind, the law itself.",'
This Part begins with a number of observations about Ronald
Reagan and Ralph Santiago Abascal, the leading actors in this case study
of California state welfare reform in the early 197os. Individuals make a
difference. Yet people do not act on an empty slate or in an institutional
void. They reflect and respond to historical legacies and circumstances
and the play of contemporary social and cultural conditions and forces.
Accordingly, my orienting remarks about Reagan and Abascal highlight
several salient features of their overall approaches to their respective
roles that are reflective of their times.
io7. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 3 (I960).
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To further situate the case study, this Part then addresses the origin,
evolution, and structure of American public relief programs, the first
actions taken by legal services attorneys to further the rights and
interests of welfare recipients, and the striking expansion in welfare rolls
(the number of individuals and families receiving welfare assistance) that
occurred during Reagan's first gubernatorial term. Afterwards, I discuss
in considerable detail the unfolding of events that comprise the case
study's core.
A. THE GREAT COMMUNICATOR AND THE REVITALIZATION OF
19TH CENTURY AMERICAN LIBERALISM
Ronald Reagan's reputation as "the great communicator" and as
someone who knew how to use the bully pulpit of high office to his policy
advantage largely reflected his unquestioning acceptance and adroit
command of deeply felt American beliefs. He was highly competent in
defining issues on his terms and in ways that resonated with a substantial
section of the general public, which made him a formidable leader and a
difficult opponent-especially for those who held progressive views
regarding the nature and purposes of social welfare policies.
A significant aspect of Reagan's effectiveness in the social welfare
field came from how he tapped into the stereotypes and stigmas commonly
attached to welfare recipients. His most frequent invocation was in his
fictionalized retelling of the story of the "Chicago welfare queen."
8
Reagan was a master at marshaling bedrock American ideology using
vivid anecdotes, both mythical and real. The story of the Chicago welfare
io8. Lou Cannon, a long-time reporter for The Washington Post, described the serious and
demagogic sides of Reagan's focus on welfare issues as follows:
Reagan had made welfare fraud a cornerstone of his reelection campaign for governor of
California in 197o and also exploited the issue in his presidential campaigns. He had dealt
constructively with welfare issues in his second term as governor, working with Democratic
leaders of the legislature to produce legislation that tightened welfare eligibility
requirements and increased the grants of the poorest recipients. But he had dealt
demagogically with welfare in his 1976 campaign, when he repeatedly told the story of a
Chicago woman who "has eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards and is
collecting veterans' benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands.... Her tax-free cash
income alone is over $i5o,ooo." The woman was convicted in 1977 of welfare fraud and perjury
for using two aliases to collect twenty-three public aid checks totaling $8,ooo. To Reagan she
was the "Chicago welfare queen," an enduring symbol of welfare fraud. When congressional
leaders called upon the president in early 1981 and asked him how he intended to achieve the
budget savings he had promised, Reagan told them the story of the "welfare queen." He also
repeated the anecdote in meetings with foreign leaders. During his visit to Barbados on April
8, 1982, Reagan met with J.M.G. (Tom) Adams, then prime minister of the Caribbean nation.
When the discussion turned to welfare, [Michael] Deaver [Reagan's deputy chief of staff]
recognized the telltale signs. He nudged James Baker [Reagan's chief of staff] and whispered
to him, "He's going to tell the story of the Chicago welfare queen next." And sure enough,
Reagan did.
CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN, supra note I, at 518-19.
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queen plays to negative feelings about individuals perceived as not
willing to fend for themselves and a government that spends money
wastefully. Beneath these popular beliefs, there are strong ideological
roots. Reagan capitalized on them.
The ideological mainstream of American politics compared to
European nations has been and remains relatively narrow. Our most
profound ideological commitments lie in liberal Enlightenment values that
encourage individual expression and growth."° American conservatives
and progressives similarly value personal freedom. Both presume the
foundational importance of individual autonomy. They have more in
common than is usually acknowledged. Where they differ is in their
views about the nature of civil society and about the role of the state in
fostering individual opportunity.
From an historical perspective, Reagan's conservative ideas, which
still resound mightily today, reasserted and reinvigorated 19th century
conceptions of American liberalism. One important core element of I9th
century liberalism is a sense that individuals owe little to nothing to
society for who they are and what they have. Another important core
element is a deep suspicion of state power. Reagan very effectively
utilized both of these elements. Much of what he had to say was
premised on a strong belief in the ability of individuals to pick
themselves up by their own bootstraps relatively unaffected by structural
conditions, such as class differences. To this notion of "rugged
individualism," he added a much-professed aversion to taxation and
"big" government. In large part because of the adept use of political
rhetoric, Reagan became the most effective challenger of his generation
to then dominant New Deal and Progressive Era assumptions about the
need for an expanded role of the state to counter social and economic
inequities as they occur in society at large.
Reagan also came to age politically during a period rife with
domestic cultural and racial upheavals and major divisions, mainly
provoked by the left, over international affairs and the war in Vietnam.
Though it was an unsettling period socially and politically, it still was a
time when there was a spread of views within both major political
parties."' Notwithstanding the historical reputation of the late I96os and
early 197os, the American electoral environment then was not as
to9. See Louis HARTrz, THE LIBERAL TRADImON IN AMERICA (1955); see also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE
PoLncA. THEORY OF POSSESSV E INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
io. When Reagan was elected governor in 1966, Robert Finch, a fellow Republican identified
with the party's liberal wing, was elected Lieutenant Governor by a greater electoral margin. Finch, a
former aide to Richard Nixon as Vice President, was much more moderate on social welfare issues
than either Reagan or Nixon. When Nixon became president, Finch served as his first Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare from January 1969 through June I97o. Robert Finch (American
politician), WxUPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RobertFinch_(American-politician) (last visited
Sept. 16, 2011).
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polarized as it has become in the early 21st century. There was more
room for significant bipartisan compromise.
In seeking welfare reform at the state level, Reagan had to contend
with a progressive legislature controlled by Democrats and limitations
set by overriding federal statutory and constitutional law. In fashioning
their positions, legislative leaders worked closely with legal advocates for
the welfare poor. The result was compromise state legislation."' One
important calculation of the legislators was to draft certain policy
proposals advocated by the Reagan administration so as to be optimally
challengeable in court as not in conformity with federal law."' The
enactment of state welfare reform legislation was only part of the story.
Its aftermath was every bit as important.
The actual effects of the welfare changes instigated by Reagan as
governor, though certainly substantial and popularly supported, were not
all that he advertised. Much of what he claimed as reductions in caseload
and costs was derived from estimated projections based on prior annual
increases in welfare rolls."3 Although not widely acknowledged politically,
an important reason for the substantial growth in welfare family caseloads
and consequent costs during the I96os was a major increase in the
participation rate of eligible households."4 By the early 197os, the
nonparticipation rate of eligible families for welfare benefits had largely
come to an end-that is, most California families entitled to benefits
were applying for and receiving them."5 This had not been the case
previously.
From a policy standpoint, Reagan did eventually achieve much of
what he wanted regarding welfare reform, but not until he became
President of the United States. Once he assumed the nation's highest
office, he moved quickly with the compliance of Congress to change the
III. Welfare Reform Act of 1971, CAL. STAT. 1971, ch. 578. For two very different perspectives
from participants in events leading up to and after the enactment of this legislation, see Anthony
Beilenson & Larry Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 PAC. L.J. 475 (1972), and Ronald A.
Zumbrun et al., Welfare Reform: California Meets the Challenge, 4 PAC. L.J. 739 (1973).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 336-337.
113. For an assessment of the impact of Reagan's state welfare reform changes, see Aaronson,
Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform, supra note 5, App'x; see also David E. Keefe, Governor
Reagan, Welfare Reform, and AFDC Fertility, 57 Soc. SERV. REV. 234 (t983).
114. See Cynthia Rence & Michael Wiseman, The California Welfare Reform Act and Participation
in AFDC, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 37 (1978); see also Barbara Boland, Participation in the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC), in JT. ECON. COMM., SUB-COMM. ON FISCAL
POLICY, STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER No. 12 (PART I), THE FAMILY, POVERTY, AND WELFARE
PROGRAMS: FACTORS INFLUENCING FAMILY INSTABILITY (1973).
115. This development was true elsewhere as well as in California. The expansion in welfare
participation in large part was the result of grassroots organizing and mobilizing of welfare recipients,
using administrative procedures to assert individual claims for assistance, and initial legal challenges to
restrictive policies and practices. For a contemporaneous explication of this strategy for increasing
welfare rolls and a description of related activities, see RICHARD A. CLOWARO & FRANCES Fox PIVEN,
THE POLITICS OF TURMOIL: ESSAYS ON POVERTY, RACE, AND THE URBAN CRISIS 89-150 (1974).
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federal statutory provisions that had frustrated his efforts as Governor of
California to clamp down on public assistance benefits -particularly for
the working poor. ,6 Additionally, he continually attempted throughout
his presidency to end funding and curb the advocacy activities of
federally supported legal services programs." 7 As I describe at length
shortly, Reagan knew firsthand how aggressive legal advocacy on behalf
of the poor in courts and in legislative and administrative arenas had
constrained his gubernatorial efforts to effectuate his welfare agenda.
B. A STAR IN THE LEGAL WORLD, AND THE STAR STILL SHINES"'
I. The Measure of the Man
On an autumn day in 1973, three young legal aid attorneys appeared
before the California Supreme Court in its Sacramento courthouse, across
the street from the California Capitol, which is the location of both
chambers of the state legislature and the main office of the governor. Each
argued a different welfare case that arose in the aftermath of California's
Welfare Reform Act of 197 I.' 9 Seated next to them at counsel's table, as
each case was called in turn, was Ralph Santiago Abascal. The indelible
impression forever left in my mind is that of a proud older brother fondly
looking on as his younger siblings presented the facts, argued the law, and
sought justice.'20 Though roughly ten years older, Abascal had not been
practicing law much longer than his co-counsel. He had been a lawyer for
just five years.
Abascal's initial job after law school was as an attorney with
California Rural Legal Assistance ("CRLA") first in its Salinas office,
where he previously had worked as a law student, and then in its
Marysville office. Both offices are in major agricultural areas. The Salinas
Valley on the central California coast is known as the Salad Bowl of the
World because more than 8o% of the lettuce grown in the United States
It6. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of I98i, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357
(198I). This 6oo-page bill made major changes in federal tax law and substantive policies affecting
more than two dozen programs. The Reagan Administration sought twenty-seven changes in the Aid
to Families with Children ("AFDC") program, which had been the main target of his state welfare
reform efforts. All passed as proposed, except for one provision that gave states the option to enact
rather than mandating a compulsory workfare plan for adult recipients. ToM JOE & CHERYL ROGERS, BY
THE FEW FOR THE FEW: THE REAGAN WELFARE LEGACY 55-57 (1985).
117. In seven of his eight budgets, Reagan proposed and Congress rejected that no money be
appropriated for the Legal Services Corporation, which since 1975 has provided federal funding for
legal services programs for the poor. He also appointed individuals to the Corporation's board, who
were hostile to its mission and continually sought to severely limit the activities of funded programs.
Neil A. Lewis, The Law; Legal Services: Political Test Loonms for Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1989, at B5.
118. Quotation about Ralph Santiago Abascal by former California Supreme Court Associate
Justice Cruz Reynoso (Oct. 1, 2011) (email correspondence written to and on file with the author).
119. Welfare Reform Act of '97', CAL. STAT. 1971, ch. 578.
120. The cases argued are discussed at infra text accompanying notes 368-380.
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is grown there. Marysville is located in the Sacramento Valley at the
northern end of California's highly agricultural Central Valley.
In his first years at California Rural Legal Assistance, Abascal
participated in the successful campaign to ban the short-handle hoe, the
repetitive use of which often resulted in serious back injuries for farm
workers. He also served as counsel in a lawsuit brought on behalf of six
nursing mothers who worked in the fields. Filed in 1969, it eventually led
to the banning of DDT.'2' This particular suit marked his foray into the
intersection of environmental, public health, and poverty issues-an
intersection of policy concerns that beginning in the early 199os came to
be known as environmental justice.
In late 1970, Abascal moved to San Francisco Neighborhood Legal
Assistance Foundation ("SFNLAF") to become its Director of Litigation.
He had been recruited because of his developing expertise in yet another
field-public assistance law and policy. He returned to CRLA as its
General Counsel five years later.
Along with Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers Union, CRLA
was the bete noir of California's large agricultural growers. The growers,
in turn, were important supporters of Ronald Reagan's political career.
As governor, Reagan continually criticized CRLA's policy advocacy
activities and at one point used his gubernatorial prerogative to veto its
federal funding.'2
During his twenty-eight-year career, Abascal played a leading role
in more than 200 major legal cases affecting the lives and rights of farm
workers, welfare recipients, persons with disabilities, immigrants, and
other vulnerable individuals.'23 He also was heavily involved in legislative
and regulatory advocacy. This work began during the conflicts over
Reagan's proposed changes in state welfare programs. Abascal's ability
to develop and maintain strong relationships with legislators and other
public officials gave him unusual access and influence in representing the
interests of the poor. He was most active legislatively and administratively
on issues involving welfare policy, environmental justice, immigration, and
funding for legal services.'24
121. Tim Golden, Ralph S. Abascal, 62, Dies; Leading Lawyer for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1997, at AIT.
122. CRLA survived Reagan's protracted attack. The outcome involved decisionmaking at the highest
levels in the Nixon white House and administration. For an accounting of the struggle from the perspective
of two CRLA participants, see Michael Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA): Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, i CcCANo L. REv. 1 (1972). Cruz Reynoso at the time was
CRLA's Executive Director. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown, Jr., Reagan's successor as governor, appointed
Reynoso to the California Supreme Court as an Associate Justice. Michael Bennett was a top CRLA
administrator.
123. Rinat Fried & Allyson Quibell, Ralph Abascal, 'Soul of CRLA,' Dies, THE RECORDER. Mar.
19, 1997, at i, o.
124. One example of the unique role Abascal played in legislation based on the strong ties he had
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Abascal's death on March 17, 1997, was deeply mourned throughout
the California and national legal community.' He was much revered by
his peers and was widely regarded as a role model by legal aid, civil
rights, and other public interest lawyers, many of whom he mentored. ,
6
developed with legislators was in California's enactment of one of the nation's first Interest on Lawyer
Trust Account ("IOLTA") programs. CAL. STAT. 1981, ch. 789; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-28
(Deering 2003). These programs provide funding for free legal services for the poor out of the interest
earned on aggregate client trust accounts, which attorneys use when the amount of money owed clients is
minimal or held for short periods of time. No interest previously was paid on these accounts. What would
have been the yield was retained by banks. The bill's sponsor was the State Bar of California. At the time,
I was the Vice-Chair of the State Bar's Legal Services Section, which was the bar entity that proposed and
drafted the legislation. The key participants were executive directors of federally supported legal services
programs. Abascal was not directly involved in the bill's drafting, but everyone knew that once the bill
was before the legislature for a vote, he had to be involved. The bill passed the Assembly, but its future
was uncertain in the Senate.
The Assembly member officially coauthoring the bill was Howard Berman, who later became a
long-term member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Abascal and Berman had a close relationship.
Berman was newly elected to the Assembly when he first met Abascal in the early 197os. In recalling that
time period in a statement made following Abascal's death, Berman recounted that Abascal "was tying
[then-Governor] Ronald Reagan up in knots, and in the process was helping low-income people survive a
little better." Fried & Quibell, supra note 123, at Io. Berman was one of the speakers at Abascal's
memorial service.
On the day of the Senate vote, Abascal and Berman caucused together. Shortly before the vote, I
observed Berman on his knees asking for the vote of Senator Rose Vuitch, a somewhat conservative
Democrat from the Central Valley. During the vote, a colleague, Peter Reid, the Executive Director of
San Mateo County Legal Aid and a principal drafter of the IOLTA bill, observed Abascal at the rear
of the temporary Senate chambers (the permanent chambers were under renovation) prodding a
dozing Democratic Senator James Mills, the former Senate leader, to wake up. Abascal then literally
raised Mills' hand to vote. The bill passed the Senate by one vote.
Since 1984, which was the first year of allocations, the California IOLTA program has distributed
more than $350 million to qualifying legal aid programs throughout the state. Email from Stephanie
Choy, Managing Director, Legal Services Trust Fund Program, State Bar of California (Jan. 10, 2012)
(on file with author).
125. Abascal was survived by his wife, Beatrice A. Moulton, a professor of law at the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law and a founding teacher and scholar in the development of
modern clinical legal education, and their then-fourteen-year-old daughter, Pilar Cristina Abascal.
126. In 1995, Marsha Berzon, then a prominent appellate attorney and now a U.S. Court of
Appeals Judge for the Ninth Circuit, described Abascal as follows: "Ralph has been, for over twenty
years, probably the most widely respected public interest lawyer in California." Aurelio Rojas, Public
Interest Is His Interest: Lawyers Honor Ralph Abascal, S.F. CHRON., May 31, 1995, at A13. After
Abascal's death, former California Supreme Court Associate Justice Cruz Reynoso said, "I'd like to
see him remembered first as a person who never lost his humanity.., and secondly as a lawyer of
great stature." Dennis Pfaff, CRLA Pioneer, Advocate for Poor Dies at 62, S.F. DAILY JOURN., Mar. 19,
1997, at 1-2. Brad Seligman, a Bay Area civil rights attorney and now a California Superior Court
judge, encapsulated Abascal's impact and manner as follows:
Ralph was probably the most successful lawyer in California-if not the nation-in using
legislation and litigation to affect people in positive ways.... He was not one to use fire and
brimstone or a big showboat.... His approach.., was more like, "Let's break bread." Yet
he was incredibly rational, intellectual and personal.
Aurelio Rojas, Obituaries, Ralph Abascal, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 1997, at A22. In describing how
Abascal urged his colleagues to do their jobs, Jose Padilla, CRLA's long-time executive director,
related the following:
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His professional work ethic was especially legendary. There are
numerous stories of his deferring his own pressing assignments to help
colleagues, of being found sleeping in his or another lawyer's office after
an all-nighter, and of being so intensely focused on his work that he
forgot whether he had left his car in San Francisco or Sacramento.
Toward the end of his life, Abascal received several prestigious
awards for his work on behalf of the poor. These included the American
Bar Association's Thurgood Marshall Award, the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association's Kutak-Dodds Prize, and the State Bar of
California's Loren Miller Award. In accepting the Thurgood Marshall
Award, he urged antipoverty lawyers to carry on despite hostile forces. He
said, "Tennyson's poem 'Ulysses' concludes with 'to strive, to seek, to
find, and not to yield.' To me that represents an injunction to persist and
not to feel a sense of defeatism."'27
2. The Nature of the Times
Abascal stood out among a generation of lawyers who finished law
school in the late I96os and early 197Os, when an infusion of federal
government dollars, initially through the OEO as part of President Lyndon
Johnson's War on Poverty, brought new breadth of coverage and new
aggressiveness to the civil representation of the poor.' During the
previous decades, social and economic injustices had built up, and all
three branches of government, nationally and in California, in different
ways and to varying degrees were responsive to the claims of the poor for
improvements in policies and practices affecting their well-being. But the
period of favorable attention and relatively easy victories for the poor
through civil protest and community organizing, administrative and
legislative advocacy, and litigation did not last long.
In California, the political backlash began early, starting in 197o at
the end of Reagan's first gubernatorial term and continuing throughout
his second gubernatorial term. In response, Abascal acted on the need
for political and legal sophistication and adroitness in working with and
representing the poor. His strategy was comprehensive and involved
compromises and risks, as he interacted with welfare recipient groups,
legislative leaders, high-level administrators, lawyers, and judges. He was
ultimately a pragmatist and, throughout his career, never let ideology
He would tell us, "You can spend your entire legal career throwing out life preservers to
people drowning in a river,"... But he would add, "If you are working for CRLA, you have
to walk up the river and find out who is throwing people off the bridge, and that's who you
sue."
Fried & Quibell, supra note 123.
127. Fried & Quibell, supra note 123.
128. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286; Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508.
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blind him to reality.'29 His commitment was to alleviating the everyday
pangs and suffering of poverty and to keeping the state honest in its
policies and practices regarding the poor.'30
For Abascal, there were no sure fixes or silver bullets to end poverty,
only constant skirmishes to try to make people's lives a little better or, as a
necessary fallback, to prevent them from becoming worse off. Nor would
Abascal take for granted governmental compliance with the law, whether
it originated in legislation or court order. Particularly when social welfare
programs benefitted stigmatized groups and involved significant public
expenditures, he well-understood that there were going to be enormous
political pressures, in the short run, to circumvent the law and, in the
long run, to change the law to cut welfare rolls and costs.
Abascal acted as a legal representative of the welfare poor,
sometimes but not always in close collaboration with those whom he
represented. His interactions with the leaders of the emerging disability
rights movement of the early 1970s, most of whom were severely physically
challenged, were very tight in the planning and execution of strategies and
specific courses of action. His relationships with leaders of welfare rights
organizations largely composed of adult AFDC recipients, while always
respectful and consultative, were not as continually close when key
decisions were made. In short, depending upon the circumstances,
Abascal varied his approach to representation. He did not interact with
his clients in a single, fixed way.
Yet even when Abascal acted with considerable autonomy, he had
the trust of grassroots leaders. It was trust gained because of how he
interacted with and listened to them. Kevin Aslanian, who in the 1970s
was the President of the Welfare Recipients League of Santa Clara
County, described Abascal as "not arrogant or elitist" and knowing how
to disagree "not in a demeaning way."''3' In summing up what was
distinctive about Abascal as a lawyer, Aslanian said, "The main thing is
he made himself accessible.' 32 Abascal had and conveyed a sense of
presence that truly connected with and reassured others.
In representing the welfare poor, Abascal sought to take full
advantage of opportunities within our institutionally fragmented and
divided political and legal system to assert the interests of the poor,
whether in legislative halls, executive offices, or court chambers. In doing
so, he was not naive about the ideological and resource disadvantages
that needed to be overcome and the likely limited responsiveness of
i29. Interview with Jay-Allen Eisen, a legal aid attorney who worked closely with Abascal in the
early I97OS (July 23, 2005) (on file with author).
130. Id.
131. Interview with Kevin M. Aslanian, Executive Director, Coalition of California Welfare Rights
Organizations (Aug. 19, 2o i) (on file with author).
132. Id.
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American political and legal institutions to claims on behalf of very poor
individuals. Much of what he did depended on legal expertise regarding
complicated statutory and regulatory programs and on predicting what
courts would do. As a problem solver, Abascal was as Aslanian observed
"an issue by issue person," who focused on specific goals.'33 In a complex
statutory and regulatory area like public assistance benefit programs for
the poor, substantive knowledge is exceedingly important. Attention to
detail in drafting legislation and regulations, in monitoring administrative
compliance, and in framing lawsuits can have very substantial
consequences. Again in Aslanian's words, "Ralph knew how to play all the
forums together."'34 It was the joint and complementary use of legislative
and administrative lobbying and group impact litigation that especially
distinguished Abascal's representation of the welfare poor during the
Reagan gubernatorial years.
Abascal was part of a new lawyering phenomenon that for the first
time brought full-service, aggressive legal representation to the poor.
There were relatively recent developments in civil rights advocacy upon
which to build, but addressing poverty directly had its own unique
challenges. Though racial, ethnic, and gender factors were never
unimportant, the ideological and institutional obstacles impeding
meaningful change regarding poverty were substantial and deeply
embedded in their own way in American political culture. There was also
much to learn about how to carry out one's role as a lawyer.
C. AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR THE
POOR
1. Tudor and New Deal Roots of American Social Welfare Policy
The origins of American social welfare policy go back to the
Elizabethan Poor Laws of Tudor England, which encompassed both
programs for the care of the poor and separate labor legislation compelling
employment.'35 The great accomplishment of the Elizabethan Poor Laws
was the government's assumption of responsibility for providing
subsistence support for the poor. Previously, religious and charitable
institutions shouldered this responsibility, not governmental entities.
The main policy principles upon which Elizabethan poor relief was
based were local governmental control, forced work requirements, and
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The most famous and important of Tudor poor law statutes was 43 Eliz. c. 2 (I6Oi). The most
notable labor legislation was the Statute of Artificers, 5 Eliz. c. 4 (1562). For a comprehensive and
provocative review of the legal history of California public relief until the mid-i96os, see Jacobus
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status (pts. i-
3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 258, 90o (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
April 20131
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
moral condemnation of recipients. 36 The I6th century English emphasis
on local control reflected institutional interests in social control, fiscal
conservatism, and discretionary administration.'37 The reasons for
coerced employment reflected concerns about minimizing public
expenditures on direct financial relief, providing a remedy for vagrancy
and idleness, and having a disciplined and available workforce to meet
labor market needs."' The basis for moral condemnation was a widely
shared "characterological theory of poverty, which defined the poor as
'the victims of their own vices.""', 39 Poverty was seen as the pathological
product of individual moral failings. These underlying principles, not all
with the same force, persist to this day in the shaping of American public
aid programs.
The equating of poverty with moral disrepute has had an especially
enduring, pervasive, and pernicious effect.4 Much of the appeal is that
such an equation comports with highly individualistic political
presumptions about people being responsible for their own fates, the
most dramatic expression of which can be found in social Darwinist
thought at the end of the 19th century. For William Graham Sumner, the
19th century American sociologist, poverty was the mark of inferior,
nonproductive beings. He concluded, "Under the names of the poor and
the weak, the negligent, shiftless, inefficient, silly, and imprudent are
fastened upon the industrious and prudent as a responsibility and duty.".'4'
Until the New Deal, state and local governments enacted and
funded governmentally supported cash aid programs for the poor in
California and elsewhere. The federal government played no role. All
states but Georgia and South Carolina had mothers' pension legislation
to provide assistance to children whose fathers were dead.'42 In 1931,
there were approximately ioo,ooo families nationally receiving such
136. tenBroek (pt. I), supra note 135, at 262-79.
137. Id. at 262-70.
138. Id. at 270-79.
139. Jacobus tenBroek, The Two Nations: Differential Moral Values in Welfare Law and
Administration, reprinted in CRIsIs IN AMEICAN INSTITUTIONS 350, 353 (Jerome Skolnick & Elliott
Currie eds., ig7o).
140. For a historical synopsis regarding the persistence of moral classifications in American welfare
legislation, see JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 44-I3I
(1991); see also Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159 (1995). For influential, contemporary, American
social policy analyses based on theories about poverty that morally blame the poor, see LAWRENCE MEAD,
BEYOND ENTITLEMENT THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984). For a critique of legislation and social policy
analyses that equate poverty and moral disrepute, see MICHAEL B. KATz, TiE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM
THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989).
141. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER (1883), as cited in
tenBroek, supra note 139, at 354.
142. See WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN ch. I (1965).
[Vol. 64:933
April 2013] LEGAL ADVOCACY AND WELFARE REFORM
assistance, almost all of whom were white.43 Many states also had special
programs for elderly or blind adults.
In addition, legislation in most states mandated local governments
to provide general assistance or general relief programs for those not
eligible for other public aid programs.'" Among the general assistance
population are those whom we now tend to type as homeless. The
statutory lineage of such general assistance legislation generally, and
specifically in California, dates directly back to the Elizabethan Poor
laws.'45
The seminal legislation that changed the role of the federal
government was the Social Security Act of 1935. It established federally
authorized insurance-type programs for those with qualifying employment
histories and categorical public aid programs for those without steady
attachment to the labor force.
The federal government directly administered the insurance-type
programs, the most prominent of which was social security for the
elderly. 46 Eligibility for these programs was not income based, and their
administration was less discretionary and onerous in operation. Their
funding depended on the imposition of a specific payroll tax on employers
and employees, which further added to the popular perception that the
promised benefits were like having a guaranteed insurance policy. The
underlying cultural assumption was that these programs mainly benefitted
those who had shown their moral worth by working.I"'
State and local governments had the responsibility for implementing
the categorical aid programs, with the federal government paying a share
of the costs and exercising administrative oversight. The categorical aid
programs targeted populations whose claims for assistance continued to
be considered morally dubious because the intended recipients for the
most part had not recently worked or were not able to work. Their claims
for assistance, however, were not as morally dubious as those receiving
benefits from programs for which there still were no federal subsidies.' 48 In
enacting policies and structuring programs to redress poverty, the Social
Security Act -notwithstanding its progressive thrust- underscored and
perpetuated longstanding, critical distinctions in American social welfare
policy between programs for individuals viewed as deserving and programs
for those viewed as less deserving.
143. Id. at 9.
144. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (2011).
145. See tenBroek (pt. i), supra note 135, at 291-98, 3o6-I7; tenBroek (pt. 2), supra note 135, at
939-44; tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 135, at 614-15.
146. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title II, Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Benefits, 49 Stat. 622, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 etseq. (2oiI).
147. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 140, at 44-131.
148. Id.
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From 1935 until the early 1970s, there were a number of key
changes in coverage regarding the categorical aid programs. The Social
Security Act initially established categorical aid programs for the elderly,
blind, and needy and dependent children in primarily female-headed
families.'49 In 1950, Congress extended categorical assistance to cover the
permanently and totally disabled.5° Subsequent amendments to the Social
Security Act revised definitions affecting needy and dependent children so
that not just children but also caretaker adults'5 ' and eventually families
with unemployed parents'52 all were eligible for assistance.
The decision whether to adopt each of the particular categorical
assistance programs rested with state government. Once the states
adopted the particular programs, they were responsible for upholding
applicable federal standards and conditions for the receipt of assistance.
While the federal government formulated basic policy and provided
matching funds for the support of the categorical aid programs, the states
determined the actual level of benefits and retained operating control
over the programs either directly or indirectly through supervision of
county implementation.
In the early I97Os, the California categorical aid programs were
known as Old Age Security, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Needy Disabled,
and Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").'53 California
adopted the Aid to the Needy Disabled program in i957, seven years after
the 195o amendments to the Social Security Act authorizing such
assistance.'5 4 It took a major legislative compromise in 1963, two years
after authorizing federal legislation, before California enacted the
necessary legislation to establish AFDC eligibility for families where the
father was in the home but unemployed.'55 The main opposition to what
became known as AFDC-U came from agricultural counties, where
politicians and large farm owners feared that this expansion in AFDC
eligibility would not only increase public expenditures but also would
stimulate a raise in farm labor wages in order to insure that income from
agricultural work would remain greater than from public aid.
149. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Titles I, IV & X. Old Age Assistance, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-o4,306 (i973); Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 49 Stat. 627, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6oi et seq.
(I973); Aid to the Blind, 49 Stat. 645,42 U.S.C. §§ 12Ol etseq. (i973).
150. Act of Aug. 28, 1950, c. 809, Title III, Part 5, § 351, 64 Stat. 555, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351 et seq.
(1973).
i5i. Act of Aug. 28, 1950, c. 8o9, Title III, Part 2, § 323(a), 64 Stat. 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6o6 0973).
152. Act of May 8, I96I, P.L. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75, 42 U.S.C. § 6o7 (1973).
153. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 12000-252 (Old Age Security); §§ 125oo-850 (Aid to the Blind);
§§ 135oo-8oi (Aid to the Needy Disabled); §§ 11200-507 (Aid to Families with Dependent Children)
(Deering 1969).
154. CAL. STAT. 1957, ch. 2411.
155. CAL. STAT. 1963, ch. 5IO.
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Changes in the structure and terms of welfare programs for the poor
have been and remain hot-button political issues. Sometimes the underlying
considerations are structural in an economic sense, such as the interest in
having a sufficient number of farm laborers available to work at minimal
wages, but most frequently the main concerns are fiscal and ideological. The
fiscal lament focuses on saving taxpayer dollars. Social welfare programs are
costly. Ideologically, much depends on who among the poor is viewed as
deserving or undeserving, something which changes over time and which
affects how particular programs are structured and characterized. I"6
The elderly poor have much benefitted from the framing of Social
Security as a form of insurance paid for by past payroll taxes, for which
virtually all over a certain age are eligible. The widespread popular
support for Social Security now also extends to Medicare, even among
conservatives. A recent book on Tea Party participants reports
overwhelming support for "earned" government benefits like Social
Security and Medicare, notwithstanding that expenditures for these
programs pose our most serious long-term domestic budgetary problem.'57
By contrast, as in i6th and 17th century England, when a group is
viewed as morally undeserving, there is a strong tendency to de-
emphasize societal causes of poverty and to blame the individuals
themselves, whether the underlying circumstances involve long-term
unemployment, child rearing, physical disability, or mental illness. In
America, such perceptions of unworthiness further reflect the evolving
yet persistent impact of antagonistic racial, nativist, and patriarchal
beliefs. Given the demographics of poverty in the United States, the
AFDC program post-I96os not surprisingly disproportionately assisted
minorities.'59 There also has been the long shadow cast by Reagan's vivid
imagery of the "welfare queen. ' ' Most often, the consequences of such
156. HANDLER & HASENFELD. supra note 140, at 44-131.
157. THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN
CONSERVATISM (201 1).
158. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE (1994); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON
POVERTY (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 1249 (1983).
159. In 1994, a few years before the enactment of successor legislation, see infra, note 164, African
Americans constituted 37.2% of the AFDC population; Latinos, 17.8%; Asians and other minority
groups, 6.1%; and Caucasians from non-Latino backgrounds, 38.9%. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. OF WAYS
AND MEANS, 1964 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 428-29 (994), as cited in JOEL F. HANDLER, THE
POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 47-48 (1995).
16o. Wahneema Lubiano describes the powerful political message of this imagery as follows:
Categories like "black woman," "black women," or particular subsets of those categories,
like "welfare mother/queen," are not simply taxonomies, they are also recognized by the
national public as stories that describe the world in particular and politically loaded ways-
and that is exactly why they are constructed, reconstructed, manipulated, and contested.
They are, like so many other social narratives and taxonomic social categories, part of the
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stigmatization are found in the extent to which state or local government,
not the federal government, controls the program administratively and
program policies compel recipients to seek and retain employment.
AFDC was the most controversial and volatile form of public
assistance during the Reagan gubernatorial years. Nationally, the
administration of President Richard Nixon proposed as a replacement for
AFDC a guaranteed income program known as the Family Assistance
Plan that would have standardized and federalized income support
payments for poor families, but it was defeated because of opposition
from the right and the left.'61 Reagan was the most prominent national
political opponent.
The major federal structural change that did occur affected recipients
of adult categorical aid, not the families who relied on AFDC for support.
In late 1972, Congress enacted a new pension-like Supplemental Security
Income ("SSI") program to be directly administered by the Social
Security Administration as a replacement for the Old Age Security, Aid
to the Blind, and Aid to the Needy Disabled categorical aid programs.6 2
There was little contentiousness in California regarding this new
assumption of administrative responsibility by the federal government.
There was, however, as I discuss later,' 63 a major battle over the cash
supplement to be paid beneficiaries by California, as the federal
legislation authorized but did not require states to augment the
standardized SSI base amounts provided by the federal government.
After the enactment of SSI, the stigma of unworthiness that
historically marked the receipt of public relief largely applied to poor
families and to adults receiving general assistance. Since the i98os,
homeless and recently homeless individuals are the most identifiable
beneficiaries of general assistance programs. It is the subsistence support
programs for poor families and poor non-elderly or temporarily disabled
single adults that have retained the characteristic features of the
building blocks of "reality" for many people; they suggest something about the world; they
provide simple, uncomplicated, and often wildly (and politically damaging) inaccurate
information about what is 'wrong' with some people, with the political economy of the
United States.
Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-
GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY 323,330-31 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
161. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLmCS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINIS-
TRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN (973). The guaranteed income for a family of four would
have been $2,4oo annually.
162. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, P.L. 92-603, Title III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (2011)
(adding new Title XVI to the Social Security Act).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 401-411.
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Elizabethan Poor Laws, especially the demeaning assumption that the
poor themselves are primarily responsible for their own poverty.'
64
In seeking to use the law to advance the interests of welfare
beneficiaries, Abascal not only had to contend with the mixed policy
provisions of the Social Security Act but also, at a deep societal level,
enduring Tudor beliefs about relief giving and causes of poverty. Though
there had been recent favorable judicial developments affecting the rights
of the welfare poor, the cultural legacy of the Elizabethan Poor Laws that
treated certain groups as morally unworthy was still, from a practical
standpoint, an operative part of the statutory, ideological, and fiscal
backdrop. Moreover, these moralistic determinations in application very
much tracked America's agonizing history regarding racial minorities, new
immigrants, and women.
Abascal embarked on what was a task of Sisyphus, one which
largely took place after the eventually frustrated, ambitious efforts of
other lawyers to transform the nature of the entire welfare system in a
progressive direction. While not grandiose, there would be rewards for
those whom Abascal and his colleagues represented.
2. The Initial Grand Legal Strategy
The great visionary for a fundamental transformation in the law of
the welfare poor was Jacobus tenBroek. He was a remarkable teacher,
scholar, and activist.' 6' Blind since childhood, tenBroek's organizational
164. Though it is beyond the historical scope of this project, it is worth emphasizing that when, at
the behest of President Bill Clinton, the Republican-controlled Congress in 1996 ended welfare for
poor families as we then knew it, the legislation enacted did not look forward to the 21st century but
backwards to the i6th century. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, tit. I, § IO3, iio Stat. 2io5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6oi et seq.
(20 I)). Congress established a state block grant system for poor families that significantly increased
the discretion given the states in the fashioning and administering of the successor programs to AFDC.
Entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"), this federal block grant program
provides only time-limited assistance for recipient families. The intended effects are to establish a new
enforcement mechanism for compelling adult recipients to become employed and to limit public
expenditures. To comply with TANF and as a successor program to AFDC, the California legislature
enacted the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids ("CalWORKs") program. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ I12OO et seq. (Deering 2001).
With TANF, the association of poverty with moral disrepute has renewed legislative vitality. For
my analysis of why this happened, see Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform
All over Again and the Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1996).
On the need to focus social policy on eradicating poverty and not attacking welfare and welfare
recipients, see Julie A. Nice, Forty Years of Welfare Policy Experimentation: No Acres, No Mule, Alo
Politics, No Rights, 4 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y I (2009). For a comprehensive historical analysis of post-
i96os American social welfare policies, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CMZENSHIP: REDEFINING
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (updated ed. 20o8).
165. For most of his career, tenBroek was a professor at the University of California, Berkeley,
first in the Speech Department and then in the Political Science Department. He had graduate degrees
in law and political science. He died of cancer in 1968 at age fifty-six. See FLOYD MATSON, BLIND
JUSTICE: JACOBUS TENBROEK AND THE VISION OF EQUALITY (2005).
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activities included the founding of the National Federation of the Blind
and serving thirteen years as a leading member of the California State
Board of Social Welfare, the last three of which as its chairman from
I96O until 1963. Until the California legislative compromise that resulted
in the enactment of the AFDC-U program, the Board had substantial
policy oversight regarding the implementation of the federal categorical
aid programs in California.
In his seminal article setting forth the legal history of California's
public relief programs, tenBroek articulated what became the initial
agenda for legal services lawyers seeking constitutional and statutory
changes in the welfare system. His clarion call was as follows:
When "the mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
constitutionally an irrelevance"; when classifications based on poverty
and handicap are measured by equal protection standards of
constitutional purpose and proper classification; when constitutional
rights cannot be sacrificed as a condition of granting public assistance;
when law enforcement and penal intrusions into the law of welfare are
fully restrained by the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments; when
free movement is recognized as a constitutional right forbidding
residence restrictions in welfare; when the highest court in the land as
well as the highest court in California see responsibility of relatives
provisions as arbitrary and discriminatory taxation; when welfare
classifications and constitutional classifications coincide; when the
granting and withholding of assistance and the variation of
requirements among and between programs are subjected to due
process and equal protection norms; when a presumption of
competence and responsibility of clients becomes a welfare
counterpart of the criminal law presumption of innocence-when these
things happen, then indeed will the law of the poor feel the full impact
of the pronouncement that "separate" is "inherently unequal,"
generating among aid recipients "a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."'6
In less than a decade after tenBroek's prescient words, the Supreme
Court in a number of landmark rulings gave credence to his faith in the
American constitutional order and legal system. But he did not live to
see these developments nor the later reversals in constitutional direction
that would occur.
The story of the initial, national, legal welfare strategy as executed
by antipoverty attorneys has been superbly told by Martha Davis and
need not be repeated here in detail.' The leading legal tactician was
Edward Sparer, who in late 1965 started the Center on Social Welfare
Policy and Law under the auspices of Columbia University's School of
Social Work.' 68 Although Sparer wanted to house the program at
i66. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 135, at 682.
167. See DAVIS, supra note I8.
168. Id. at 34-35.
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Columbia Law School, his request was turned down because his intention
to sue governmental agencies on behalf of welfare clients was too
controversial within the law faculty.' 69 At the time, most legal academics,
like most welfare officials and most Americans, considered public
assistance a charity, a privilege, and not in any way a legally enforceable
right.
Taking a cue from the civil rights movement, Sparer wanted to
begin the welfare litigation campaign with a case from the South both
because conditions of poverty generally were worse in the southern than
the northern states, and because he wanted welfare rights to be seen as a
civil rights issue. " The intent was to challenge state practices in federal
court, and it was poor southern blacks who most egregiously suffered
from arbitrary state and local administration of welfare programs.
Consistent with Sparer's plan, the first AFDC case to reach the Supreme
Court, King v. Smith, 7 ' originated in Selma, Alabama. The plaintiff was a
poor black woman with four children, who was visited by a married man
unrelated to her children and from whom she received no financial
support. Under Alabama's "substitute father" rule, a variation of man-
in-the-house regulations then found in eighteen states including
California, she and her children were cut off from welfare benefits
because she regularly and frequently cohabited with a man regardless of
whether he was obligated to provide or provided any support. "2
In a unanimous Supreme Court ruling, Chief Justice Earl Warren
found that there was federal jurisdiction to decide the case, an open issue
at the time, and that Alabama's policy plainly conflicted with federal law.
Though constitutional issues were raised, only Justice William 0. Douglas
in a concurring opinion addressed them. The other justices joined the
Chief Justice in deciding the case on statutory grounds because Alabama's
AFDC policies were not in compliance with the Social Security Act.
Specifically, the Court held that "legally fatherless children cannot be
flatly denied federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that
they have a substitute father."'7 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
rejected the State's assertion that its "interest in discouraging illicit
sexual behavior and illegitimacy" was a legitimate justification for AFDC
disqualification.'
Looking back on the history of welfare litigation, King v. Smith is
especially important because the Supreme Court recognized for the first
time that welfare recipients themselves had a legal right of action to
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id. at 56-69.
171. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
172. DAvis, supra note I8, at 6o-6i.
173. King, 392 U.S. at 334.
174. Id. at 320.
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enforce federal statutory policies in disputes with state welfare agencies.
Before the King case, the primary remedy for holding states accountable
to federal policies was infrequently convened federal administrative
conformity hearings. It is noteworthy that in acknowledging what was, in
effect, a new legal remedy, the Court engaged in no analysis and simply
referenced 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without discussion. This section was a 1871
Civil Rights Act provision that had lain dormant for ninety years until
i96i, when the Supreme Court relied on it to establish a federal cause of
action for a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violation involving
police practices.'75 Immediately following King, § 1983 became a principal
statutory basis for bringing federal causes of action to enforce the Social
Security Act and other social welfare legislation. The scope of its
application, however, has been legally contentious and is now highly
circumscribed., 6 In terms of the ability to access the courts to protect the
legal interests of the welfare poor, nothing is written in stone.
The King decision was also seminal because it sealed the demise of
blatant state and local efforts to regulate and punish the sexual conduct
of AFDC mothers by withholding cash benefit assistance for them and
their children. In the summer of i96o, for example, Louisiana had
dropped approximately 23,000 children from its AFDC rolls mainly on
the ground that homes were not "suitable" if an illegitimate child had
been born subsequent to the receipt of public assistance.'77 In California,
the most notorious practices, including an especially egregious incident in
January I963 in Alameda County, involved unannounced late night or
early morning raids on welfare recipient homes in order to determine
whether there was an unreported man in the home.' 78 King laid to rest an
important legal pretext for highly moralistic and excessively intrusive
governmental actions, but it did not much lessen subtler distinctions in
175. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (I96I).
176. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that § 1983 creates a private
right of action only where the plaintiff has "an unambiguously conferred right"); Wilder v. Virginia
Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (i99o) (holding that § 1983 can only be used to remedy violations of federal
"rights" and assigns a three-part test to determine whether a right has been created); Middlesex Cnty.
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. i (i98i) (holding that even if a state violates a
statutory right, there is no private right of action if Congress has already provided a comprehensive
enforcement scheme); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. i (i98i) (holding that
there is no private right of action if Congress did not intend to confer primary rights on individuals);
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. i (i98o) (holding that § 1983 can be used to remedy both a government
violation of a statute as well as the Constitution).
177. King, 392 U.S. at 322.
178. tenBroek (pt. 3), supra note 135, at 668; see Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and
the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1355 (1963). The Alameda County case became the subject of a
lawsuit brought by Benny Parrish, a county social worker, who was fired because he refused to
participate. Parrish happened to be blind. The California Supreme Court ordered his reinstatement
finding that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the raids violated the rights of recipients and
were unconstitutional. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm., 66 Cal. 2d 260 (1967). Attorneys associated with
the ACLU represented Parrish.
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the structuring and administration of welfare programs based on
perceptions about the general moral worthiness of recipients.
The high watermark for welfare rights litigation, especially
constitutional litigation, occurred during the following two Supreme Court
terms after the King decision. Then followed a number of important high
court setbacks, one exceptionally critical.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,79 a landmark opinion, the Court declared
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds the practice prevalent in
almost all states of holding individuals ineligible for public assistance if
they did not meet a durational residency requirement. This residency
requirement was typically one year. The interest at issue was the
constitutional protection afforded the right to travel. The Court explicitly
rejected assumptions rooted in the Elizabethan Poor Laws that linked
the receipt of public assistance with controlling vagrancy. It found that
the expressed legislative justification of inhibiting migration by needy
persons into a state, primarily for fiscal reasons, was constitutionally
impermissible.'8 In strong terms, the Court concluded that welfare
recipients are guaranteed the same opportunity to travel and settle where
they want as other American citizens.
The next term, in Goldberg v. Kelly,"s' another landmark opinion,
the Supreme Court held that in accordance with the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, state welfare agencies could not terminate
or suspend AFDC grants without providing the affected recipients with
advance notice of the reasons for the action, the right to appeal the
proposed action before an independent adjudicator, and an opportunity
to have a prior evidentiary hearing before termination or suspension. In
writing the majority opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., denoted the
benefits received by welfare recipients as an "entitlement" and
characterized them as more like "property" than a "gratuity."'2 In support
of this groundbreaking judicial conceptualization of welfare benefits,
Justice Brennan referenced the work of Charles Reich, then a young Yale
Law School professor.' 83 Reich had analogized various forms of
government largess, such as job licenses and welfare payments, to
traditional forms of property. He then argued such new forms of property
similarly deserved legal protection from potentially impermissible or
arbitrary governmental conditions and actions. The effect of Justice
Brennan's opinion was to give heightened legal status to welfare benefits.
179. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
I8o. Id. at 628-29.
181. 397 U.S. 254 (970).
182. Id. at 263 n.8.
183. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.
1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. 768 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, The New
Property].
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No longer would they be construed as mere charity-a privilege, not an
enforceable right. For welfare administration, the time had come to lie to
rest the discretionary paternalism that had long characterized the
implementation of public assistance programs, sometimes to the benefit
of individual recipients but often not. Governmental agencies now had to
meet meaningful, not minimal, standards of procedural due process. 84
Shortly after Goldberg, the Supreme Court issued three other key
AFDC decisions. The first two involved statutory issues. The third raised
a highly novel constitutional claim.
In Rosado v. Wyman, 85 the Court found that states had to update
standards of subsistence need and account for certain special allowances
in determining benefit amounts. The critical ruling, however, was that
states could elect to pay only a "percentage reduction" of those amounts
as a cash benefit. 86 Welfare recipient lawyers unsuccessfully argued that
such a "percentage reduction" was unlawful. Their position was that
based on family size the standard of need and benefits paid should be the
same. The case originally arose as a result of widespread failures by the
states to make cost-of-living adjustments in AFDC benefit amounts. In
terms of requiring an upward adjustment in benefit amounts, the Rosado
decision gave with one hand and took away with the other.
In Lewis v. Martin,'87 a California case, the Court extended the
reasoning in King v. Smith to welfare policies which did not result in the
termination of families from assistance but, instead, reduced their grant
amounts on the grounds that there was a man-in-the-house. The state's
assumption was that funds were available to the family for basic support
without regard to whether the man voluntarily paid support or was
legally liable for support based on a law of general applicability. The
Court rejected the use of both absolute presumptions regarding the
availability of child support and separate rules for AFDC families
regarding legal liability for child support. The Lewis decision established
important legal propositions for the administration of AFDC programs.
States in practice, however, narrowly confined its holding to the underlying
facts. In comparable situations, state policies continued to rely on
184. Six years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), a case concerning the extent
of constitutional due process to be accorded recipients of Social Security disability benefits prior to
termination, the Supreme Court in determining the specific procedural safeguards that would apply
framed a balancing test that gave more weight to governmental interests and fiscal considerations than
in Goldberg. This balancing test has been widely applied ever since in administrative procedural due
process cases involving governmental agencies.
185. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
186. In the AFDC program, states enacted both standards of need and standards of assistance. The
former presumably represented the amount a family needed to meet subsistence living expenses, such
as housing, food, and clothing costs. The amounts calculated were often approximations and tended to
be on the low side. The latter represented the amount actually to be paid a recipient family.
187. 397 U.S. 552 (970).
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assumptions about the availability to a family of income or resources to
deny AFDC eligibility or pay much reduced grant amounts. I
The most consequential and unmitigated early setback experienced
by antipoverty lawyers was Dandridge v. Williams,'s where the most
important contested issue concerned an equal protection challenge to
how states set categorical aid benefit amounts. In establishing a grant
structure, Maryland set benefit amounts in accordance with standards of
need up to a fixed family unit size. After that, there was an upper limit
on benefit amounts without regard to family size and need. The Court
upheld the Maryland regulation as violating neither the Social Security
Act nor the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the constitutional
claim, the Court applied a deferential "reasonable basis" test because it
regarded the regulation as falling within the social and economic field
and wanted to avoid acting in a way "reminiscent of an era when the
Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down
state laws 'because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought.""' The Court acknowledged that there
was a dramatic difference between state programs to meet the needs of
impoverished individuals and state business or industry regulation, but it
found no basis for applying a different constitutional standard. 9'
Sparer characterized the initial multipronged legal challenge to the
welfare system as a "grand" strategy.' The objectives were to raise benefit
levels, to end exclusionary requirements unrelated to economic need, to
remedy a lack of fair procedures, and to curb local and state discretion.'93
The first cases to reach the Supreme Court accomplished these objectives
to a remarkable extent, at least from the standpoint of underlying legal
doctrine. Dandridge was the wake-up call that case law developments
occur incrementally and slowly and that courts over the long run were not
likely to be especially receptive to the claims of the welfare poor.
At the center of Sparer's strategy was an attempt to establish
constitutionally a right to welfare, which he termed a "right to live."'94 In
the Supreme Court, the idea was dead on arrival. It received nary a
mention in the Dandridge majority opinion or in the two dissents. The
time for landmark constitutional rulings lasted only a few short years.
A right to welfare is a social right. Conceptually, social rights are not
an easy fit for American constitutional law and underlying political
188. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 368-380.
189. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
i9o. Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
i9i. Id. at 485.
192. Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGrs OF AMERICANS 84 (Norman Dorsen
ed., 1972).
193. Id. at 66.
194. Id. at 84. For a critique of the right to live as a tenable judicial doctrine, see Samuel Krislov,
The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare, 58 MINN. L. REV. 211 (IQ73).
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ideology. Social rights have to do with the social welfare of individuals in
a broad sense and focus on such concerns as education, healthcare,
subsistence income support, and job guarantees. 95 They address issues of
social equity and economic security and are not self-executing. They
usually require the establishment and operation of costly governmental
programs. Their aim is to provide measures of insurance against societal
uncertainties. To the extent Americans acknowledge social rights, it is
through the enactment of legislative programs, not through constitutional
interpretation.1" American constitutional guarantees of individual rights
are directed at the evils of government, not the evils of the social and
economic order. The Shapiro and Goldberg decisions fell within the
traditional framework of American constitutional law. The claims raised
in Dandridge did not.
Later AFDC cases before the Supreme Court have turned by and
large on questions of legislative interpretation alone. Beginning with the
ascendancy to the Supreme Court of Republican appointees Warren
Burger as Chief Justice and Harry Blackmun as Associate Justice, even
constitutional arguments building on established doctrine were likely to
be unpersuasive when applied to welfare policies and practices. In
Wyman v. James,'97 the Court's 6-3 majority opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun held that it was not an unconstitutional or unreasonable
search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to require welfare
recipients to submit to warrantless and usually unannounced searches of
their homes. The Court's only reservation was that a late night or "early
morning mass raid upon the homes of welfare recipients" would "present
another case for another day."' 98 In short, after Dandridge, in terms of
protecting the legal interests of welfare recipients, much depended on
maintaining the status of welfare benefits as statutory entitlements,
something which was not a sure bet given the dominance in American
ideology of deeply held beliefs about rugged individualism, picking
yourself up by your own bootstraps, and blaming the poor for their own
195. See MAURICE ROCHE, RETHINKING CmZENSHIP: WELFARE, IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN MODERN
SOCIETY 3 (1992).
196. The closest the U.S. Supreme Court has come to recognizing a social right as constitutionally
based is in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), where the Court held that undocumented children, just
like other children, were entitled to a free elementary and secondary education.
197. 400 U.S. 309 (97i).
198. Id. at 326. Wyman v. James was the first majority opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, who
had taken his seat on the Court shortly before oral argument in the case, While Justice Blackmun is
seen as exemplifying change and growth in a sitting justice, he never changed his mind about the
Wyman decision. Late in his tenure, he noted, "I have never regretted my vote in that litigation and
would vote the same way again." LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 63 (2005).
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poverty.' 9 Sparer was not wrong in fearing what would happen if a right
to welfare were not grounded in the Constitution.
While litigation was the chief tactic in Sparer's grand strategy, it was
not the only tactic. Antipoverty lawyers also worked in support of local
and national welfare rights organizations. Nowhere was this more
evident than in the special needs campaigns initiated in the mid-I96os.2"
A number of states at the time, including California and New York,
calculated AFDC grant amounts based on individual family needs, which
included allowances as special needs for items like furniture, clothes,
dishes, and cleaning equipment. Welfare rights organizations mainly led
by recipients took the lead in helping individual claimants apply for and
obtain special need allowances, with legal aid attorneys providing back-
up support for grant applications and representation at fair hearings in
the event of denials.
The campaigns were successful both as organizing tools and in
obtaining benefits. Local welfare rights organizations grew in membership,
and the National Welfare Rights Organization played an influential role in
national welfare politics in the late I96os. Cash grants to recipients also
went up dramatically. In New York City, for example, the average
special grant per person for clothing and furniture alone, between May
1965 and June 1968, rose from $24 to $192.2°1 Special needs campaigns
marked the high point in welfare rights organizing. By the early 197os,
most states adopted a flat grant system, which provided little to no room
for requesting special additional benefits. 2
Although aggressive legal advocacy and grassroots organizing aimed
at AFDC beneficiaries emerged at about the same time, most welfare
rights organizations were not able to sustain meaningful levels of
participation and activity over time. Sparer described the legal and lay
199. Congress's enactment in 1996 of state block grant legislation to replace the AFDC program
explicitly added as part of its purpose clause in new Social Security Act section 401(b) the following
language: "No individual entitlement-this Part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or
family to assistance under any state program funded under this Part." Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, tit. I, § 103, i Io Stat. 2105 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6ot(b) (201i)). Generally speaking, the reported cases citing this provision
find that TANF benefits are not statutory entitlement in the same way AFDC benefits were, but that
denials, terminations, or conditioning of benefits are still subject to constitutional review, though
typically at a lesser degree of protection. See, e.g., Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir.
2002) (drug testing of beneficiaries); Westenfelder v. Ferguson, 998 F. Supp. 146 (D.R.I. 1998)
(durational residency requirements); K.M. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 575
S.E.2d 393 (W, Va. 2002) (pre- and post-termination hearings); Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469 (Colo.
App. 2001) (pre-termination notices).
200. See DAvIs, supra note i8, at 40-55.
201. Sparer, supra note 192, at 78.
202. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of special benefit grants as an organizing
and welfare reform tool in the i96os and 1970 on the East Coast, see DAVIS, supra note 18, at 41, 48-
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forces as "sometimes cooperating, sometimes working independently,
never quite sure of their proper relationship to each other and-
consequently weaker-in their joint effect.""0 3 Sparer's observation was
as true in California as elsewhere.
3. Rising Welfare Rolls and the Rise of Advocacy in California
In fall of 1966, California voters elected Ronald Reagan their
governor. One of his main campaign issues consisted of attacks on
increasing welfare rolls and costs. 4 Once in office, however, he found
that he had neither the knowledge about welfare programs nor the degree
of control over the state bureaucracy which he felt necessary to take
effective action." It took time for his administration to develop the
expertise, the staff, and the confidence to propose and carry out substantial
revisions in welfare policy and practice.
Although Reagan campaigned vigorously against welfare state
"handouts," his first term as governor was marked by unprecedented
growth in public assistance costs and in numbers of individuals receiving
welfare benefits. This was particularly true for AFDC. In 1967, the
California monthly AFDC caseload averaged 174,891 families. By 1971,
there were 421,799 families who each month received AFDC benefits. In
terms of the cost, total annual expenditures for AFDC grants in California
during this period almost tripled, rising from $372,239,647 in 1967 to
$954,519,582 in 1971.' Despite a forcefully articulated conservative
philosophy, an overarching interest in curbing state expenditures, and a
core political constituency not known for its sensitivities to the claims of
the poor, Reagan exerted surprisingly little influence over spiraling
increases in public relief rolls and expenditures during his first term.
One major contributing reason was the emergence of forceful
statewide welfare rights advocacy by both legal services attorneys and
organizations of the AFDC poor. The organization of welfare rights
groups in California preceded by several years the expansion of federally
funded legal aid as part of President Johnson's War on Poverty."
In April 1963, several months after the Alameda County early
morning raids on the homes of AFDC families, members of the
International Longshoremen's Workers Union initiated the formation of
the Oakland Welfare Rights Organization. In conducting an unemployment
203. Id. at 65.
204. CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN, supra note i, at 157.
205. Interview with Ronald Reagan, supra note 6.
206. Public Welfare in California, 1972-73, App'x F, State of Calif., Health & Welfare Agency,
Dept. of Social Welfare. The data reported are for the fiscal year, which in California runs from July
through June.
207. For a history of the formative years of federally supported legal services as initiated by the
Federal Office of Economic Opportunity, see JOHNSON, supra note 27.
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survey, they had discovered a woman and seven children without food or
money. For months they sought to obtain relief for the family from the
Alameda County Welfare Department but without satisfaction. Partly
out of frustration and partly out of a conviction in the power of
organization, these union members decided to form a grassroots group
capable of pressing recipient claims upon a frequently unresponsive
county welfare agency. They were soon joined by dissatisfied county
social workers including Benny Parrish, who had refused to participate in
the infamous raids.28
Parrish brought with him copies of the various California regulations
and handbooks concerning public assistance, which at the time were not
readily available to the public, and proceeded to train members of the
organization as lay advocates knowledgeable in the multitude of
requirements determining welfare eligibility and assistance. The
organization opened an office which was staffed to provide assistance to
present and potential recipients. It also conducted mass action activities
including a sit-in one weekend to protest the Alameda County policy of
sending unemployed mothers to do farm labor. Although the Oakland
group at first was dominated by professionals, it soon came to be
composed largely of African-American AFDC mothers. Following the
Oakland example, welfare rights organizations began to develop
throughout the state.
Legal aid societies with highly limited resources existed in major
California cities well before the advent of federal funding. They were
rarely active in the public assistance field. In 1965, one of the first agencies
nationally to receive a substantial infusion of federal funds was the
Alameda County Legal Aid Society in Oakland. The following year,
programs were initiated or expanded throughout California. The new
funding for the most part resulted in the hiring of recent law school
graduates. These new attorneys had few preconceptions about the precise
problems that they would confront and the kinds of actions that they
would have to take. They were encouraged by OEO officials to engage in
both individual service delivery and group advocacy for the poor. At the
beginning, there was seldom much statewide planning of group advocacy
strategies.
With respect to California welfare policies and practices, no one
initially fulfilled the chief tactician role undertaken by the New York-
based Ed Sparer, who focused on litigation brought in the eastern and
southern states." By and large, the early actions undertaken by California
2o8. See Marilyn J. Blawie, Law and Politics of Welfare Rights Organizations 18-i9 (1970)
(unpublished paper delivered at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association).
209. There were some experienced California attorneys who laterally joined the new OEO legal
services programs from other legal practices. To my knowledge, none had a specific welfare advocacy
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antipoverty lawyers were ad hoc and more than anything else reflected
each individual attorney's own experiential learning curve about the
needs of the poor, barriers and opportunities within the law for social
change, and the resourcefulness and obstinancy of political leadership.
At the same time, welfare recipients were on their own learning
curve. Several attitudinal surveys indicated that in the mid-r96os most
public aid beneficiaries were not especially conscious of the legal remedies
available to them."' Only rarely did they conceive of themselves as rights-
bearing citizens. Restrictive eligibility tests, intrusions upon privacy, lack
of information about entitlements, all tended to foster attitudes of
submission rather than self-assertion."' Shortly thereafter, these baseline
attitudes began to change, as substantial numbers of welfare recipients
for the first time sought legal help from welfare rights organizations and
then, after the advent of federal funding, a much-bolstered network of
free legal services programs.
The most visible actions initially taken by legal services attorneys
involved the commencement of class action lawsuits against state and
county welfare officials. The AFDC actions filed raised similar issues as
those filed elsewhere in the country, though there usually was not a great
deal of coordination until issues reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The first
wave of major lawsuits in California included challenges to durational
residency requirements," ' deficient procedural due process safeguards," 3
assumptions about financial contributions and responsibilities of unrelated
males,1 4 and maximum AFDC grant amounts not based on family size or
determination of need."1 In almost all instances, the cases ended with
favorable judicial decisions."' The main exception was the vacating and
the eventual reversal of the California court decision on setting
maximum grant amounts as a result of the Supreme Court's pivotal
ruling in Dandridge v. Williams"7 not to apply a strict scrutiny equal
protection standard when reviewing welfare classifications.
agenda in mind.
210. See Scott Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 370 (1966); see also Joel F. Handler & Ellen J. Hollingsworth, How Obnoxious Is the
"Obnoxious Means Test"?: The Views of AFDC Recipients, 1970 Wisc. L. REV. 114.
211. Briar's study, which was based on a small but intensely interviewed sample of California
AFDC-U recipients, revealed that most tended to view themselves as "suppliants" with unquestioned
obligations to welfare agencies and little cognizance of their own rights. Briar, supra note 210.
212. Burns v. Montgomery, 299 F. Supp. ioo2 (N.D. Cal. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 848 (1969).
213. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S. 28o (I97O);
McCullough v. Terzian, 2 Cal. 3d 647 (1970).
214. Lewis v. Montgomery, 312 F. Supp. 197 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Lewis
v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (I97O). See supra text accompanying note 187.
215. Kaiser v. Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 329 (1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U.S. 595 (97o).
216. For a comprehensive review of California AFDC cases decided from the end of 1967 until the
middle of I97O, see Peter Sitkin, Welfare Law in California, I97O CALIF. LAw 559.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 189-191.
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At the beginning of the legal services movement, the decentralized
character of the federally supported legal services program resulted in
relatively little overall coordination among various local California
projects in the filing of lawsuits. When attorneys with the Alameda
County Legal Aid Society, for example, challenged California fair
hearing regulations on due process grounds in an action instituted in
state court, they were not aware of a similar case already filed in federal
court by San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation.2"
Conflicting judgments were entered in the two cases within several weeks
of one another. The federal action, Montgomery v. Wheeler,219 was decided
against the claims of the welfare recipients and was successfully appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it was the companion case to Goldberg
v. Kelly."' In the state court proceeding, McCullough v. Terzian,"' legal aid
attorneys immediately obtained injunctive relief, which led to the
institution in California of prior notice and pretermination hearing
requirements two years before the landmark Goldberg ruling. Several
years later, largely at the instigation of Abascal, the degree of explicit
coordination among California legal services programs on welfare policy
advocacy increased substantially.
On an everyday basis, legal service attorneys working in the welfare
field spent most of their time assisting individual welfare recipients in
disputes with county welfare departments. Much of this work involved
providing representation at administrative fair hearings or in facilitating
settlements with county welfare agencies prior to the actual holding of a
hearing.
Daniel Brunner, an attorney with the Long Beach Legal Aid Society
from 1969 until 1976, estimates that during that time period he probably
assisted close to rooo welfare recipients in fair hearing proceedings, either
directly himself or supervising others.2" He came to know firsthand the
range of practical and legal problems which poor families regularly
confronted when applying for or seeking to retain public assistance
benefits. Building on this experience, Brunner would work closely with
Abascal on fashioning and implementing the litigation strategy
undertaken after the enactment of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971.
218. Interview with Thomas Schneider, staff attorney, Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County (Feb.
I, 1974) (on file with author).
219. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
220. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
221. No. 379011 (Alameda Cnty. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968), aft'd, 2 Cal. 3d 647 (1970).
222. Interview with Daniel Brunner (Aug. 29, 201i). Brunner served as the General Counsel for
the Department of Benefits Payments during Jerry Brown's first term as California's governor from
1976 through 1978. He then returned to legal services work with the Western Center on Law and
Poverty from 1978 to 1981, where he co-facilitated a statewide welfare task force that had assumed the
role and functions in coordinating California welfare advocacy first undertaken by Abascal.
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In California as well as elsewhere, the initial instinct of the first
generation of antipoverty lawyers, most of them just out of law school
and heavily influenced by the Civil Rights Movement, was to think in
broad constitutional and policy terms. There were glaring legal defects in
the existing welfare system, and they were easiest to perceive and to
challenge. But relatively quickly, legal services lawyers learned from their
representation of individual recipients in administrative proceedings that
the bottom line was not the evolution of legal doctrine but how much
money recipients had to support themselves.
This meant cash in their pockets, not just the establishment of new
rights that might or might not be enforced. As Beulah Sanders, a founder
and later chair of the National Welfare Rights Organization, put it:
"Everyone has their own plan on what to do with welfare recipients.
Well, the only thing you can really do is get up off your Seventeenth
Century attitudes, give poor people enough money to live decently, and
let us decide how to live our lives." '223 California legal aid lawyers came to
share her perspective. In describing his work in the early 1970s, Brunner
said that he mostly thought of himself as a "tax-lawyer for poor people"
whose goal was to "get more money for poor people-more money in
their hands."2 4 An increase in cash assistance was a tangible gain. The
efficacy of anything else was highly uncertain.
Questions about benefit levels required, however, untangling and
then mastering a labyrinth of fairly obscure welfare statutes and
regulations. The impacts of landmark court rulings on eligibility and
benefit levels were the tip of the iceberg. Welfare is a highly regulated
field. The full range of issues affecting the receipt of cash assistance was
not immediately obvious. The issues also changed over time. For the
lawyers initially involved in welfare advocacy, the learning curve was
multipronged and steep. One notable example of such learning was the
collaboration between legal services attorneys and welfare rights
organizations on grassroots campaigns to obtain special benefits.
The most sweeping joint effort in California took place in 1967 and
1968. It involved a mass campaign to establish educational trust funds for
AFDC children. 5 Under state regulations, previously seldom implemented,
sums either earned or unexpectedly received by AFDC families could be
set aside for future educational needs of the children. The amounts were
then not subject to inclusion in the ordinary computations that govern
223. Beulah Sanders, Statement to the Presidential Commission on Income Maintenance (June 5,
1969), as cited in Felicia Kornbluh, The Goals of the National Welfare Rights Movement.- Why We Need
Them Thirty Years Later, 24 FEMINIST STUDIES 65 (1998). On another occasion, Sanders similarly
stated: "We have a plan to end poverty. It's called money." Aaronson, Legal Advocacy and Welfare
Reform, supra note 5, at 65.
224. Interview with Daniel Brunner, supra note 222.
225. Aaronson, Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform, supra note 5, at i 19.
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determinations of eligibility and benefit level. Welfare rights groups
publicized the availability of educational trust funds, while legal services
attorneys instituted legal challenges whenever there was significant official
resistance to their creation. Successful for a time, the campaign came to an
end when the Reagan administration took decisive action and repealed
virtually all regulatory authorization for the establishment of such funds.
Both recipient groups and legal services lawyers learned how
unhesitatingly public officials could and would act to counter efforts to
increase cash benefits for the poor.
Notwithstanding collaborative actions like the educational trust
campaign, the overall relationship between welfare rights organizations
and legal services programs in California, as in other states and nationally,
was problematic. From the beginning, there were difficult, inherent
tensions between the requirements of effective grassroots organizing and
the existence of government-supported, free legal representation.
With respect to litigation, the first major policy impact cases served
as important rallying points for expanding membership in welfare
recipient groups in that successful lawsuits underscored the effectiveness
of organized challenges to governmental policies. Later, along the same
line, antipoverty attorneys frequently included the California Welfare
Rights Organization or a comparable group as named parties in class
action litigation. This practice, which had certain legal advantages as a
way to avoid mootness, provided noteworthy, added publicity for the
group. Welfare rights organizations, in turn, were an important resource
in the planning of litigation. In particular, they played a key role in
finding and referring individual recipients whose factual claims were
most likely to bolster whatever legal contentions were being advanced.
Yet, viewed from an organizing perspective, the results in the end
were not entirely salutary. Major litigation, especially successful litigation,
had a lulling effect on political organizing. It focused attention on the
courts, on the role of lawyers, and on legal argumentation rather than
self-help actions by recipients themselves. Reliance on litigation
produced results but with minimal participation and self-sacrifice on the
part of affected beneficiaries, which is the kind of engagement usually
needed to build and to expand grassroots organizations.
According to a prominent welfare rights organizer, it was not,
however, law reform activities but routine services provided by legal aid
offices that most damaged recipient efforts at self-organization. , 6 For
grassroots organizations, providing a benefit, such as free legal assistance,
can be a key factor in attracting and retaining members. When welfare
226. Interview with Timothy J. Sampson, former high-level NWRO staff member (Feb. 8, 1974)
(on file with author). Following his time at NWRO, Sampson returned to the San Francisco Bay Area,
where he was a social work professor and highly active community organizer.
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rights groups first began in California, they were the only organizations
actively engaged on a broad scale in assisting AFDC beneficiaries. The
expansion of free legal services by the federal government created a
competing and eventually superseding network of advocacy organizations.
Legal services programs exacted no cost, financial or otherwise, from their
clients and promised professional rather than lay representation. It did
not take long for legal aid offices, not welfare rights offices, to become
the preferred place for ordinary recipients to seek individual help. By
1971, welfare rights organizing in Alameda County, where California
efforts to organize AFDC recipients first began, had come to a standstill.
The period from the beginning of Reagan's first gubernatorial term
to late 1969 involved strong disagreements between welfare recipient
advocates and state welfare officials but without hostility or animosity.
The Director of the State Department of Social Welfare ("SDSW") was
John C. Montgomery, a Reagan appointee who was previously a member
of the Ventura County Board of Supervisors. During his tenure in office,
Montgomery made few adjustments in SDSW's policymaking staff, which
was composed largely of holdover personnel from the latter years of the
prior Democratic administration of Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown,
Sr. Montgomery had, much of the time, a surprisingly free hand in
administering the SDSW with relatively little interference from either the
Governor's Office or the Secretary of Human Relations, the
gubernatorial cabinet member to whom he was directly responsible.
At the end of 1969, under fire from others in the Reagan
administration for having let welfare rolls and costs skyrocket,
Montgomery resigned his position. In his final press statement, he stated
the following:
Here in California we have been challenged on dozens of issues all of
them coming back to the fact that for the first time, the poor have real
and effective advocacy.... This .. . is the significant point transcending
all other considerations and consequences. An era of advocacy has
begun out of which, I am sure, public assistance is never going to be the
same.
Not only is this happening through the courts, but also in meetings and
hearings of welfare boards, advisory commissions and administrators at
every government level. The poor have come out of their apathy, and
our accountability for what we do and why we do it is theirs to know-
as it always has been under the law but never before so vocally
sought."7
Having had to confront an unexpected and unprecedented series of
challenges from welfare recipient groups and legal services lawyers,
Montgomery was able to accept what had occurred as a promising step in
the enfranchisement of the poor.
227. Sitkin, supra note 216, at 607 (citing Montgomery's press statement).
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Through Montgomery's tenure, SDSW vigorously defended its
policies and practices against attack. There was, however, a willingness to
accommodate contrary views, particularly when ordered by a court. This
was not to last. After Montgomery's resignation, the Department's
position became one of constantly challenging statutory requirements and
judicial developments with which the Reagan administration disagreed by
seeking new legislation and exceptions to federal policy and by
circumventing and resisting adverse court rulings. For the conservative and
ambitious governor, the specter of continually rising welfare rolls and
costs had to be brought under control.
Meanwhile, Abascal and his legal services colleagues had become
expert not only in the law but in the practicalities of welfare policy and
administration. They were not of a mind to abandon litigation, but their
perspective was highly pragmatic. Litigation would be used as part of an
overall strategy that included legislative and administrative lobbying.
Substantively, the key questions before initiating actions were how much
money was at stake for intended beneficiaries, and how many recipients
were likely to benefit. Although there was ample respect for legal
principles and advancing the constitutional and statutory rights of the
welfare poor, the primary approach taken would be technical and
mundane. It was quite different from Sparer's grand strategy initiated
just a few years before.
D. THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM
I. Prelude: Setting an Agenda and Reshaping the Bureaucracy
Total annual expenditures in California for all categorical aid and
general assistance programs had nearly doubled during Reagan's first
term of office, from $925 million to more than $i.8 b 2llon. To call
attention to these increases without accepting political responsibility for
them, Reagan mounted a formidable case against the existing welfare
system. His approach was twofold.
First, he strongly identified his interests with that of the taxpayer.
Welfare in California became more than ever an issue explicitly tied to
tax relief. Reagan's most persistent refrain was that a reduction of
welfare expenditures would ease the burden on the taxpayer. In July
1970, in a letter to the chairmen of all county boards of supervisors, he
stated, "The fact is California taxpayers are looking to their elected
representatives in government-at every level-to make the kinds of
tough decisions necessary for bringing runaway welfare costs back in
228. Public Welfare in California, 1972-73, supra note 206, App'x A.
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check."" 9 Though old hat now, the extent to which Reagan was able
rhetorically to bind welfare policy to tax relief was novel at the time.
Second, Reagan placed the blame for rising costs on others. At
various times, he and his top administrators attributed the increases to
previous state legislation, cumbersome federal requirements, laxity in
administration by counties and individual social workers, recalcitrance
on the part of middle level bureaucrats within SDSW, unwarranted
interference by courts, antipoverty attorneys, welfare rights organizations,
and the suspect behavior of welfare recipients themselves.23 Although the
allegations were exaggerations and had inaccuracies, they were not
entirely off base. Some of what he underscored indeed had contributed to
an unwelcome, from his standpoint, liberalization in welfare policy and
administration.
In discussing specific reforms, Reagan's main policy themes recalled
to a striking degree the Tudor poor law vocabulary long associated with
public relief. He spoke of compulsory employment for those capable of
working, of strengthening family ties, of increasing assistance to the "truly
needy," and of purifying the welfare system by uprooting those who were
not strictly entitled to benefits-usually conceived of as the "non-needy. '23'
These themes were largely symbolic.
In talking about jobs for welfare recipients, state officials neither
consulted nor incorporated specific data about the prospects for private
or public sector employment.2 32 They had only the slightest awareness of
actual labor market needs. Furthermore, they took few steps to establish
the necessary day care facilities for children who were to be left
unattended while their mothers sought work. The bulk of potentially
employable adults who received public aid were AFDC mothers. The
appeal being made was about "work" as an abstract value, not the
establishment of a meaningful program for employment.
Recommendations to strengthen family relationships, which centered
on increasing the financial responsibilities of relatives for the support of
welfare beneficiaries, had a similar hollow ring. In practice, such provisions
placed a considerable strain on bonds of affection and family ties, since
they imposed additional economic obligations in situations where
individuals were often least able to bear the monetary burden.
The commitment to the "truly needy" was no less wrought with
inconsistencies. The conception, like older notions such as the "deserving
poor," appeased altruistic impulses but in application was elusive. The
229. Attachment to Press Release of Governor Ronald Reagan #356 (July 10, 1970).
230. See CAL. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA ... SHOWING THE WAY
(1972) [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA].
231. Id. at Io.
232. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, former California Director of Social Welfare (Jan. 1971-
Mar. 1973), in D.C. (Feb. 25, 1974).
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"non-needy" more often than not turned out to be the families of
working adult recipients who, entitled under federal law to having their
grants calculated after taking into account reasonable work-related
expenses and certain financial incentives for working, were struggling to
get off the welfare rolls. For the poor there was no escaping political
stigmatization. If they were not working, they did not want to work and
had to be compelled to seek employment. If they were working, they
were "non-needy" and thus, by implication, were wrongfully receiving
public aid benefits.
The Reagan welfare campaign gave new authority to old ideas and
placed his opponents on the defensive. The reforms he proposed set the
agenda to which others, including Abascal and his colleagues, had to
respond. But Reagan was too masterful a politician to rely on rhetoric
alone. He took deliberate and comprehensive action to transform SDSW
into an administrative agency that vigorously carried out proposals he
wanted implemented in a concerted drive to curtail welfare costs.
In August 1970, Reagan appointed a special task force on public
assistance to conduct an extensive review of all laws and regulations
affecting welfare programs and to develop detailed organizational and
fiscal analyses concerning the administration of public assistance. The
work of the task force was not widely publicized so as to avoid premature
controversy. The four individuals selected to serve on the task force had
no previous experience either in social work or public assistance policy.
Three came from the Departments of Agriculture, Conservation, and
Public Works, respectively. The fourth was the Governor's Appointment
Secretary. The report summarizing the task force's work described them as
"men with proven management capabilities." '233 Their professional staff
consisted of attorneys and fiscal experts.
At the beginning of December, shortly after Reagan's resounding
reelection for a second term, the task force completed its work and
delivered findings and proposals for a broad welfare reform program.
The main conclusions, as set forth in the formal report issued, were as
follows:
Many state and federal laws had been "broadened, expanded and
twisted" by implementing regulations.
"Interpretations" of federal and state law were being made by social
work professionals without sufficient legal knowledge or research.
The original system, which was set up essentially to provide social
services and manned primarily with social worker skills, had since
become a huge management and fiscal operation for the issuance of
"unrestricted direct money grants," while the necessary shift in
personnel skills to accommodate the change in circumstances had not
occurred.
233. WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 230, at 9.
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... the tightening of eligibility and grant determination regulations was
assessed to be central to reform. 34
In short, the report called for a restaffing of SDSW and a thorough
reworking of state provisions governing the distribution of welfare
benefits.
After the submission of the report, Reagan selected Robert B.
Carleson, a member of the task force and previously the Chief Deputy
Director of the State Department of Public Works, to be the Director of
Social Welfare. 3 He also named James Hall as the Secretary of Human
Relations, the cabinet-level position with oversight responsibility for
social welfare policy and administration. Hall was a close and trusted
cabinet member, who had been serving as Secretary of Business and
Transportation. Both Carleson and Hall assumed their new positions in
early January 1971. According to Carleson, he met regularly with
Governor Reagan for the first two months after his appointment. At
these meetings, the proposals of the special task force on public
assistance were transformed into a concrete program for change. After
this initial period, Carleson's continuing contacts with Reagan were
mainly through Hall. 6
The first priority in the administrative restructuring of SDSW was
the removal from all positions of authority persons regarded as overly
sympathetic to the claims of the poor. Reagan generally referred to these
individuals as "professional welfarists. '237 He meant mainly social workers,
who for years composed the Department's policymaking staff.
Carrying out Reagan's directions to remove high-level
administrators with social work backgrounds, Carleson vacated the
positions and then reclassified the jobs to require that they be filled by
individuals with fiscal, managerial, or legal experience rather than social
work training. Social workers in mid-level positions with responsibilities
for welfare benefit programs were transferred into a community service
program for treating the mentally ill. Their previous positions, too, were
similarly reclassified. What happened was subsequently described in the
following vivid terms:
Out the window went the tradition of having the Department run by
social workers or unwitting captives: in the door marched a
management-legal-fiscal-oriented team intent upon reshaping welfare
234. Id. at 9-IO.
235. Carleson replaced Robert Martin, a lawyer, who served in the position for about a year as
Montgomery's successor. High Reagan administration officials quickly came to regard Martin as
lacking the necessary administrative skills for the job but wanted to wait until after the election to
make a change, so as to avoid any appearance of political instability within the administration during
the campaign.
236. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, supra note 232.
237. Interview with Ronald Reagan, supra note 6.
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into a viable system under which both the genuinely needy and the
troubled taxpayer would find equanimity and relief.31
Acting expeditiously, Carleson dismantled SDSW's existing bureaucratic
structure and thereby preempted the prospect of any internal dissent to
or moderation of the governor's welfare policy agenda and its eventual
implementation.
One of Carleson's chief assistants was Ronald Zumbrun, an attorney
who worked with him at the Department of Public Works and who was a
staff member of the special welfare task force. Zumbrun assumed the
newly created position of Deputy Director for Legal Affairs.239 The
creation of the Legal Affairs Division was the most novel development in
Carleson's overall restructuring of decisionmaking within SDSW.
At the end of 1970, prior to Carleson's changes, SDSW employed
about five full-time attorneys. They worked out of a simply designated
bureau known as the Legal Office. The formal authority of the Office
extended only to providing in-house legal advice and to supervising
through a chief referee the state fair hearing system. Under Carleson, the
position of chief attorney became a deputy directorship with immediate
supervisory control over federal coordination, legislative matters,
regulations development, administrative proceedings, security operations,
and a priority task force on welfare fraud. Within a year, in line with these
expanded functions, the legal staff of the Legal Affairs Division grew to
thirty-five attorneys.
In addition, Carleson took advantage of the election of Evelle
Younger, a Republican Attorney General succeeding a Democrat, to have
a special unit of ten deputy attorneys general physically placed within
SDSW headquarters. This was a highly unusual move. The California
Attorney General is responsible for representing all state departments and
agencies in litigation. While pivotal litigation decisions are made by
client departments and agencies, deputy attorneys general ordinarily
view themselves as independent legal advisors. The placement in SDSW
of this group of attorneys, though they were not the only deputy attorney
generals to work on welfare cases, had the effect of increasing further
SDSW's internal legal capability and its leverage in controlling the
handling of court cases.
It is noteworthy, however, that on all major judicial issues the
Attorney General's Office consulted independently with the Secretary of
238. WELFARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 230, at i I.
239. Following his state government service (c. 1973), Zumbrun became a principal founder of the
Pacific Legal Foundation, where he initially served as the Executive Director of Legal. One of the earliest
conservative public interest law organizations, the Pacific Legal Foundation has played and continues to
play an especially prominent role in advocating for constitutional limits on the power of government to
take and regulate private property.
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Human Relations.24" This continuing high level involvement reflected the
political priority placed on welfare reform by the governor and his closest
advisers.
On March 3, 1971, Reagan transmitted to the California Legislature
his program for welfare reform.24 ' This was the most significant legislative
message of his administration. The stakes involved were extraordinarily
high, as the message was intended not only to present proposals for
legislation but also to showcase an entire blueprint for change. Having
presidential ambitions, Reagan wanted a conservative public assistance
program that would counter the Nixon administration's proposed Family
Assistance Plan.
To Carleson, the message gave explicit authority to take whatever
action was necessary to carry out the welfare reform program. In doing so,
he self-described his operational style as confrontational.42 He felt that
previous SDSW Directors had been too conciliatory in interactions with
opponents or dissenters. In support of a highly aggressive approach to
welfare reform, he was able to call upon the entire resources of
California's executive branch of government. Any objections within the
administration were dealt with by Hall at the cabinet level.243
After only several months in office, Carleson successfully completed
the restructuring and restaffing of SDSW, a major objective of which was
to centralize departmental authority in the hands of a few like-minded
individuals. A welfare bureaucracy once dominated by social workers
was no more. The reorganization resulted in a greatly bolstered role for
lawyers but in ways that tied them closely to the administration's welfare
policy objectives. Carleson had done what was expected of him. The
Reagan government had new confidence in its ability to promote and
defend its welfare reform agenda, including challenges from public
assistance recipients and their attorneys.
2. Combat: Defiance and Delay in Complying with Law
a. Preparing for a Strategy of Conflict
While most California legal aid programs were involved to one
degree or another in welfare-related activities, one program, San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation ("SFNLAF"), came to
240. Interview with Jay Linderman, former deputy attorney general (Feb. 8, 1974) (on file with
author).
241. RONALD REAGAN, GOVERNOR OF CAL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE: A RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM FOR
WELFARE AND MEDI-CAL REFORM (Mar. 3, 1971) [hereinafter MEETING THE CHALLENGE].
242. Robert Carleson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley, Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series, Stemming the Welfare Tide: Oral
History Transcript 52 (1986).
243. Interview with Ronald Zumbrun (Oct. 25, 1973) (on file with author).
[Vol. 64:9331012
LEGAL ADVOCACY AND WELFARE REFORM
occupy the dominant role in the early 197Os. The first steps were taken
by Peter Sitkin, a Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellow,"44
assigned to the San Francisco program. Sitkin developed an early
expertise in public assistance law. His most prominent case was Wheeler
v. Montgomery, which he handled from the trial stage through oral
argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, where the case was jointly heard
with Goldberg v. Kelly. 45 In addition to providing direct representation
himself, Sitkin regularly provided welfare law advice to other California
legal services lawyers and, in that capacity, initiated under SFNLAF
sponsorship the first of several in-state welfare training sessions for
California antipoverty attorneys and lay advocates.
Sitkin left SFNLAF in mid-1971. Before his departure, he recruited
Abascal to work at the San Francisco program. They had previously co-
counseled on welfare litigation. Upon taking over most of Sitkin's
statewide welfare advocacy responsibilities, Abascal encouraged SFNLAF
to formalize the loose, guiding role the program previously had been
performing in the welfare area. The result was the creation of a special
"law reform" unit under Abascal's direction to oversee welfare advocacy
in California. In an unusual development, a unit of a local legal services
program formally assumed major responsibility for the initiation and
coordination of welfare recipient advocacy for an entire state.
It was no coincidence that during roughly the same period that
Carleson acted to expand the number and intensify the coordination of
SDSW lawyers, Sitkin preliminarily and then Abascal systematically
embarked on a comparable course regarding legal advocacy for the
welfare poor. Both sides realized that they had to prepare for heightened
levels of ongoing conflict. For welfare recipients, legal services attorneys
began to account for the prospect of increasing political as well as legal
resistance to their challenges. Each course of action they took depended
more and more on what they expected might be the reactions of
administrators and legislators as well as judges. In similar fashion, the
Reagan administration focused on multiple ways to preempt and
forestall welfare recipient advocacy efforts. The governor was ready to
act aggressively on legislative, administrative, and judicial fronts. In
short, the actions of legal services attorneys and the Reagan
administration increasingly centered on expectations about the other
side's likely behavior and anticipated responses. Each had to plan not
244. Holders of this fellowship were commonly referred to as "Reggies." Leaders of the OEO
Legal Services Program initiated the Reggie Fellowships in 1967 as a primary method for recruiting to
antipoverty law practice recent law school graduates with strong academic credentials. One of the
objectives of the Reggie program was to establish a cadre of talented lawyers who were likely to be
aggressive "law reform" advocates for the poor.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 181-184, 218-221.
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just one step ahead but several steps ahead. The two opposing sides came
to be engaged in a complicated chess game.
This kind of mutual, anticipatory engagement is what Thomas
Schelling has called a "strategy of conflict."246 Schelling took the term from
game theory, where in a game of strategy, "the best course of action for
each player depends on what the other players do..., [and the focus is] on
the interdependence of the adversaries' decisions and on their
expectations about each other's behavior." '47 In winning the 2005 Nobel
Prize for Economic Sciences, Schelling commented that in game theory,
"everyone's best choice depends on what others are going to do, whether
it's going to war or maneuvering in traffic." ' And so it was during the
intense conflicts over welfare policy and administration in the early 197Os.
A strategy of conflict presumes that there will be bargaining. In 1971
and 1972, the Reagan administration and antipoverty advocates, however,
seldom bargained directly. While their respective decisionmaking was
interdependent and anticipatory, resolutions usually required the
intervention of other governing institutions. The bargaining was indirect
and very much relied heavily on the actions of others.
For Abascal and his colleagues, this meant that they had to become
broadly attuned to what Reagan administration officials were likely to do
offensively as well as defensively. But the playing field was not level. In a
game of strategy, Reagan had far more chits to play given his political
stature. Nonetheless, to a surprising extent welfare recipient advocates
held their own, even as the underlying political and legal terrain became
less hospitable. An especially dire development was the Reagan
administration's waning respect for the rule of law.
When Montgomery was SDSW Director, there was a willingness to
accept in good faith legal constraints on executive authority. Once welfare
reform became the highest political priority of the Reagan administration,
there was no longer the same deference to legal limits. In complying with
court orders and legislation viewed as adverse to the governor's objectives,
state welfare officials adopted the narrowest interpretations possible and
then proceeded to implement them only at the last conceivable moment
prior to the issuance of sanctions. Defiance and delay became standard
procedures in responding to the challenges mounted by welfare
recipients and their attorneys, by legislators, and by the federal
government. Even on the clearest issues there was no sense of voluntary
compliance with provisions or rulings favorable to the poor.
246. THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 3 (197o).
247. Id. at3 n.I.
248. Matt Moore & Josef Feldman, Game Theory Wins Nobel For 2, S.F. CHRON., Oct. II, 2005, at
A2.
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b. Conflict over Cost-of-Living Adjustments
A particularly illuminating example of this pattern of behavior
involved the Reagan administration's resistance to making adjustments in
AFDC grants and standards of need in accordance with federally
mandated cost-of-living provisions. The main statutory issue reached the
Supreme Court in Rosado v. Wyman, a New York case.249 The California
saga was far more complicated. The dispute originated during
Montgomery's tenure as Social Welfare Director and continued for almost
three years, with the most politically and legally convoluted machinations
occurring as Reagan initiated his welfare reform agenda and while
Carleson was SDSW Director. It was played out in multiple
decisionmaking arenas including the unusual institution of federal
administrative conformity hearings and lawsuits in both federal and state
courts.
As in Rosado, the dispute centered on the implementation of section
402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, a provision enacted by Congress in
1967, which required California as a "maximum grant" state to update by
July I, 1969, dollar amounts used to determine for AFDC families both
individual need calculations and any maximums imposed on grant benefits
paid. Like most states, California failed to meet the statutory deadline.
Top state welfare officials were not in a hurry to comply because they
assumed that the issue would be resolved politically, not legally. According
to a former mid-level welfare administrator, their belief was "that they
would not be called to account for their failure to follow federal law and
that there would be no day of reckoning since the Republican
Administration in Washington would not jeopardize the position of a
Republican Administration in California.""25
Federal welfare officials did not share the same set of assumptions.
During Nixon's first term, the federal department with oversight
responsibility for AFDC, then known as the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare ("HEW") and subsequently as the Department
of Health and Human Services, was controlled by individuals from the
moderate wing of the Republican Party. With few exceptions, they
continued many of the agency policies put into effect during eight years of
Democratic administration. At the time, the Department was under
considerable pressure from the National Welfare Rights Organization and
from the filing of lawsuits to systematically enforce federal legislation. The
effect was that for the first time in more than thirty years, HEW initiated
formal administrative conformity hearings to determine whether a number
249. See supra text accompanying notes 185, 186.
250. Declaration of Marion Chopson, former Chief of SDSW's Income Maintenance Division
(Sept. 4, i97o), submitted as part of the record in Bryant v. Martin, Civ. No. 5 19 o9-AJZ (N.D. Cal.
complaint filed Aug. 6, 1969).
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of states including California were in compliance with federal law. The
decisions were made with full concurrence of the HEW Secretary and
Under Secretary. California's noncompliance with federal law was not
viewed as an especially distinctive political problem.25'
To give states additional time to comply voluntarily with federal
requirements, decisions to hold federal conformity hearings were not
announced until early summer i970, a year after required cost-of-living
adjustments were to have been made. As of the previous January, thirty-
one states had not yet met the standards imposed by § 402(a)(23). By June,
eleven states still had not made the necessary adjustments. By July, only
California, Indiana, and Nebraska were considered out of compliance.
In late spring 1970, California welfare officials made a modest effort
to get the governor and his cabinet to authorize a legislative proposal to
raise maximum grant amounts in accordance with federal requirements.
The cabinet failed to act in timely fashion, and the governor never
submitted the necessary legislation. There was some sentiment within the
Reagan administration to cast responsibility for any eventual action taken
against California on the Democratic controlled legislature, since it was the
legislatively enacted maximum grants that constituted the most serious
failure to comport with federal law. While the legislature was derelict in
not initiating action on its own, the Director of Social Welfare under state
law had authority to make adjustments in state provisions whenever
necessary to comply with superseding federal welfare enactments.
The prospect of an adverse HEW decision was not the only threat
that California had to confront. In August 1969, welfare recipients
pursuing their own legal remedies had filed in federal court a suit raising
many of the same issues that were to become part of the federal
administrative proceedings."' Throughout the conformity struggle, there
were distinct but parallel administrative and judicial actions.
The HEW hearing was held in San Francisco on August 25, 1970.
State welfare officials were not permitted by their superiors to testify at
the inquiry. Only SDSW's chief legal officer was in attendance, and his
instructions were to invoke the attorney-client privilege as grounds for
not conveying any substantive information.53 The state's case was
handled in its entirety by deputies to the Attorney General.
Upon the completion of the hearing, which lasted two days, the state
moved to defer all judicial action in the federal suit already initiated by
welfare recipients until after a final HEW decision. The motion was
25I. Interview with John Twiname, former Administrator of the Social and Rehabilitation Service,
the specific HEW division charged with overseeing state AFDC administration (Feb. 25, 1974) (on file
with author).
252. Bryant, Civ. No. 5 19o9-AJZ.
253. Interview with Rudolf H. Michaels, former SDSW Chief Legal Officer (Aug. 30, 1973) (on file
with author).
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rejected by the federal district court. Shortly thereafter, in early
September, the court issued its first major ruling in the matter-a partial
summary judgment upholding the contentions of recipients. The State was
given sixty days to meet the requirements of § 402(a)(23). In the
accompanying memorandum opinion, Judge Alfonzo J. Zirpoli stated,
"Regardless of the 'practical and political consequences' involved in State
adherence to the provisions of § 402(a)(23), the State cannot continue to
frustrate the will of Congress without incurring the risk of an injunction
against the payment of Federal moneys to the State.
2 54
In complying with the court's ruling, the state had the option of either
increasing the existing maximum limitations on grant amounts or adopting
legislatively a "ratable reduction" system. The latter was a method for
computing grant levels that set cash benefits at a certain percentage of a
family's imputed standard of need. As part of the judicial order, the state
was also under instructions to upgrade calculations of need.
Reagan's public response to Zirpoli's decision was colorful and
blunt. He minced no words in criticizing not just the ruling but any role
for judicial review in welfare decisionmaking. In expressing his
administration's intention to file an appeal, Reagan proclaimed,
We don't think a judge has a right to tell any state what they are or are
not going to pay in welfare.
I think the judge was absolutely wrong. If I sound mad, then I am.
We're going to fight this out if we have to secede.'55
On October 6, several weeks after the district court's order, the HEW
hearing examiner announced his recommended findings. He too found
California in violation of § 402(a)(23). In his opinion, he underscored the
impact on AFDC families of the state's failure to keep pace with rising
costs of living, one of the major problems being increased malnutrition
among AFDC children.
At the end of October in a hearing before Judge Zirpoli, the state
proposed to comply with § 402(a)(23) by raising need standards 21.4% and
by instituting, at the same time, a ratable reduction so that only 74% of the
recognized need standard would be paid recipients. The 21.4% figure was
based on cost-of-living increases incurred since January 1962, not October
1957 as plaintiffs contended and as the court had first ordered. The
January 1962 base year was one agreed to by federal and state officials as
part of the continuing HEW conformity proceedings. On November 17,
Judge Zirpoli amended his earlier order by accepting the new base
period. But he rejected the state's proposal to institute a ratable
254. Bryant, Civ. No. 5 19o9 -AJZ (memorandum filed Sept. I6, 1970).
255. Reagan Charged by Welfare Group, SACrO OBSERVER, Oct. 29, 1970, at A-4.
256. See Peter E. Sitkin, Welfare Law: Narrowing the Gap Between Congressional Policy and Local
Practice, printed in Jt. Econ. Comm., Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy, Issues in Welfare Administration:
Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 5 (pt. 2), at 42 (Mar. 1973).
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reduction, as it was a change in the method for computing grant levels
not authorized by California legislation. The Reagan administration was
given sixty additional days to comply with the judgment.257
Two days later SDSW issued several emergency regulations: One
raised the dollar maximums by 21.4%; another eliminated any cash
benefits for recipients from such increases by limiting the grant amount
received by a family to 69% of its computed standard of need, a figure
even lower than that originally proposed by the state and already rejected
by the district court. The regulations were never implemented.
The same day these emergency regulations were adopted the
California Welfare Rights Organization filed suit in Sacramento Superior
Court challenging the authority of the Director of Social Welfare to
institute a percentage reduction in grant amounts without legislative
approval."8 The state court immediately issued a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the implementation of the 69% limitation on benefit
payments, the effect of which was to uphold grant amounts at ioo% of
the revised standard of need.
On November 24, a week after the restraining order was issued,
California submitted to the federal district court its proposal to increase
the maximum grant amounts on paper but to reduce actual payments to
69% of the computed need standard. The proposal was filed in an
affidavit allegedly in compliance with the district court's amended
judgment. It was, however, inconsistent with that judgment and also, by
this time, contrary to the outstanding superior court order. California
welfare officials were not overly concerned about complying with Judge
Zirpoli's ruling as they had already taken steps to appeal the decision to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In early December, the Court of Appeals stayed the partial
summary judgment issued by Judge Zirpoli pending a full review on the
merits. At about the same time, the Sacramento Superior Court issued a
preliminary injunction reaffirming the proscription against the 69%
limitation on grant payments. On December i8, in light of the Court of
Appeals stay, Judge Zirpoli, who still retained original jurisdiction over
the federal case, revised the time for compliance with his order to give
the state until March I, 1971, to meet the requirements of § 402(a)(23).
Several days later, a third court action affecting the issue was filed in
Los Angeles Superior Court. In an order that conflicted with the
injunction previously issued in Sacramento, the Los Angeles court
enjoined all increases in grant maximums, not just the imposition of the
ratable reduction.59 The effect of this order was to provide the state with a
257. See Bryant v. Carleson, 444 F.2d 353 (9 th Cir. 971).
258. CWRO v. Martin, No. 207231 (Sacto. Cnty. Super. Ct. complaint filed Nov. i9, Ig7o).
259. Levine v. Martin, No. NWC-21865 (L.A. Cnty. Super. Ct. complaint filed Dec. 21, 1970).
[Vol. 64:933
LEGAL AD VOCA CY AND WELFARE REFORM
judicial basis for not raising grants immediately. By the end of 1970,
welfare recipients had not yet received the cost-of-living adjustments to
which they were statutorily entitled one and one-half years earlier.
On the morning of January 8, 1971, John Twiname, the Administrator
of the Social and Rehabilitation Service, acting for the HEW Secretary,
adopted the recommendation of the federal hearing examiner and issued a
final decision concerning California's continuing violation of Congressional
statutory requirements. Because of procedural objections to the scope of
the formal notice received by the state, the issue resolved concerned only
whether California had updated its AFDC grant maximums. Twiname
concluded that the state had not and, thus, had failed to comply with
§ 402(a)(23). He then ordered, effective April I, that all federal financial
assistance for the California AFDC program be withheld until such time as
California conformed with federal requirements. The termination of the
federal share of public aid costs was the only sanction available to him.
Several hours later Twiname withdrew and rescinded the final decision.
During the course of the conformity proceedings, Twiname
continually had informed those federal officials who he thought had a
conceivable interest in the matter. They were HEW's Secretary and Under
Secretary, Kenneth Cole (the chief assistant to John Ehrlichman in the
White House Domestic Affairs Council), and Vice-President Spiro
Agnew-who was in charge of intergovernmental relations. Until January
8, the only questions about the actions being taken had come from Elliot
Richardson when he succeeded Robert Finch as HEW Secretary. Once
Richardson understood the issues, he indicated full support for Twiname's
handling of the proceedings. It was Secretary Richardson who, in a sudden
reversal, directly ordered Twiname to retract the California decision.1
6
,
Immediately after the state and other affected parties received
advance notice of the decision, Governor Reagan first contacted Vice-
President Agnew and then Secretary Richardson. The objective was to
arrange yet further time for a settlement of the matter. In describing what
happened, newspaper accounts citing the governor reported the following:
... [W]hen [Reagan] learned of HEW's threat he telephoned Vice-
President Spiro Agnew late Thursday and told him there had been a
misunderstanding. "He called me back and told me that (HEW)
Secretary Elliot Richardson would be calling me ...."
Reagan said he told Richardson it was a misunderstanding and the
Secretary "called off the press conference (announcing the cut) and
ordered them not to take action.
26
'
During the telephone conversation Reagan gave Richardson personal
assurance that California had taken appropriate steps to conform with
federal requirements. The governor's reference was to the two emergency
260. Interview with John Twiname, supra note 251.
261. $7oo Million Welfare Aid Is Restored, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1971, at 1, 12.
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regulations that were presently enjoined by lower state court rulings. To
expedite a final judicial ruling on the California plan, Reagan indicated
that the state administration had already petitioned the California
Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the cases.262 The alleged
"misunderstanding" was over whether the proposed regulations
constituted a reasonable effort to comply with § 402(a)(23).
By this time, it was perfectly clear to all parties, though never
explicitly stated, that the state administration lacked the legislative
authority to initiate on its own a percentage reduction in the amount of
grants afforded recipients. Nonetheless, pressured by the Vice-President
and wary of directly confronting Reagan himself, HEW decided to give
California yet another opportunity to take corrective action without the
imposition of federal sanctions. The pending action in the California
Supreme Court provided a convenient basis for granting the extension. In
his statement to the press concerning the rescission of his initial decision,
Twiname stated,
With the full expectation that the Supreme Court of California is
assuming jurisdiction and will expedite a decision and break the
judicial deadlock, I am willing to withhold the drastic action previously
contemplated for the expected short time it will take the court to
resolve the matter one way or the other.' 63
Expedited legal action had become grounds for yet further delay.
Two and one-half months later, the California Supreme Court in a
unanimous decision sustained the position advanced by welfare recipients
and found that the State Director of Social Welfare had the authority to
increase maximum grants, but had no authority to implement a 69%
ratable reduction.264 What was obvious from the very beginning now had
the authoritative approval of the state's highest court.
On March 26, the following day, Twiname sent to Carleson, who
was now the California Director of Social Welfare, a letter requesting by
no later than April 2nd the state's timetable for implementing the
increases in maximum grants. On April i, Carleson responded by asking
for additional time. He complained, "Because of the numerous legal,
fiscal, and administrative uncertainties with which we are presently faced,
it is not possible at this time to provide you with a definite answer
regarding how and when we can proceed to comply with § 402(a)(23). ''165
Carleson also suggested that action on the governor's welfare reform
proposals by the California Legislature would in all likelihood resolve
262. Telegram from Governor Ronald Reagan to Elliott Richardson and John Twiname (Jan. 8,
'97').
263. John Twiname, Statement to the Press (Jan. 8, 1971).
264. CWRO v. Carleson, sub nom. CWRO v. Martin, 4 Cal.3d 445 (1971).
265. Letter from Robert Carleson to John Twiname (Apr. 1, 1971).
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the entire matter. The day after Carleson's response, the following article
appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle:
Governor Reagan made clear yesterday that his administration is in no
hurry to have the State conform either with Federal regulations or a
recent court decision on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program. "There is no great and immediate problem on this," the
Governor told reporters at his news conference.
Asked about a "deadline" of today, supposedly set by the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Reagan said only that
"they just wanted.., the knowledge that we are proceeding."
"We are talking to each other," he said. 66
Reagan's comment about "talking" to the federal government was a
classic understatement. The same day that the article was published,
Reagan met with President Nixon at the Western White House in San
Clemente, California. The two discussed matters privately for about one
hour before they were joined by other officials from their respective
administrations. These officials included HEW Secretary Richardson,
Caspar Weinberger (Reagan's former finance director and at the time
Nixon's Director of the Bureau of the Budget), and Hall (California's
Secretary of Human Relations).,67 The main purpose of the San Clemente
meeting was for Nixon and Reagan to reach a political agreement on
conflicting welfare reform proposals. Although recipients and poverty
attorneys suspected a major item on the agenda was yet further evasion of
§ 402 (a)(23), there was apparently no extended discussion of this issue
during these sessions.' 68
The meeting ended with important concessions to the state concerning
Reagan's proposed welfare reform program.269 Having obtained major
federal commitments on this highly significant issue, the Reagan
administration finally was prepared to comply with the requirements of
§ 402(a)(23). Further resistance only antagonized HEW officials from
whom specific waivers of federal law had to be obtained if the general
settlement reached by the President and the governor was to be
transformed into concrete policy proposals. Although actual conformity
was not to come for several more months, the San Clemente meeting
marked the end of state resistance to federally mandated cost-of-living
adjustments. Compliance with § 402(a)(23) was now a distracting side
issue to the state administration's overriding concern for comprehensive
welfare change.
266. Reagan in No Hurry on Child Aid, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 2, 1971, at iO.
267. Robert Fairbanks, Nixon and Reagan Talk, Find Views on Welfare Are Similar, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1971, at 1, 22, Part i.
268. Interview with Ronald Reagan, supra note 6.
269. See infra text accompanying notes 312-321.
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At the press conference held immediately after the San Clemente
meeting, Richardson announced that he had granted California a new
deadline of June 30 to implement cost-of-living increases for AFDC
families. On April 5, Twiname, acting for Richardson, extended until April
i2 the time the state had for submitting a plan that would comply with
§ 402(a)(23).
California's response was a general letter from Carleson to Twiname
indicating that conformity in all likelihood would be achieved prior to July
i. Since the state had not offered assurance of immediate compliance,
Twiname decided to reissue on April i6 the decision that he had originally
prepared on January 8. It was a move designed to clarify any ambiguity
as to HEW's intentions regarding compliance with § 4o2(a)(23). It also
reflected continuing pressure from aggrieved welfare recipients.
Uncertain about what precisely occurred at the San Clemente
meeting and still fearful of further delays in the receipt of cost-of-living
adjustments, Abascal on behalf of the California Welfare Rights
Organization had filed the week before yet another lawsuit concerning
the much delayed implementation of grant increases. The action was
brought in federal district court.27 It alleged a conspiracy among state and
federal officials to deprive California AFDC families of their rights under
law. The named defendants included President Nixon and Governor
Reagan. 7' For the plaintiffs the purpose of the suit was "to vindicate their
belief that no man, not a governor nor a president, is above the law.""'
The case itself-novel and difficult to prove-was eventually resolved in
favor of the defendants, but the basic contentions advanced were far from
frivolous. They underscored what was by then almost two years of official
procrastination and misconduct during which state defiance and federal
vacillation mocked the rule of law as a constraint on executive authority.
In the middle of April, Judge Zirpoli in the Bryant case, the first
action filed against California, had occasion to comment on the state's
continuing failure to comply with § 402(a)(23). Anguished and exasperated,
he stated,
Between July I, 1969, and today, the State of California has been told
indirectly by the United States Supreme Court in Rosado, and directly
by this court, the California Supreme Court, the Superior Court of
Sacramento County and the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare that it is not in compliance with Federal law. It has been
ordered by several of these tribunals to comply forthwith with Federal
law. Yet in what can only be described as a flagrant disregard of these
bodies, indeed of the authority of the U.S. Congress whose statutes are
involved, the State has refused to take any meaningful corrective
270. CWRO v. Reagan, No. C-7 167 6-ACW (N.D. Cal. complaint filed Apr. 8, i97i).
271. The others were Vice-President Spiro Agnew, Elliot Richardson, John Twiname, James Hall,
and Robert Carleson. Collectively the defendants were referred to as the San Clemente Seven.
272. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, CWRO, No. C-71676-ACW.
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action, while at the same time it continues to accept Federal moneys.
The court has at all times acted on the assumption that the State was
proceeding in good faith, but this assumption becomes increasingly
strained as weeks become months and months become years without a
single welfare recipient receiving grants calculated in accordance with
Federal law."3
The court's statement aptly summarized the Reagan administration's
questionable good faith and insensitivity regarding the constitutional
limits imposed upon executive office.
On April 29, Carleson notified Twiname that he had filed that day an
emergency regulation readjusting grant maximums in accordance with the
HEW decision. Because of a surplus in the specific appropriation for
AFDC in the fiscal year to expire on July i, Carleson made the
readjustment effective on June i rather than waiting the additional month
allotted the state for compliance. This was not the only news that day.
At the same time, Carleson also announced the promulgation of
another emergency regulation on an entirely different and separate matter
that promised to remove from the AFDC rolls 27,500 recipients. This
proposed regulation affected households with working adult recipients and
was inconsistent with other federal provisions. It was adopted in response
to an Alameda County Superior Court ruling in a suit brought by the
counties against the state. The specific substantive issue involved limiting
to four months a recipient family's period of eligibility for income
exemptions under federal work incentive requirements. Although SDSW
officials were the named defendants in the original action, the state on
appeal was the main advocate for the retention of the regulation. The
litigation throughout had overtones of collusion between the counties and
the state. In expeditious action, on the motion of Alameda County Legal
Aid Society attorneys representing intervening welfare recipients, the
California Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court
decision.274 The effect of the ruling was to void the pending cutoff of
AFDC households with eligible working adult recipients. Had California's
highest court not acted quickly, HEW officials were prepared once more
to institute conformity proceedings against the state."' There was no
letup in the need to monitor constantly the actions of California's welfare
officials.
At the beginning of May, Twiname informed all the interested parties
that the proposed California increases in grant levels were satisfactory, a
decision that was formalized at the end of June after California had
actually complied. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit in the Bryant case
273. Bryant v. Martin, Civ. No. 5 19 o9 -AJZ (N.D. Cal. memorandum, opinion, and order filed Apr.
19, 1970; see Sitkin, supra note 216, at 45.
274. Cnty. of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730 (1970.
275. Telephone conversation with Eugene Rubell, former special assistant to SRS Administrator
John Twiname (Feb. 13, 1974).
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affirmed the federal district court judgment issued the previous
November.Y76 The main question that now remained was whether welfare
recipients were to receive not only prospective but also retroactive
increases. The estimated sum involved if retroactivity were to be afforded
was $90 million.Y77
Since the adjustments were to have taken place on July I, I969,
recipients were legally entitled to the increased allowances withheld from
them, but the judicial decision to grant retroactivity is discretionary. In
August, Judge Zirpoli held that California was at last officially in
compliance with § 402(a)(23). Fearful of a pending fiscal and budgetary
crisis, he then found that despite the state's prior unlawful action, the
financial burden would be too great to warrant retroactive increases. The
following July, three years after the initial date for conformity, the Ninth
Circuit upheld Judge Zirpoli's judgment on retroactivity. Citing the
lower court's opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, "While the State has
no one to blame but itself for being thrust on the brink of bankruptcy in
the administration of its welfare program, this Court will not push it over
the edge. ' '1
7 9
Notwithstanding the constant claims of the Reagan administration,
the state was not on the brink of bankruptcy. Six months later, with a
substantial surplus in state revenue, the governor was able to propose and
eventually obtain legislation that granted to Californians sizeable income
tax credits for the coming year. It was a cash rebate that benefitted few
welfare recipients.
The American political system, with its separation of powers and
multiple levels of government, provides numerous opportunities for
affected parties to challenge and influence official decisions. In seeking to
implement congressionally mandated AFDC cost-of-living adjustments,
legal services attorneys on behalf of California welfare recipients initiated
lawsuits and argued at the appellate level in multiple cases in federal and
state court. They also closely monitored the federal conformity hearing
process. Litigation was critical both in seeking to hold the Reagan
administration legally accountable and in creating a form of counter-
pressure on the federal government not to back down in its effort to
obtain California compliance with federal law. This extensive litigation
was not about extending constitutional rights nor even about the
meaning of congressional legislation, something which the U.S. Supreme
Court had definitively interpreted relatively early in the Rosado case. In
these protracted proceedings, California antipoverty attorneys found
276. Bryant v. Carleson, 444 F.zd 353 (9th Cir. 1971).
277. Legal services attorneys estimated the figure as $50 million to $6o million. The courts,
however, based their decisions on the state-supplied figure of $9° million.
278. Bryant v. Carleson, 465 F.2d iII (9th Cir. 1972).
279. Id. at 114.
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themselves fully engaged-not in influencing policymaking-but in the
arduous and time-consuming task of policing state administrative
compliance with governing law.
For the Reagan administration, the disputes were mainly about
political will. During this period, the governor and his subordinates
wanted to show that they were serious about cutting back on AFDC
costs. The same fragmented American system of government that
opened up opportunities for welfare recipient participation also provided
opportunities for state governmental delay. Throughout the § 402(a)(23)
compliance proceedings, California welfare officials had no hesitancy in
playing one institution against another. Until the end, there was little
concern for conforming to federal requirements. At each step along the
way, deputies in the Attorney General's Office had advised state welfare
officials that what they were proposing was presumptively illegal."" Yet,
with respect to enforcement, there were practical constraints on the
abilities of both HEW and the courts to take timely and definitive action
against California.
Regarding federal administrative conformity proceedings, the only
sanction against the state-the termination of federal funds-was too
drastic. The impact of any cutoff of federal funding in all likelihood
would have been borne by AFDC beneficiaries, whose grants ultimately
would have been reduced accordingly. HEW officials could threaten and
cajole, but actually to impose the sanction would have been contrary to
the very purpose of the legislation being enforced.
The courts faced a similar dilemma regarding the imposition of
sanctions. Legal disputes rest on the assumption that conflicting parties act
in good faith. Judges are very hesitant to draw an opposite conclusion. For
elected officials, it is always possible to flout judicial authority with little
fear of direct recrimination, as courts sensitive to their own limitations
usually strive to avoid ultimate clashes with other institutions of
government. The contempt power is seldom imposed. Even Reagan's very
public defiance of the judiciary was not sufficient to overcome such
caution. The entitlements of the poor are not the kinds of issues over
which governments quake.
There is another striking subtext to this story. The underlying issue
regarding the need to update the benefit amounts received by AFDC
recipients was something with which the Reagan administration was in
sympathetic agreement. According to Carleson, his overarching welfare
system policy objective was "to direct a finite amount of money to those
who need it the most."2"1 In an oral history interview he gave in 1983, he
cited as a particular example his concern that there had been no increase
280. Interview with Jay Linderman, supra note 240.
281. Carleson, supra note 242, at 40.
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in AFDC benefit levels since 1958 and that a family of four still received
in 1970 the same $221 to which it was entitled back then.12 He also
reported that when he informed the governor about this, Reagan had
said, "Oh, my. ' '2 83 Carleson and apparently Reagan both realized the
inadequacy and inhumaneness of current benefit levels, but their
emphasis on capping welfare costs resulted in protracted confrontations
with the federal government and with welfare recipient lawyers in federal
and state courts. From the Reagan administration's standpoint, the
three-year fight was not about what was lawful nor about what was right
but about minimizing welfare expenditures no matter what.
Although AFDC beneficiaries eventually received cost-of-living
adjustments, the results achieved were but partial victories. Not only did
they not receive retroactive benefits, there also were questions regarding
the reliability of the percentage amounts used to adjust upward their
maximum benefits, which had remained virtually unchanged since 1951
and arguably should have been set higher.4 Worse still, from a welfare
recipient advocacy perspective, the struggle over implementation of §
402(a)(23) underscored for the Reagan administration the advantages in
prolonged if not ultimate resistance to legal mandates, notwithstanding
formidable opposition from welfare rights groups, antipoverty lawyers,
the judiciary, and HEW. For the next few years, conflicts over how
California implemented welfare legislation would follow a similar
pattern. The Reagan administration was not, however, just about
defiance and delay. It also had its own welfare policy agenda to enact.
3. Compromise: The California Welfare Reform Act of 1971
Reagan's ability to command public attention and his aggressiveness
in asserting fairly traditional and highly accepted ideas about public relief
enabled him to dominate events concerning welfare reform in California,
whether they involved decisionmaking in Sacramento or Washington,
D.C. His opponents, fearful of the political liabilities attached to
identification with runaway welfare costs, after extracting some
modifications, generally fell in line behind his proposals. To institute
changes in California, Reagan obtained waivers of federal law from HEW
Secretary Richardson, who was widely perceived as personifying "all there
is of personal and official integrity in the Nixon administration. ' '285 The
governor also gained the reluctant support of Democratic legislative
282. Id. In this recollection, Carleson cited as the time benefits had last been increased a date
similar to that put forth by legal services attorneys. During the actual litigation, the state contended
and the court eventually used January 1962 as the base period for updating aid amounts. See supra text
accompanying notes 256-257.
283. Carleson, supra note 242, at 41.
284. See Beilenson & Agran, supra note I I I, at 483.
285. John Osborne, Reagan's Welfare Deal, THE NEw REPUBLIC II (May 15, i971).
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leaders including State Senator Anthony Beilenson, the Chairman of the
Senate Health and Welfare Committee, who more than once during the
legislative proceedings wanted to disassociate himself from the
eventually enacted welfare reform bill, of which he was the chief sponsor.
In one of those ironies that occurs in politics, the governor's
effectiveness in dealing with opponents stemmed in part from shared
expectations among the various political actors about the actions of legal
services attorneys. The prospect of judicial intervention initiated by
antipoverty lawyers had the unintended effect of easing the moral and
legal defenses of those who questioned the Reagan proposals. Federal
officials and state legislators found themselves in a position where, in
anticipation of legal challenges from welfare recipients, they could make
highly dubious concessions to the state administration without feeling
responsible for their programmatic impact. The ultimate decisions would
come from the courts. Prior to the advent of federally supported legal
services, governmental administrators frequently ignored the statutory and
constitutional claims of the poor because there was little chance of legal
redress; now federal and state officeholder were prepared to barter such
claims precisely because there would be judicial challenges. Calculations
about legal advocacy for the poor became part of the political bargaining
process.
a. Reagan's Message
During the first four years of his administration, Reagan introduced
each legislative term the same package of twelve welfare measures. It was
usually only with great difficulty that he was able to find a Republican• • 286
legislative sponsor for the proposals. His welfare message on March 3,
197i, marked a new turn of events, as he promised comprehensive and
novel legislation. He also promised massive savings: $220 million at the
state level and a corresponding $73 million and $283 million at the
county and federal levels, respectively."7
Having just been convincingly reelected and having had an entire
gubernatorial term to consolidate control over the California Republican
Party, Reagan was in an extraordinarily strong political position. With
few exceptions, he enjoyed the solid if not always enthusiastic backing of
Republican legislators. Since a two-thirds vote in each house of the
legislature was necessary under state law either to enact welfare changes
involving budgetary appropriations or to override a gubernatorial veto,
Reagan had more than sufficient legislative strength to block any
286. Interview with Tom Joe, former advisor on welfare in the Assembly Office of Research (Feb.
26, 1974) (on file with author).
287. Beilenson & Agran, supra note i i i, at 477. Those amounts were large numbers at the time.
April 2013]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
counter-proposals initiated by the Democrats, who had slim majority
control in both the Senate and the Assembly.2m
In the political vocabulary of public assistance, "welfare reform"
connotes governmental efforts to tighten the conditions for receiving
assistance. It is the reaction that sets in after a period of expansion and
liberalization in programs for the poor. 89 The Reagan proposals were not
directed at improving the life circumstances of AFDC recipients but at
curbing welfare expenditures and minimizing opportunities for suspected
recipient abuse and fraud.
A few months after Reagan submitted his welfare message to the
Legislature, he addressed the convention of the California Republican
Assembly, an association of conservative Republican Party supporters.
The governor stated,
We must declare an end once and for all to the idea that welfare is a
right and certain jobs are more disgraceful than welfare.... I've had a
bellyful of people who think tinkering with the social welfare system is
lacking in compassion. But the majority of poor have been herded into
a great big government feed lot and been told to just raise hell until
you get a larger trough."'
Reagan's vow to end welfare as it then had become was far more colorfully
put than President Clinton's similar promise twenty-five years later." '
There was no hesitancy in Reagan's seeking to stamp out the recently
recognized but still fragile rights of the welfare poor. And he was
confident in the popular appeal of his message in no small part because
his agenda for change was not new but old. It represented a return to and
reinvigoration of longstanding seventeenth century English principles of
public relief.
Relying mainly on the general recommendations of the special task
force on public assistance that he had appointed in August 1970, the
governor's plan for reform focused on AFDC provisions, some changes in
the Aid to the Needy Disabled program, and revisions in Medi-Cal, the
state's program of medical assistance for the poor."' The major changes
proposed in the AFDC program were subsequently described as follows:
288. The breakdown in the Senate was twenty-one Democrats and nineteen Republicans; in the
Assembly, forty-two Democrats and thirty-eight Republicans. CAL. STAT. 1971, A12I-24.
289. See Francis Fox PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE I I I (updated ed. 1993).
290. Welfare War (cont.), S.F. ExAM. & CHRONICLE: THIS WEEK'S NEWS IN REVIEW, May 9, 1971, at 5,
6.
291. Upon signing the 1996 welfare reform legislation eliminating AFDC, Clinton said, "Today we
are taking a historic chance to make welfare what it was meant to be: a second chance, not a way of
life." Francis X. Clines, Clinton Signs Bill Cutting Welfare; States in New Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
1996, at AI.
292. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 241.
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i. Eliminate the Maximum Participation Base [the system of statutorily
established maximum grants] with its open-ended budget in favor of an
equitable apportionment with a modified close-ended budget.
2. Sustain an intensive effort to reduce the welfare rolls through a
tightly controlled qualification program to provide for only those
entitled to participate.
3. Assist those able to work to become economically self supporting
through a comprehensive work experience program.
4. Eliminate aspects of the welfare system which weakened family
responsibility and intensify efforts to collect child support."
These proposals and the terms used require brief clarification.
The elimination of statutorily enacted maximum grants and the
institution of "equitable apportionment," a concept coined by the Reagan
administration, meant that individual grant amounts would vary in
accordance with fluctuations in the overall size of the state's public aid
caseload. The proposed system was a floating variation of ratable
reduction schemes that existed in other states. For the poor it held out the
constant prospect of decreased levels of assistance. Quarterly increases in
the number of people receiving aid automatically would lead to
decreases in the cash benefits provided recipients. The objective was to
ensure that relief expenditures would remain within an annual budgetary
ceiling.
A "tightly controlled qualification program" was simply another way
of talking about stringent income or "means" testing, which was still the
defining feature of the eligibility process for public relief. The governor's
proposals called for increased verification of applicant and recipient
information through computerized cross-checking of state tax and
employment records.
The proposed comprehensive work program, a central and much
publicized aspect of welfare reform, involved the establishment of certain
work requirements as conditions for receiving assistance. These
requirements were offered as alternatives to federally conceived ideas
about earned income disregards as incentives for encouraging recipients
to seek employment. Similar mandatory employment legislation had
existed in California in the 1930S.29 4 At that time, the stated reasons for
compulsory work provisions were that "work would keep 'the indigent
from idleness... assisting in his rehabilitation and the preservation of his
self respect,' reduce the burden on the county by enabling the recipient to
contribute to his own support, and demonstrate 'to the welfare authorities
the sincerity and good faith of the applicant."'295 The rationale for
Reagan's work proposals was much the same.
293. See Zumbrun et al., supra note i i i, at 477.
294. CAL. STAT. 1933, ch. 761 § i.
295. tenBroek (pt. 2), supra note 135, at 942-43.
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The measures to strengthen family responsibility broadened the
financial and legal liabilities of relatives for the support of persons who
received public assistance. The main target groups were stepfathers and
adult children whose parents were aid beneficiaries. The Reagan
recommendations also included an intensification of efforts to collect
child support payments from absent fathers.
In addition to what was said publicly, the Reagan administration
had as a principal priority an expansion of state administrative discretion
in implementing public assistance programs. Hemmed in by what they
regarded as unduly restrictive national and legislative standards, they
wanted exceptions to and reversals of prevailing federal and state law. In
exchange for increased administrative leeway, they were prepared to
concede even such essential features of the initial reform proposals as
equitable apportionment and a close-ended state welfare budget. They
calculated that with increased regulatory latitude, they would have all the
additional authority needed to curb welfare expenditures.
There were two main ways to cut public assistance costs. The first
was to reduce the number of persons who received benefit payments; the
second was to lower the actual welfare allowances provided individual
recipients. As a catchall in referring to these dual objectives, state
officials usually talked about "closing welfare loopholes." The term was
vague and somewhat misleading in that the point was not so much to
eliminate welfare loopholes as to substitute ones beneficial to the state
treasury for those beneficial to the poor. Immediate savings were,
however, to be minimal, as the governor promised to transform most of
the retained revenue for the first year into higher benefits for those he
termed the "truly needy."
To reduce the actual welfare caseload, welfare officials concluded
that the most efficient method required stringent administration of the
initial eligibility process. They considered later efforts to remove
beneficiaries from the welfare rolls as marginal, since the normal process
of attrition insured that a majority of current recipients soon would no
longer be receiving public assistance. 6 In 1971, less than one-half of
California's AFDC families remained on the relief rolls for lengths of
time longer than eighteen months.297 For state welfare administrators, the
main problem was that the "means test" as presently administered was
not adequately screening out aid applicants. In rather graphic terms, they
referred to eligibility decisionmaking as a spurting artery in desperate
need of a tourniquet.
296. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, supra note 232.
297. DHEW, SRS, Natl. Ctr. for Social Statistics, Findings of the I971 AFDC Study, Part I-
Demographic and Program Characteristics, tbl.I2 (Dec. 22, 1971).
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The solution which they foresaw revolved around a new set of
administrative options that could be selectively employed to reduce the
number of persons who, in the first instance, qualified for assistance.
These options were to replace those regulatory mechanisms that had
recently been eliminated or eroded as a result of court decisions following
welfare recipient challenges. In a word, the Reagan administration needed
a series of substitute devices that could fulfill the screening functions
previously performed by such traditional programmatic features as
residency requirements and man-in-the-house rules.
Primarily, SDSW planned to rely on job and job seeking
requirements, cumbersome application and monthly reporting forms,
and extensive verification of beneficiary-provided information. The
overall purpose was to make the AFDC application process increasingly
unpleasant. State officials even began to talk in earnest about the
"inconvenience factor," the point at which applying for aid became so
intrusive, so demeaning, and so frustrating that a certain percentage of
potential recipients would forego trying.298
The Reagan administration was equally methodical about how to
approach the implementation of grant reductions. Although the protracted
resistance of the state to federally mandated cost-of-living adjustments
suggested otherwise, state welfare officials claimed that they actually
favored raising welfare grants for the most destitute. Carleson as SDSW
Director, in particular, professed no objection to annual cost-of-living
indexing for AFDC families.2 9  What he did not favor was legislation that
automatically mandated such changes without new legislative action
because he wanted to be able "every year to bargain the increase to get
something else."3" Carleson maintained that it was possible both to raise
maximum grant allowances and to cut overall public relief expenditures.
The hope for achieving such a formidable fiscal feat centered on
reducing the actual cash benefits received by individuals who had access
to non-welfare resources. This meant mainly lower grant amounts for the
working poor who under existing law still qualified for AFDC benefits
and for AFDC households where not all the members were eligible for
such assistance. The reason for state optimism was that the mechanics for
computing grant levels for working recipients and households with both
AFDC and non-AFDC individuals were sufficiently malleable that a
number of key changes could be expected to produce substantial state
savings. It was projected that a number of adjustments in the formulas
used to account for earned income and other financial and in-kind
resources would result in considerable reductions in grant amounts to
298. Interview with Jay-Allen Eisen, former staff attorney in the SFNLAF welfare unit (Feb. 21,
1974) (on file with author).
299. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, supra note 232.
300. Carleson, supra note 242, at 93.
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certain families. The size of the reductions depended on the latitude
afforded the Reagan administration in shaping state regulations.
The counties were among the first to respond to the governor's
proposed welfare legislation. They were most concerned that a good
share of the asserted fiscal savings at the state level represented cost
shifts to the counties. Most of the large counties did their own fiscal
analyses of the administration's recommendations. The Welfare Director
for Sacramento County estimated that the Reagan "reform proposals
would add a net cost to the county of $6,580,000. ' ' 3"L A supervisor from
the same county termed the legislation "the same old thing. He [Reagan]
is just shifting costs back down to the county level again.""3 2 A report of
the County Supervisors Association of California found support for some
of the proposed savings, but it also concluded that other estimates were
too high or could not be reliably computed and that several of the
changes were legally questionable.3" Recommendations for equitable
apportionment and a close-ended state welfare budget especially
perturbed county officeholders, since they feared heavy recipient
pressure on local government for additional benefit supplementation in
the event of reductions in state grant levels.3 4 Under California law, the
county is the welfare agency of last resort.3 5
The leadership of the Assembly and Senate shared the governor's
and counties' concern for rising welfare costs. But they were much less
confident about what could be done at the state level. The nonpartisan
Legislative Analyst's Office reported that the projected savings from the
governor's program were seriously exaggerated."' Most legislative
leaders saw a federal solution as ultimately necessary. They therefore
supported President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. Even though they
were not optimistic about the effectiveness of new state legislation, in
anticipation of the governor's legislative suggestions, they proceeded to
develop their own program of state welfare reform.
Their proposals covered much the same ground as those put forward
by Reagan. Like the governor, they stressed closing welfare loopholes,
which at times resulted in families with significant income still being
eligible for supplemental aid benefits. Although legislators expected little
actual savings from these provisions, they felt that even the relatively few
cases of abuse associated with existing provisions unnecessarily undercut
301. Jim Lewis, Reagan Plan Boosts Costs, SACTO UNION, Mar. 4, 1971, at 3.
302. Id.
303. County Supervisors Ass'n of Calif., Governor's Welfare Reform Proposal Analysis, App'x B
(Apr. 23. 197).
304. Id. App'x A, at 2.
305. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (Deering 2013).
3o6. See OFFICE OF CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, COMPARISON OF SAVINGS (COST) ESTIMATES OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE (SDSW) AND LEGISLATIVE ANALYST (June 14, 1971).
[Vol. 64:933
LEGAL ADVOCACYAND WELFARE REFORM
the integrity of the welfare system.3" Other recommendations covered
state-initiated job programs, comprehensive family planning, and child
care facilities. The most significant feature was an increase in AFDC
benefits that would have raised the maximum grant to an AFDC family
of four from $261 per month, the figure set as a result of § 402(a)(23)
litigation, to about $314 per month. This latter figure was the "standard
of need" that SDSW set as the amount minimally necessary for a family
of four to meet basic living costs.
Reagan strongly attacked the bill proposed by the Legislature's
leadership. He argued,
This is not welfare reform. It is a blatant attempt to force a frantic tax
increase on the people. The Democratic leadership has apparently
seized on the welfare reform issue as a means of raising taxes-a goal
they have announced repeatedly. I intend to continue to push for
responsible welfare reform which serves the interests of all the people
including the taxpayers, whose patience has been stretched to the
breaking point."9
The governor never wavered in linking welfare reform and tax relief.
After extensive public hearings, the Democratic welfare package
passed the Senate Health and Welfare Committee. A few days later on
July Ii, 1971, the governor's program, which was embodied in several
different bills, died in Committee. Near the end of July, the Democratic
version of welfare reform was adopted by a majority vote of the Senate
but lacked the two-thirds support necessary to retain key appropriation
provisions. At this point, the legislative leadership decided to enter into
direct negotiations with Reagan.
The Democratic legislators were especially worried that if they did
not reach agreement with the governor on welfare reform, he would
propose and submit for popular vote a welfare reform initiative. They
already had been subjected to a grassroots cards and letters campaign
calling for welfare reform that was instigated by Reagan's political
supporters." ' A welfare initiative was viewed as a political lightening rod
that would generate Republican votes and cost Democrats their slim
control of the state legislature if it were to appear on a statewide ballot.
For Reagan, the threat of a welfare initiative meant that he was prepared
to hold tough on his legislative proposals. If they were killed by the
Legislature, he was fully committed to campaigning hard for an initiative,
the main provisions of which already had been written by his welfare
team.3 '
307. Beilenson & Agran, supra note I 11, at 478.
308. S. B. 796, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971), as amended June 7, 1971.
309. Richard Rodda, Reagan's Welfare Program-And What He Really Got, SAcro BEE, Aug. 22,
1971, at 1, 4.
310. Carleson, supra note 242, at 76.
311. Id.
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In the meantime, the governor and his welfare advisors were in deep
consultation with HEW officials. Their approval also was necessary if the
state administration was to have sufficient authorization to make the full
range of changes proposed.
b. Taking out the Federal Government
Negotiations with the federal government began several months
before the governor's bargaining sessions with the Legislature. Reagan's
objective in the HEW negotiations was to obtain waivers of certain federal
requirements, which circumscribed the state's receipt of public assistance
funds. The state administration considered that three-fourths of the reform
effort could be carried out through regulations and without new state
legislation. The problem was that many of the proposed changes
conflicted with existing federal law. Without the requested waivers, each
step taken by the governor was likely to be met by delays incurred as a
result of recipient-instigated litigation and by administrative protests
from HEW officials.
The key meeting was the one between President Nixon and Governor
Reagan at San Clemente on April 2, 1971. The President was meticulously
briefed as to the differences between his welfare proposals and those of
the governor. He was also carefully forewarned as to the delicate political
considerations involved. In a confidential memorandum, Nixon was told:
We want to leave the meeting with the Governor with (a) his maximum
possible long-term public support for your welfare and health reform
programs and (b) the minimum, possible exposure of these reforms
(and the Administration more generally) to attack from other quarters.
These objectives are not easy to reconcile. The line we walk should be
clearly defined; a successful meeting will require a precise balancing of
benefits and risks.?
In the spring of 1971, the Nixon administration still had substantial
hopes about enacting significant national welfare reform legislation
including a second version of the Family Assistance Plan. As the leading
political figure opposed to these measures, Reagan had support not only
from conservative Republicans, but also from conservative Democrats in
Congress. For the President, the task was to defuse Reagan's opposition
without losing pivotal legislative backing from moderates and liberals.
The recommended course was to emphasize the "striking elements
of commonality" between the two proposals for welfare change. This was
the conclusion to be announced publicly at the end of the meeting. At
the same time, the President was advised to make concessions only in
312. Memorandum from Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary, DHEW, to President on San Clemente
Meetings of April 2-California Welfare Reform (Apr. i, I97I). Much of the information on the
federal negotiations was obtained in confidential interviews and from originally confidential
documents. Interview notes and document copies are on file with the author.
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general terms. It was felt that to make specific commitments during the
meeting would jeopardize support for the Nixon administration's own
proposals. It was also felt that the immediate granting of waivers to
Reagan would intensify pressure for similar treatment from other
governors.
In support of a general statement about commonality, HEW
identified sixty-six separate items in Reagan's program that were of
potential federal interest and concluded that thirty-nine appeared not to
pose a significant legal or policy problem. The most ticklish issue, on
which there was not agreement, concerned the treatment of the "working
poor." While the federal government stressed the importance of work
incentives to encourage the poor to take and hold jobs, the Reagan
proposals created penalties for meaningful employment by undercutting
the economic benefits for families with wage earners.
Besides political reservations, HEW officials also had legal and
programmatic qualms about the granting of the waiver requested by the
governor. A 1962 amendment to the Social Security Act gave the HEW
Secretary broad discretion to waive compliance with federal
requirements and to provide special additional federal funding for
certain experimental state projects.3 This discretionary power was to be
exercised to support demonstration projects likely to be supportive of
AFDC beneficiaries and was not to be used to fund broad, continuing,
statewide programs. HEW officials found "no supportive, credible
precedent for granting" the waivers requested by California. Reagan
sought permission to reduce benefit levels. Furthermore, he intended to
establish programmatic changes that would have a statewide impact. The
waiver authority had never before been used either on the scale
suggested or as a basis for justifying benefit reductions.
Another cause of discomfort was that the Reagan administration, as
of the end of March 1971, had not yet submitted any actual proposals in
support of the waiver request. HEW officials felt that "program integrity
and 'due process' require an evaluation of 'demonstration' projects on
the merits of the proposals in fact submitted." Nonetheless, in the event
the request was to be granted, they were prepared to counter negative
reactions, and to defend against any litigation initiated, by having the
HEW Secretary adhere to all proper procedures before exercising his
discretion. In light of the broad authority conferred on the Secretary,
procedurally correct action was not likely to be vulnerable to substantive
challenges.
At the conclusion of the meeting between the President and the
governor, Nixon announced to the press that he and Reagan, at their
"summit conference on welfare reform," had found "many areas of
313. Social Security Act § 115,42 U.S.C. § 1315 (I973).
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agreement" and had established to their mutual satisfaction that "major
details" of the governor's proposals "can be implemented without being
in violation or contrary to the federal regulations or federal law. 31 4 After
the announcement, the President left the governor and Secretary
Richardson to answer the questions of reporters. Richardson stated that
there was "really no problem" with thirty-eight of the Reagan proposals,
and that most others entailed "no significant problem" because "they are
consistent with the Administration's own welfare proposals." '315 The
Secretary added, however, that before the waivers could be granted,
members of his staff and the governor's would meet in Sacramento to
review the issues. 16 John Osborne, one of the reporters present, concluded
that the "occasion reeked of a deal. 37
In summing up what took place, Osborne stated:
There is a certain satisfaction to be had from watching Richard Nixon
being taken by Ronald Reagan and it is just possible that the President
may derive a needed lesson. He is committed to approving the "major
details" of the Reagan program. Reagan is committed to nothing. For
all of his talk about cooperating with Mr. Nixon in getting "welfare
reform at the national level," Reagan remains adamant in his
opposition to a guaranteed federal floor under the incomes of
dependent families and to the inclusion as a matter of national policy
of underpaid "working poor" among those who are eligible for federal
and state welfare support. Without these elements, the Nixon program
would be as harsh and inhuman as the Reagan "reform" is in its worst
aspect.3'8
At his meeting with Nixon, Reagan promised to temper his criticism
of the federal government from whom he still needed specific waivers. He
conceded virtually nothing else. The President meanwhile emphasized that
he and Reagan were working "toward a common goal."3 '9 Notwithstanding
his professed commitment to the Family Assistance Plan, Nixon shared
many of the governor's views about compulsory work requirements,
welfare cheating, and rising public assistance costs. It was officials within
HEW who had different points of view. In dealing with the governor,
they in reality had little actual room to maneuver. The President's
support for their positions was lukewarm, and Reagan politically was too
powerful to antagonize.
Following the San Clemente meeting, Secretary Richardson's main
tactical decision was to have discussions about the California waiver
request in Sacramento rather than Washington, D.C. HEW's objective
314. Osborne, supra note 285.
315. Id. In this article, either the Secretary or the reporter was in error. There was no disagreement
on thirty-nine issues.
316. See Fairbanks, supra note 267, at 22.
317. Osborne, supra note 285, at ii.
318. Id. at 12-13.
319. Id. at ii.
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was to minimize interference from others in the Nixon administration,
most notably Vice President Agnew. Most of the discussions were
between high-level state and federal officials. Carleson and Hall were the
main negotiators for California. Reagan and Richardson met together on
July 15. The major issue over which there was substantial disagreement
concerned Reagan's request to establish the Community Work
Experience Program ("CWEP"). In this program, employable welfare
recipients would be required to work up to twenty hours per week in
public sector jobs in exchange for their family's welfare grant. They
would receive no additional wages. HEW officials regarded the proposal
as indefensible. Under the Social Security Act, it imposed an
impermissible penalty on the receipt of public assistance. They also
regarded the work experiences as unlikely to lead to permanent
employment and a reduction in welfare dependency. For Reagan, CWEP
was central to his conception of welfare reform, as it symbolized most
graphically his commitment to "workfare" not welfare.
A briefing memorandum to the White House described the
governor's position in the following way:
The Governor has made it clear that the work provisions are the most
important part of his program. His feeling is that there are a great
many recipients of welfare today who are not motivated to seek
employment and are content to remain on the welfare rolls despite the
fact that under the present rules they will be better off economically if
they do go into competitive employment. Therefore, in order to insure
that a person will want to seek competitive employment, his present
situation must be made less appealing. The mechanism to be used is to
require the recipient to work for twenty hours a week without any
additional benefit. The Governor reasons that if he is working already,
he will actively seek competitive employment since, if he has to work
anyway, he might as well benefit from it economically.2 °
Reagan's premises regarding CWEP's utility were ideological, not
factual. They were not backed by data about the availability of jobs for
which employable recipients were likely to be qualified.3 ' Furthermore,
they reflected deeply and widely held beliefs that impoverished individuals
would rather receive welfare than work, a proposition for which there was
no credible factual support. 2 What was at play was an underlying ideology
about poverty that harkened back to Tudor England.
While HEW officials balked at the Reagan work relief plan, it was
to no avail. In the middle of August, Nixon and Reagan met once more
320. Memorandum from John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, DHEW, on Status of Discussions
with California on Welfare Reform and Items that the Governor Will Probably Discuss with the
President (Aug. 13, 197) (copy on file with author).
321. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, supra note 232.
322. See LEONARD GOODWIN, Do THE POOR WANT TO WORK? A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF WORK
ORIENTATIONS (1972).
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to discuss welfare reform. Following the meeting, Nixon ordered that a
waiver be granted California's Community Work Experience Program.
To temper the effect of the order, HEW imposed several programmatic
conditions: Authorization for CWEP would terminate after three years
unless specifically renewed by the Secretary, the mandatory work
requirements would not affect more than 48% of the AFDC caseload,
and project funds would be set aside for a state in-house evaluation and a
large-scale federal evaluation. Some federal officials also hoped that the
conditions set would facilitate legal challenges by antipoverty attorneys.
In September, Secretary Richardson signed a set of waivers approving
CWEP and a majority of Reagan's other requests. Having just reached
agreement with the California Legislature on welfare reform, Reagan
had all the authority that he deemed necessary to institute sweeping
changes in the AFDC program.
c. Negotiations with the Legislature
Playing to general public antipathy for public assistance programs,
Reagan made welfare reform the critical political issue for his
administration. It was not, however, a legislative matter that much
concerned California's major economic interests. Even powerful
agricultural lobbyists, who in the past kept a watchful eye on public relief
policy, displayed little interest in the governor's proposed legislation. The
same was true for general business and labor interests. During legislative
negotiations, only representatives of the counties, social workers, and the
poor themselves took a direct and immediate interest.
Early in the year, the state administration decided to pursue a
strategy that pressed for the adoption of the entire package of welfare
amendments at once.323 The theory was that tradeoffs among organized
opponents could defeat any single measure separately introduced but not a
complete set of proposals intricately tied together. State welfare officials
hoped to pit nonsupporters of the legislation against one another so that
opposition to the governor's program would remain fragmented and
divided.
Throughout the legislative proceedings, there was little in the way of
cohesive opposition to Reagan's proposed reforms. The County
Supervisors Association of California focused almost exclusively on
provisions that shifted costs to the counties. Association lobbyists obtained
some modest changes in the proposed formulas for dividing the nonfederal
share of public assistance expenditures, and they played a decisive part in
eliminating from the final legislation administrative recommendations
concerning equitable apportionment and a close-ended welfare budget.
Organizations of social workers, meanwhile, concentrated almost
323. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, supra note 232.
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entirely on sections of the legislation that affected the employment of
social workers. The most tenacious opponents to the entire Reagan
program were representatives of the poor, of whom the most active and
deft was Abascal.
The actual legislative negotiations began in late July 1971, and
lasted nearly two weeks. There were numerous breakdowns and near
breakdowns. Reagan himself personally headed the state administration's
negotiating team. For the first week, until agreement was reached on
basic provisions, he participated on a full-time basis in the discussion
sessions. Afterward, for the specific drafting of the agreed legislation, the
principal negotiator for the administration was Edwin Meese, III, the
Executive Assistant to the Governor."' State Social Welfare Director
Carleson and Ronald Zumbrun, the Deputy Director for Legal Affairs,
were also in attendance throughout the intense discussions with
legislators.
During the direct discussion with the governor, Bob Moretti, the
Speaker of the Assembly, was the lead participant on the five-member
legislative negotiating team. He was institutionally and in reality the most
powerful figure in the California Legislature. The other legislators were
Senator Beilenson and Assembly Members Leo McCarthy, John Burton,
and William Bagley. 25 All except Bagley, who was Chair of the Assembly
Welfare Committee, were Democrats. All opposed or criticized Reagan's
welfare program. 6 The direct and sustained participation of the governor
and the Speaker of the Assembly in the negotiations were unprecedented
in recent state legislative history.
During the negotiating process, Reagan proved to be a strong and
talented negotiator. He grasped the varying significance of different issues
and maintained throughout a tough bargaining position. 7 It was not until
the second stage of the negotiations, during the drafting of the legislation
after the governor was no longer a direct participant, that the legislators
and their staff were able to modify the likely impact of certain provisions
through draftsmanship.32 8 The result was a tempered version of the
324. During the Reagan presidency from 1985-1988, Meese served as the 7 5th Attorney General of
the United States.
325. Beilenson & Agran, supra note iii, at 479.
326. In his recollection of the Welfare Reform Act discussions, Carleson was especially struck by
the strong connections of the legislative negotiators to major proponents of the Nixon
Administration's Family Assistance Plan. Within HEW, a chief advocate for FAP was Under
Secretary John Veneman, a former California Assembly member who was close to Bagley and like
him a liberal Republican. A major congressional supporter was Democratic Representative Phillip
Burton, John Burton's brother. Carleson, supra note 242, at 49-51.
327. Interview with Robert B. Carleson, supra note 232.
328. Interview with Larry Agran, former Committee Counsel, California Senate Health and
Welfare Committee (Oct. 8, 1973) (on file with author).
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governor's final proposals but one, nevertheless, fully consistent with his
basic objectives.
In entering into negotiations with the governor, the Democratic
legislative leadership was intent upon reaching some kind of agreement
with the state administration. They were also prepared to allow Reagan
to claim full credit for the final bill. For a number of reasons, they did not
consider it feasible either to do nothing or to enact substitute legislation
over the governor's opposition.
In the first place, the governor had cast so much attention on welfare
as a problem that not to accede to his requests in some way was likely to
have nasty repercussions for Democrats in the coming election still a year
away. If they failed to act, Reagan would hold them fully responsible for
past and subsequent increases in public assistance costs. On a very
practical and very partisan level, the objective was to slay the "welfare
monster" now so that it would not be a negative issue to be used against
them in the next election.
Secondly, the legislators seriously worried about the consequences
of a voter-approved, Reagan-drafted welfare initiative. Fearful of the
impact upon aid beneficiaries of untempered Reagan administration
proposals, even liberals in the legislature felt compelled to participate in
and to enact compromise legislation no matter what the eventual
outcome.
Lastly, there was some expectation that in bargaining with the
governor, arrangements could be reached that would prove beneficial to
welfare recipients. These efforts centered on increasing the basic grant
received by recipients, adopting mandatory annual cost-of-living
adjustments for AFDC beneficiaries, and preventing the prospect of
across-the-board grant reductions. It was also hoped that in the drafting of
the provisions it would be possible to posit language that would facilitate
judicial challenges. Sleight-of-the-hand draftsmanship was, however, a
precarious course of action. The final bill contained no general purpose
clause. Since the legislative language was lengthy, highly technical, and
sometimes contradictory, judicial construction would be a puzzling and
arduous task.
Organizations of welfare recipients by and large maintained a low
legislative profile. Not wanting to fuel further already substantial political
antagonism, they engaged in few public demonstrations. Instead their main
activities consisted of testifying at public hearings, preparing statements for
the media, and maintaining a careful watch over those legislators regarded
as their staunchest supporters. In terms of actually affecting the legislative
negotiations, Abascal was the key representative for the welfare poor.
Because of his prior and continuing involvement in litigation, Abascal
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had close connections to leaders of both AFDC welfare rights groups
and the emerging disability rights movement."9 He had their full trust.
California legislators had highly competent and knowledgeable staff
support. Abascal's contribution to the legislative process was, therefore,
not so much knowledge about the public assistance system as predictive
insight into the likely actions of courts. The negotiators for the legislature
wanted to avoid intransigence and, ultimately, political responsibility for
costly welfare provisions. But they also wanted to compromise as little as
possible the interests of the poor. Their intention was to defer to the
judiciary decisions about what they regarded as legally questionable sections
conceded the governor. The result was that Abascal found that he had
unexpected political leverage, as the specialized knowledge that he and
other legal services attorneys had developed during several years of intense
welfare litigation now meshed with the interests and needs of the
Democratic-controlled legislature.
There also was an element of personal magnetism involved.33 It had
to do with Abascal's deep confidence and trust-inducing presence. He was
not a dynamic speaker, and his style was in no way flamboyant or self-
aggrandizing. One would not describe Abascal as charismatic in any usual
sense. He was very thoughtful and paid attention to the politics in play as
well as the law at issue. When he expressed himself, there was a strong
sense of conviction, but he never exaggerated or oversold his opinions and
views. He explained matters carefully and concisely, and his explanations
were neither ideological nor strident. He straightforwardly said what he
thought and what was likely to happen. While his ideas usually were cast
as suggestions, his words were taken by others as golden. Abascal was, of
course, not infallible. It mainly was his honesty, integrity, and sincerity
that led others to always have a great deal of confidence in him. This
included legislators whom he got to know in the early I970s, a number of
whom remained close friends and important political contacts for the rest
of his life.
During the negotiations concerning the Welfare Reform Act,
legislative leaders regularly and closely consulted with Abascal. Since the
propriety of legislative lobbying was a sensitive issue within the OEO
Legal Services Program, he participated in the proceedings while on
329. Abascal's representation of the California Welfare Rights Organization intensified during the
struggle to implement section 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act. See supra text accompanying notes
249-284. He also developed very close relationships with disability rights activists during an attempt by
the Reagan administration in summer 1970 to cut back on spending for homemaker and attendant
care services for aged, blind, or disabled recipients, whose plight garnered considerable public
sympathy. Regarding the cutback in attendant care services, the Reagan administration did back
down, but only after protest activities at the state capitol, high-visibility media attention, and a court-
issued injunction. Interview with Ralph Abascal (Feb. I 1, 1973) (on file with author).
330. Interview with Marjorie Gelb, a former legal services attorney who worked with Abascal in
the early I97os (Oct. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
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leave of absence from San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation. This precautionary measure was necessary, as critics of
federally funded legal services, which included most relevantly Governor
Reagan, viewed anything other than routine individual legal assistance as
illegitimate. The well-founded fear was that Reagan would seek to
defund government-supported legal services programs in California.33'
The basic role that Abascal fulfilled was the kind usually reserved for
individuals who represented the strongest lobbying interests. He lacked,
however, their ability to influence both the positive and negative sides of
political compromise. He was in a position where he could impede
attempts to cut welfare benefits, but he was not in a position where he
could significantly expand the economic and political interests of welfare
beneficiaries. Lodged in a small backroom office of the California Capitol,
Abascal reviewed and wherever possible subtly revised all concessions
granted the Reagan administration. He was later to spearhead numerous
legal challenges against many of the provisions that he helped to draft.
His most critical work was during the drafting stage of the negotiations
after the governor personally was no longer a direct participant. The
Reagan administration was not initially aware of Abascal's involvement.
On the Saturday morning after the first week of discussions -which had
resulted in some basic agreements in principle- Carleson and Zumbrun
went over to the state capitol to try to find out why they had not yet
received a working draft of the proposed legislation. Unexpected and
unannounced, they walked into an interior office of the legislative
counsel's office and saw Abascal working with legislative staff on the
drafting of the bill's proposed language. Also present was Coleman
Blease, who represented the ACLU and a social workers union.332 Taken
aback, Carleson asked Bob Rosenberg, the chief legislative aide, why
Abascal and Blease were there. Rosenberg admitted that they had been
called.333 Carleson subsequently commented that the draft being prepared
"looked like the stuff we'd agreed to, but they had changed sentences, they
had changed phrases, they had made many, many, many changes which
almost would reverse in many respects" sections already negotiated.334
What followed was a week of very intense negotiations over actual
language, but off of the draft prepared by the legislature with Abascal's
very direct participation. Throughout the process, he continued to provide
counsel to the legislature's negotiating team.
331. For a description of Reagan's concerted effort to defund CRLA, see Bennett & Reynoso, supra
note 122.
332. Carleson, supra note 242, at 84. Blease, who later became a California Court of Appeal
Justice, was an experienced state lobbyist. On AFDC issues, he supported Abascal but was not the
lead.
333. Id. at 85.
334. Id.
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Now fully aware of the extent of Abascal's involvement, the Reagan
administration was vigilant in trying to counter the legislative negotiating
team's initial proposed language regarding statutory changes. Carleson
later explained:
All of the issues were our issues and our elements. We knew that this
paragraph was not doing the same thing that... [it once did. You]
practically had to be a lawyer to see the differences between these two
paragraphs.... It was very carefully done and very skillfully done by
the other side.
One of the reasons that was so important was because we were having
to ride a very careful line about federal law, because our welfare [code]
had to be consistent with federal law....
They were trying to write it, their lawyers, their welfare lawyers, not
their in-house lawyers, were writing it to make sure it would go down
in flames in court if it passed.. .3"
A mutually understood strategy of conflict over welfare reform was in
full bloom. Each side was very much on top of what to expect in response
from the other.
Abascal provided the legislative negotiators with a practicing
attorney's understanding of what was necessary procedurally and factually
to expedite and optimize chances for welfare recipient litigation success.
The recommendations that he made reflected judgments about the
requirements of judicial advocacy. Contrary to what Carleson assumed, a
significant part involved not changing the Reagan administration's
proposed language. A major thrust of Abascal's counsel was to reject
moderation in the framing of the welfare reform provisions. The
following example illustrates the reasoning behind and risks involved in
adopting this position."36
Federal law at the time permitted welfare recipients who were
employed to set aside earnings to meet all work-related expenses actually
incurred. This set aside provided a method for making sure that the extra
expenses that resulted from employment were not overlooked in
computing supplemental welfare benefits. The provision was one of
several authorized by the Social Security Act as a financial incentive to
encourage aid beneficiaries to seek work.337
The Reagan administration proposed an absolute $50 limitation on
all such expenses except child care. The legislative negotiators wanted to
cushion the limitation with a tempering clause, which would have
allowed amounts in excess of $50 in instances of extreme hardship.
Abascal argued against the inclusion of the tempering clause because the
effects of the basic provision then would have been inconclusive. A
335. Id. at 87-88.
336. Example provided by Ralph Abascal. Interview with Ralph Abascal, supra note 329.
337. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6o2(a)(7), (8)(ii) (1970).
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blanket limitation sharpened the legal distinctions that could be raised in
later argumentation.
Procedurally, courts also would have been inclined to await the
development of state practices under the enactment before determining
whether the provision as qualified conflicted with federal law. Since a
straight $50 limitation did not involve any significant factual questions, it
was immediately ripe for judicial challenge and an early summary
judgment decision. The prospect of litigation delay was an important
factor in the calculations of the legislature and the state administration.
In the absence of expedited judicial proceedings, the Reagan reforms
were likely to remain in force for lengthy periods of time whatever the
eventual determinations about their legality.
The legislators accepted Abascal's judgment. The governor got what
he initially had requested. If the legislators had not considered the
probable effects of subsequent legal challenges to the legislation, the
final work-related expense provision probably would have contained a
tempering clause. On the one hand, a modified provision minimized the
opportunities for quick judicial reversal; on the other, an unqualified
provision maximized such opportunities but heightened the costs for
recipients in the event of defeat. The decision to accept the governor's
proposal involved risks. The ultimate judicial outcome was not by any
means a certainty.
On August 13, 1971, in a rare show of bipartisan comradeship,
Governor Reagan signed into law the Welfare Reform Act of 1971.338 He
was flanked by Speaker of the Assembly Moretti and by Senator
Beilenson, who officially sponsored the legislation as revised Senate Bill
No. 796. A few days before, the bill had passed the State Senate on a 3 1-8
vote and the State Assembly on a 62-9 vote. The opposition votes in the
Assembly came mainly from black representatives who regarded the bill
as racist and antithetical to the interests of poor constituents. In the
Senate, the negative votes for the most part were cast by conservatives
who considered the provisions of the bill too generous. For most others
including the governor, the final legislation was a much heralded solution
to California's welfare woes. Assembly Member Bagley quipped,
"Politicians in and out of office won't have welfare to kick around any
more." '339 This was hardly to be the case.
The Welfare Reform Act was designed not to settle difficult public
policy problems but to appease the voting public. As a reporter for The
Sacramento Bee noted, the "big question is who got the most political
338. Welfare Reform Act of 1971, CAL. STAT. 1971, ch. 578.
339. Comprehensive Welfare System Reform Sent to Governor's Desk, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, Aug.
12, 1971, at 1, 2; see Eldon Rosenthal, Observations on the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 as a Political
and Legal Battleground 5 (Dec. 1971) (unpublished Stanford University paper) (copy on file with
author).
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mileage out of the lengthy welfare debate-Moretti or the governor?""3
The Democratic legislative leadership hoped to turn welfare into a
nonissue so that rising public assistance expenditures could not be used
against them in coming elections. With an eye on the presidency, Reagan
hoped to find in restrictive welfare policy and administration a nationally
marketable campaign issue. Given the governor's single-minded concern
for conserving public aid costs and his considerable competence in
utilizing the media, conflicts over public relief were scarcely likely to die
a quiet death. Neither the negotiations nor the eventual legislation in any
way altered the complexion of factors that made welfare policy for poor
families an intractable issue subject to political manipulation but not a
sensible solution.
From the standpoint of public aid recipients, the final legislation
despite its shortcomings was an improvement over the initial Reagan
proposals. It did not include provisions on equitable apportionment and
the establishment of a close-ended state welfare budget. Instead, as in
the past, state appropriations for public assistance were to be made on an
as-needed basis in accordance with a legislatively enacted maximum
grant schedule. This meant that grants to AFDC families and the disabled,
the two categories to which equitable apportionment was to apply, would
not be reduced as caseloads grew. There were also no changes in the
definition of "disability" for receipt of Aid to the Needy Disabled, though
severe restrictions had been among the original reforms proposed.
Additionally, through various parrying back and forth and a
complicated set of actions, the governor and legislature reached agreement
on provisions that significantly raised the basic allowances received by
most AFDC beneficiaries but reduced the supplemental welfare
allowances received by working recipients. The provisions concerning how
to take into account the wage earnings of working recipients were among
the most contentious discussed. According to Carleson, getting the
language the Reagan administration wanted "was the major piece of the
whole thing."34' It was estimated that, as a result of these revisions, two-
thirds of AFDC families would realize grant increases, while one-third
would suffer grant decreases.342
The very positive development for welfare beneficiaries was the
enactment of permanent legislative authorization for an annual cost-of-
living adjustment ("COLA") in AFDC payment and need standards.343
Previously, such automatic increases applied only to the adult categorical
aid programs. The inclusion of a COLA provision for the AFDC
program in the reform package was especially remarkable given the
340. Rodda, supra note 309.
341. Carleson, supra note 242, at 91.
342. Beilenson & Agran, supra note I Ii, at 481.
343. Welfare Reform Act of 1971, CAL. STAT. 1971, ch. 578 § 29.1.
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state's longstanding prior inaction and recent defiance regarding the
updating of AFDC benefit amounts. It was also unusual in that in almost
all other states annual AFDC adjustments were considered entirely too
costly to warrant serious legislative attention. For welfare recipient
advocates, the COLA provision was the most important offsetting
benefit to all that was conceded to Reagan. The first automatic increases
took effect on July I, 1973. Annually thereafter, for almost two decades,
AFDC families received upward adjustments in benefit amounts worth
collectively hundreds of millions of dollars.3" It is highly unlikely that
such steady increases in grant levels ever would have occurred if
politically they required separate authorizing legislative action each year.
Furthermore, even if they were enacted annually, the legislative
bargaining cost in terms of new restrictions affecting other aspects of the
AFDC program was apt to have been heavy.
Taken as a whole, however, the Welfare Reform Act was very much
Reagan's bill. In characterizing his reforms as workfare not welfare, he
took advantage of the resiliency within dominant American ideology of
old Anglo-Saxon ideas about the poor and poverty. Any moderating
restraints on implementing the changes Reagan most wanted would have
to come from the courts as a result of challenges brought by Abascal and
other legal services attorneys largely relying on overriding federal
statutory law.
4. Aftermath: Full Employment for Lawyers
a. Perceptions and Expectations About the Role of Courts
The Democratic legislative leadership and Governor Reagan had
very different views about the role of the courts in welfare policy
administration. Fully appreciating that the judiciary has the final word on
determining the constitutionality of legislation and the supremacy of
federal law, the negotiators for the legislature counted on the prospect
that the courts would be in a position to nullify some effects of various
concessions given the governor. For Reagan, the courts had no business
telling the states how to run welfare programs, especially when he
regarded their rulings as defying common sense. A good example was the
governor's insistence on reinstituting a durational residency requirement
344. The COLA provision enacted by the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 continued to cover the
setting of AFDC maximum aid payments until 199o. Between 199o and 2OO, California legislation
most years authorized suspending the implementation of the COLA provision, first as applied to the
AFDC program and then to the successor CalWorks (federally TANF) program. As of the 2oo-Il
fiscal year, the legislature must enact by specific statute any COLA adjustment in CalWorks cash
benefits. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11453 (Deering 2oi2). In other words, California legislation
regarding an annual adjustment in welfare benefits for families with children is now back to what it
was prior to the 197 1 Welfare Reform Act.
[Vol. 64:933
LEGAL ADVOCACYAND WELFARE REFORM
as part of the Welfare Reform Act,345 notwithstanding clear precedential
decisions regarding the unconstitutionality of such requirements.
36
In commenting on the reasoning of the legislators, Senator Beilenson
offered the following explanation:
Our strategy was to give the Governor a watered-down
unconstitutional residency requirement in exchange for real program
benefits.... Passing the buck to the courts is, of course, not the
preferred way to legislate. But in terms of the ultimate effects on poor
people, the trade off in this instance seemed reasonable.347
This concession to the governor was relatively risk free. As expected,
Abascal and his colleagues brought suit and successfully obtained an
injunction preventing the state from implementing the new durational
residency requirement."' Although the state threatened to appeal the
ruling, it did not.349 Reagan's understanding of constitutional limits on
legislative policymaking was strikingly different from Beilenson's. For
Reagan, the decision in the durational residency case was an especially
telling example of wrongheaded judicial decisionmaking.
When I interviewed the governor and future president several years
after the issuance of the injunction in this case, one of my questions was
what he regarded as the judicial role in reviewing welfare policies and
practices of the state government. His reply was as follows:
I think that all too much the courts have ... had the same attitude
there that they have had with regard to crime itself in the
permissiveness and the leniency. Can I give an example? It just
happened not too far from here and not too long ago.
Two men and their families moved here from Dallas, Texas. They had
been welders down there. They decided they wanted to live in California.
They worked for the same company there. They came up, and they
were neighbors. They lived in the same neighborhood here. They
couldn't get welding jobs here. So they applied for welfare.
Well, under our new system of checking and our reforms, we checked
with their employer. And he said, "Not only are their jobs still open,"
but he said, "I have openings for forty more welders." Now here are
two men in California applying for welfare, trained welders, and
there's a man in Dallas, Texas, where they voluntarily came from who
is looking for forty-two welders like themselves. So we denied them
345. CAL. STAT. 1971, ch. 578, § 24.65. The Welfare Reform Act provision imposed a twelve-month
durational residential requirement that applied only to the adult share of a grant for AFDC families in
counties with unemployment rates in excess of 6%.
346. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Burns v. Montgomery, 299 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D.
Cal. i968), affd, 394 U.S. 848 (1969).
347. ACLU Southern California Open Forum (Oct. 1971), as cited in Rosenthal, supra note 339, at
30.
348. Brown v. Carleson, No. 217636 (Sacto. Cnty. Super. Ct. injunction issued Feb. 15, 1972).
349. Frederick Doolittle & Michael Wiseman, The California Welfare Reform Act: A Litigation
History III.I6 (Income Dynamics Project, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Dep't of Econ., Working Paper
No. 7, I976).
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welfare. They took the case to court. They sued us. And a judge ruled
that to not give them welfare interfered with their constitutional right
to travel and live where they wanted to live.
Now, it is very precious that you and I have the right to vote with our
feet, to move across the state line, to live wherever in this country we
want to live. But I'll be damned if we have a right to live there knowing
that the only way we can subsist if we decide to live in that place is on
the largess of our fellow citizens.
So I went to one of our lawyers after that case and I said, "Look, I
want to ask you-give you a hypothetic." I said, "In a few months I'll
no longer be Governor." I said, "My main occupation was motion
picture actor. So when I'm no longer Governor I can be an
unemployed motion picture actor." I said, "Suppose I decide that I
want to go back and live in the small town where I grew up in Dixon,
Illinois. Now they don't make movies in Dixon. There are no jobs for
movie actors, but under his decision am I eligible to go back to my
home town and say I am an unemployed motion picture actor and
apply for welfare and they have to give it to me?"
And he said, "That's exactly what the decision meant."
Now, we lost that case. I claim that the judge was wrong-that this is a
wrong interpretation of the Constitution. Any common sense or reason
says to you that you can't say to the people of the United States you
can just go out and search for a place that cannot possibly provide you
employment and then move there and stop working for the rest of your
life and your neighbors take care of you. But this is what a judge really
ruled.35
Reagan was not interested in theoretical propositions. His approach
to a conceptual question about the role of courts was to give an example -
to tell a story. He governed not with ideas about the rule of law and
separation of powers in mind but by anecdote. He focused on practical,
substantive outcomes-not the applicability of abstract legal principles. I
doubt that Reagan ever thought of himself as acting lawlessly or as
encouraging others in his administration to act lawlessly. He simply
discounted as illegitimate interpretations of law with which he disagreed.
For Reagan, it was all about what he considered common sense.
And what he considered common sense in welfare policy, as for most
Americans, was rooted in longstanding beliefs about public relief. In this
constellation of beliefs, durational residency requirements are powerful
and recurring political symbols.35' They connote a perception of the poor
350. Interview with Ronald Reagan, supra note 6.
351. In California, there were two more attempts in the 199os to implement a durational residency
requirement. In both instances, District Court Judge David Levi, the son of Edward Levi, the late,
distinguished legal scholar and former U.S. Attorney General in the Gerald Ford administration,
found the provision unconstitutional. See Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997), affd,
134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998), aff d as violating the privileges and immunities clause sub nom. Saenz v.
Roe. 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Green v. Anderson, 811 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affd, 26 F.3 d 95 (9th
Cir. 1994), vacated as unripe, 513 U.S. 557 (1995). The evidentiary record before Judge Levi in the Roe
case included declarations and statistical studies supporting the conclusion that the "welfare magnet"
[Vol. 64:933
April 2013] LEGAL ADVOCACY AND WELFARE REFORM
as irresponsible vagrants not wanting to work for a living and preferring
to move to places where they can get the highest benefits. Reagan's
hypothetical was an exaggeration, as there were far more barriers to his
receipt of welfare than simply being an unemployed actor. Yet the story
he told had considerable popular appeal. His ability to tap into widely
shared, persistent political and social beliefs gave him confidence that he
could maintain the political legitimacy of his welfare reform program no
matter how much was legally overturned.
The number of lawsuits filed involving the Reagan reforms was
unprecedented. The durational residency case was only the tip of the
iceberg. One study published five years after the passage of the Welfare
Reform Act detailed thirty-two different cases.3"2 Abascal called the
legislation "the Legal Services Employment Act of I97I. ''35 As a
backroom participant in the bill's drafting, he was fully aware of its
numerous infirmities.
To establish some degree of coordination over the legal challenges
that would be forthcoming, Abascal arranged in early September 1971 a
weekend conference at Camp Loma Mar in the Santa Cruz Mountains
for California antipoverty attorneys known to be involved in welfare
litigation.3 54 The purpose of the conference was to organize an integrated
strategy that, on the one hand, would halt implementation of the Act's
onerous provisions and, on the other hand, would not impede those
sections that improved cash and other benefits for the poor. At the
conference, litigation areas were assigned to different attorneys from
legal aid programs throughout the state. The overall legal advocacy
campaign involved dozens of legal services lawyers. San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, the local program for
whom Abascal worked, would function as the back-up center for the
forthcoming litigation. Abascal along with Jay-Allen Eisen, another
SFNLAF attorney, served as co-counsel for AFDC recipients in most of
the litigation initiated. Daniel Brunner of the Long Beach Legal Aid
Society also played an instrumental role in coordinating the statewide
advocacy effort.
Welfare recipient organization lay leaders participated in the initial
September conference and several other statewide informational and
planning sessions over the next few years. Brunner recalls these sessions
theory, which hypothesizes that recipients in significant numbers make decisions where to live based on
the level of welfare benefits paid, was factually invalid. Roe, 966 F. Supp. at 981-82. Facts and strong
judicial precedents notwithstanding, durational residency requirements have had enduring political
appeal.
352. Doolittle &Wiseman, supra note 349, § II. This study includes both reported cases and non-
reported cases decided at the trial stage without an appeal.
353. Tom Goff, Two Rights Lawyers Predict Suits over Welfare Measure, L.A. TIMES, Aug. II,
I97I, at 3, 34.
354. Rosenthal, supra note 339, at 8.
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as not having a "huge structure or hierarchy. [They were] just
collaborative. '' 35 ' Lay leaders were part of the overall decisionmaking, but
the specific decisions necessarily called on the special expertise of
lawyers. 36 Approximately, fifty legal services lawyers were in attendance.357
The issues overwhelmingly involved questions of legal tactics and legal
resources. The follow-up role of grassroots, welfare rights organizers was
principally to help in the identification of individual recipient plaintiffs and
to have their organizations serve as plaintiffs whenever tactically
appropriate."' In both the legislative fight over welfare reform and its
aftermath, legal aid lawyers and leaders of welfare rights groups were on
the same page. There were no significant differences over strategy and
tactics.
The California Legislature early on became aware of the Reagan
administration's questionable and selective implementation of policies and
practices after the enactment of the Welfare Reform Act. In late
November 1971, a special Senate-Assembly Subcommittee on
Implementation of Welfare Reform held hearings on various actions taken
and not taken by the State Department of Social Welfare and Robert
Carleson, its Director. Yet the Legislature took only a few halting steps
against SDSW. Legislative attention focused mainly on reducing the
Department's administrative budget, especially funds for expanding the
Legal Affairs Division. The legislators had come to the unhappy
conclusion that lawyers within SDSW were employed for the most part to
develop ways of avoiding legal responsibilities rather than carrying them
out. They also used the power of the purse to compel the removal of the
special ten-person Attorney General's unit from its physical lodgings
within SDSW headquarters. The only other major legislative action was to
transfer budgetary responsibility for child care programs from SDSW to
the Department of Education. The move was dictated by Carleson's
refusal to initiate necessary funding arrangements for an expansion of
statewide child care facilities.
John Miller, an African-American Assembly Member from Alameda
County, who later became a California Court of Appeal Justice, was
especially appalled and anguished at what he had learned. At the
Subcommittee hearings directing his comments to Carleson (who had just
testified), Miller stated:
355. Interview with Daniel Brunner, supra note 222.
356. The welfare rights, grassroots activists present included Catherine Jermany from Los Angeles,
and Moiece Palladino from San Francisco. Both at the time were prominent leaders of the California
Welfare Rights Organization. Id. Jermany's later career focused on paralegal training and alternative
dispute resolution; Palladino subsequently became a California licensed attorney.
357. Id.
358. Interview with Kevin M. Aslanian, supra note 131.
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As I see it, there is just one fundamental issue, and I mean only just
one.
The State Department of Social Welfare, Mr. Carleson, has
completely, it seems to me, abandoned any semblance of lawful
behavior in implementation of the so-called Welfare Reform Act.
It is obvious to me that you and your people are caught with a promise
to deliver massive savings and welfare dollars to the Governor,
promises which you cannot deliver because your welfare reform
proposals are fiscal lies from the very beginning, since legal, and I
emphasize legal, implementation of the so-called Welfare Reform Act
of 1971 cannot produce the promises and the savings....
They [Mr. Carleson and his staff] know that the course will catch up
with them eventually..., but to them it is worth the gamble because
they are counting on not being forced to make retroactive payments of
illegally denied benefits, and they are counting on county government
not to be able to find everybody who has been stolen from in this case.
They also have started to begin to put the blame on the courts, and on
the counties, for the redress that will inevitably come. I am certain of
that."'
Miller's plaintive and prescient observations notwithstanding, it was
largely left, as all expected, to Abascal and his colleagues to take the
actions necessary to hold the Reagan administration legally accountable
to governing state and federal law.
The issues involved challenges to provisions of the Welfare Reform
Act, to regulations issued without new authorizing legislation, and to
changes in administrative practices. Most of the issues were highly
technical and concerned matters like determining the availability of
income from stepfathers, the treatment of in-kind resources, the valuing
of assets, bureaucratic accounting and verification practices, and
calculations of eligibility and grant amounts for families with earned
income. Some of the cases were not especially consequential, others were
mainly important symbolically, and still others entailed serious benefit
and cost consequences. Not taking into account the varying significance
of the different cases and acknowledging sometimes mixed or not easy to
classify results, my best reading is that welfare recipients were on the
winning end and the Reagan administration on the losing end in three-
fourths of the cases filed.
b. Three Post-Welfare Reform Act Skirmishes
To highlight the range and nature of the contested issues, I now turn
to case developments concerning three different aspects of the Reagan
administration's implementation of welfare reform. This accounting of
post-Welfare Reform Act litigation is not comprehensive but illustrative.
359. Hearings of S. Assemb. Subcomm. on Implementation of Welfare Reform, 1971 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1971), Transcript 3, at 39-42 (statement of John Miller).
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The first example discusses SDSW's mismanagement of recipient due
process safeguards; the second discusses the use of non-rebuttable
presumptions to reduce grant amounts to eligible families; and the third
discusses the symbolic importance of forced work programs and the high
stakes involved in calculating eligibility and grant amounts for families
with working members.
i. Due Process Mismanagement
In instructing counties and notifying recipients of changes in the
grant structure, the State Department of Social Welfare ("SDSW") was
reluctant to conform to the specific notice requirements mandated by the
Supreme Court in the jointly decided Goldberg and Wheeler cases.36, The
opinion in these cases required that all recipients receive in advance and
in writing the precise reasons for any contemplated reduction or
termination in welfare benefits. Such notification was considered an
essential prerequisite for a fair hearing.
To inform recipients of changes in their status or benefit levels as a
result of the Welfare Reform Act, Reagan administration officials advised
the counties to send to all beneficiaries a standard, generalized notice. A
"suggested" format for the notice was sent to each county welfare director
on September 2, 1971, as part of a lengthy telegram concerning various
welfare reform revisions. The recommended notice included the
following statement: "Under provisions of the Welfare Reform Act of
1971, your grant beginning October ist, 1971, may be changed, or you
may no longer be eligible for a welfare grant. One or more of the
following changes may affect you. ' The notice then cited the four
grant-affecting sections of the new legislation. No other information was
to be provided recipients.
The day after SDSW sent the telegram, the Department formally
filed with the California Secretary of State a revised set of regulations
concerning notice and fair hearing requirements. SDSW had prepared the
regulations over a period of several months in compliance with judicial
orders issued by the federal district court in the Wheeler case after the
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. These regulations clearly indicated
that recipients were to receive precise and specific information on how and
why a change in policy affected them. The issuance of a generalized notice
conflicted with SDSW's own revised standards of fair practice.
A number of county officials regarded the state administration's
suggested notice as legally defective. But when they approached Ronald
360. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal.
1968), rev'd, 397 U.S. 280 (970).
361. Report to the Legislature, S. Assemb. Subcomm. on Implementation of Welfare Reform 27,
Mar. i7, 1972.
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Zumbrun-SDSW's Deputy Director for Legal Affairs-and expressed
their reservations, he insisted that the notice met all necessary
requirements of law. Zumbrun's opinion was backed by some vague
threats that those counties which failed to comport with the state notice
would be "claim cut." A claim cut meant that the counties would not
receive state reimbursement for any funds spent in contravention of an
administrative order. Reluctantly, the counties sent out the suggested
notice.
Abascal and co-counsel quickly obtained a temporary restraining
order against the defective notice. 6 ' The counties were told to issue
immediately supplemental grants to all recipients whose benefits were
illegally reduced or terminated. However, still under the threat of an
administrative claim cut, the counties were urged by Carleson and his
deputies to disregard the judicial order. Some of the counties complied
with the court ruling; others, fearful of state administrative repercussions,
took no corrective action.
At the end of October, the three-judge federal panel reviewing the
matter ratified on the merits the previously issued temporary restraining
order.,6' The judges found the proposed notice's lack of specificity a
serious departure from the requirements of due process. They further
concluded that none of the deficiencies could be justified by any showing
of countervailing governmental interest, not even the need to effect
changes in the grants of a large number of recipients. The court's opinion
placed the responsibility on SDSW Director Carleson and his deputies for
the continued failure of some counties to take required remedial action.
This failure was seen as due to "the influence exercised by defendant
Carleson and those acting under his direction in the State Department of
Social Welfare."' 6' Carleson denied any such responsibility and attempted
to shift the blame for any illegal action to the counties, over whom he
maintained that he had no effective control.
Several months later, in yet another order, the three-judge panel
once again had occasion to draw attention to Carleson's role. The court
stated:
In spite of defendant Carleson's remonstrance that he does not have
the power effectively to coerce compliance with his directions and
orders, the records in this case are replete with proof that he does.
Moreover, there is not the faintest suggestion in those records that any
county agency has ever refused to comply voluntarily in the past, or
362. Wheeler v. Montgomery, Civ. No. 48303 (N.D. Cal. TRO and Order to Show Cause filed
Sept. 28, 1971). Because the case involved constitutional issues, it was before a three-judge district
court panel. A single judge had authority to issue a TRO pending further resolution by the entire
panel.
363. Id. (order and opinion filed Oct. 29, 197).
364. Id. at 9.
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would ever refuse to comply voluntarily in the future, with an
instruction from defendant Carleson. 6 s
Turning to the obligations of the Social Welfare Director to insure
adequate, statewide, fair hearing notices, the court then stated, "In short,
the responsibility for insuring the adequacy of those notices is committed
by statute to defendant Carleson, and defendant Carleson may not, as he
has tried to do in these proceedings, seek to displace that responsibility
onto the counties or this court." 6f Afterwards in rather terse language,
the judges proceeded to lecture Carleson on precisely what he had to do
to meet the requirements set down in the prior order of October 29,
1971.
The Social Welfare Director's immediate response to the court's
reprimand was to convene a press conference to explain his version of the
case. At the press conference, he persisted in his attempt to shift the blame
to the counties, and he hinted that in order to correct the situation he
might have to remove some county directors of welfare and run the local
departments himself.367 Some of the directors were among the county
officials who initially attempted to dissuade the issuance of the original
notice.
In a clumsy and single-minded effort to institute grant cuts as
quickly as possible, SDSW urged the use of an illegal generalized notice.
The improperly terminated or reduced benefits, which the court ordered
restored, meant that projected savings for the first months of welfare
reform were nonexistent. In this instance, Carleson's defiance of law
resulted in a substantial setback in the implementation of the governor's
welfare reform program. The Reagan administration was made to pay a
price for cavalierly disregarding the due process procedural rights so
recently accorded AFDC recipients. This turn of events would not have
happened but for the vigilant policing of state administrative behavior by
legal services attorneys working with welfare rights organizations.
ii. The Unborn Baby and Other Resource Presumptions
For poverty attorneys the most trying issues generally concerned
newly adopted administrative regulations. These regulations were part of
an extensive effort to accomplish through executive action alone what
the governor was unable to achieve legislatively. Some of the regulatory
changes were ostensibly interpretations of new legislative provisions;
others were accompanying administrative reforms that either had nothing
directly to do with the Welfare Reform Act or initiated policy changes
specifically rejected by the Legislature. A number of these regulations
365. Id. at 3 (order and opinion filed Feb. 24, 1972).
366. Id. at 4.
367. See William Cooney, Court Ultimatum to Welfare Chief, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1972, at i.
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shared a common approach, which was to impute financial resources to
recipient households without regard to their actual availability or worth.
The purpose was to reduce the amounts of individual subsistence grants
and thus public assistance costs overall.
The most bizarre action taken by the state concerned an
administrative attempt to deny pregnant women supplemental grants
for their unborn children. The policy of granting such aid had existed in
California for years. Welfare officials acted to reduce the size of such
grants on the theory that an unborn infant in an expectant mother's
womb had the equivalent of free room and board and thus was not in
need of a full allowance. The state's position was that "the mother's
body constitutes a 'resource' of the fetus, the economic value of which
'resource' may be deducted from the assistance grant otherwise payable
to the mother upon pregnancy."' ' The California Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that the administration's argument was without
merit and contrary to a longstanding state policy designed to insure that
a pregnant woman's increased needs for nourishment and other care
were adequately met' 6'
On the same day that the unborn baby case was argued, the
California Supreme Court heard two other cases, Cooper v. Swoap37° and
Waits v. Swoap,37' which involved comparable imputations about the
availability of what the Reagan administration characterized as noncash
economic benefits.372 Cooper concerned the computation of grants when
different members of the same household were eligible for different
categorical public assistance programs. The most common circumstances
involved an adult caretaker who received disability benefits and therefore
was not part of the AFDC family budget unit. Waits mainly affected
AFDC families where the supervising adult was not a welfare recipient.
The underlying factual situations usually involved children living with
grandparents who, because they were receiving social security or pension
benefits, were not themselves eligible for public aid. The challenged
regulations in both cases invoked presumptions about reduced housing
needs.
Unlike the unborn baby case where the decision had been authored
by one of the Court's more conservative members, these two cases sharply
divided the justices. The decisions were not issued until two and one-half
368. CWRO v. Brian, ii Cal. 3d 237, 239 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1022 (974).
369. Id. at 243.
370. i1 Cal. 3 d 856 (974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
371. ii Cal. 3d 887 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
372. The impression of Abascal conveyed previously, at supra text accompanying note 120, drew
on my recollection of the oral arguments in these three cases. The legal services attorneys who
respectively argued each of the cases before the Court, with Abascal at counsel's table in a supportive
role, were Jay-Allen Eisen and Edmund Schaffer from SFNLAF and Marjorie Gelb from Alameda
County Legal Aid Society.
April 2013]
HASTINGS LA WJOURNAL
months after the decision in the unborn baby case. It had taken
considerable effort on the part of Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner, who
authored the Court's opinions, to get the four votes necessary for a
majority.373 In each case, the Court held that the challenged regulation
was inconsistent with the establishment of the flat grant system
mandated by the Welfare Reform Act and with federal law.
A main principle of California's revised grant structure after the
enactment of the Welfare Reform Act was that benefits were to be
awarded recipients based on the number of eligible AFDC members
without regard to specific factual circumstances other than actually
available income. The legislation specified fixed minimum need standards
and set at lower amounts fixed maximum payment standards. The
differences reflected the value of Food Stamps for which families of
different sizes were eligible. The major purposes were to cut AFDC
administrative costs by standardizing grant calculations and "to eliminate
welfare paternalism by allowing recipients to allocate grant money
according to their own priorities.'
Nonetheless, SDSW promulgated several regulations, including those
at issue in Cooper and Waits, which reintroduced determinations about
need as a way to reduce levels of assistance. These determinations of need
were based on administrative assumptions about the value of an in-kind
resource, not an individualized calculation about its actual value. In
Cooper and Waits, the Court found that the Legislature, in adopting a flat
grant system, explicitly had rejected determining individual families' needs
as a basis for setting grant payments.' The Court further concluded that
shared housing with non-AFDC recipients was consistent with the
Legislature's intention to give families leeway to save in one area to meet
less-flexible expenses in another.' Lastly, as a separate basis for rejecting
the state's approach, the Court held that using fictitious rather than actual
figures for valuing in-kind resources was inconsistent with governing
federal law.377
The close California Supreme Court decisions in Cooper and Waits
underscored the risks involved in relying on the judiciary to hold the
state legally accountable in its administration of welfare programs. The
plain language of the new welfare legislation did not directly address the
contested issues. To determine whether the Reagan administration had
authority to act on its own required the Court to account for at times
373. Several years after the issuance of the decisions, Eisen ran into Justice Tobriner and asked him
what accounted for the delay. Tobriner stated that initially he had only one other vote, and it just took
him awhile to bring along the others. Interview with Jay-Allen Eisen, supra note 129.
374. Cooper, ii Cal. 3d at 862.
375. Id. at 864.
376. Id. at 866.
377. Id. at 870; see Waits v. Swoap, i i Cal. 3 d 887, at 894 (974), cert. denied 4 19 U.S. 1022 (I974).
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vague state legislative history and often convoluted state and federal
regulatory history. In such circumstances when selecting what to marshal
for support, judges have ample discretion to interject their own values
and sense of justice.
The dissent of Justice William P. Clark, Jr. in Cooper and Waits is
especially striking in this regard. Prior to his appointment to the
California Supreme Court, he had served as Reagan's Chief of Staff."'
To support his dissent, Clark unabashedly relied on a law review article
by Ronald Zumbrun, who as the chief of SDSW's Legal Affairs Division
had been a principal architect and defender of the Reagan
administration's welfare reform program including the policy approach
and regulatory provisions at issue in Cooper and Waits.379 At the very
least, Clark's reliance on this material, which easily could be construed as
biased, was inappropriate. Given his prior role as a close aide to Reagan,
he certainly knew of Zumbrun's involvement in the development of the
challenged policies.
Governors, like Presidents, can be surprised by appointments to
high judicial positions. Indeed, then California Supreme Court Chief
Justice Donald Wright, whom Reagan reportedly regarded as his Earl
Warren, joined Justice Tobriner in forming the majority in Cooper and
Waits. Nonetheless, the handwriting was on the wall: Conservative chief
executives with little sympathy for the legal claims of welfare recipients
more often than not were likely to identify and appoint individuals to the
judiciary with predilections like Clark's, not Wright's. The legal rights of
public assistance beneficiaries, which only recently had come to be
judicially recognized, lacked firm footing in American political culture.
Given the latitude afforded judges in their decisionmaking, ample
opportunities existed for laws and policies to be interpreted in ways that
trumped the interests of the welfare poor.
State efforts to impute economic and other resources to recipients,
as in the unborn baby (CWRO v. Brian), Cooper, and Wait cases,
extended as well to interpretations of the Welfare Reform Act. For
378. When Reagan became President, Clark resigned from his judicial position and served during
Reagan's first presidential term as National Security Advisor and then Secretary of the Interior.
379. In an early footnote, Clark wrote,
For a helpful discussion of the administrative, legislative, and litigative history of
California's welfare reform program, see Zumbrun, Momboisse and Findley, Welfare
Reform: California Meets the Challenge (1973), 4 PACIFIC L.J. 739, relied on throughout this
opinion. The authors are members of the Pacific Legal Foundation, a non-profit, public
interest law firm recently founded in Sacramento. Pacific Law Journal (University of the
Pacific (McGeorge School of Law)) specializes in the analysis of significant California
legislation.
Cooper, ii Cal. 3d at 88o n.2 (Clark, J., dissenting). Clark neglected to note that the Zumbrun article
in large part was a rejoinder to an earlier article also appearing in the Pacific Law Journal by
Democratic State Senator Anthony Beilenson. Beilenson & Agran, supra note i i i.
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example, the new legislation reinstituted stepfather liability for the
financial support of stepchildren. This was accomplished through a
complicated formula involving a wife's community property interest in the
earnings of her husband. In applying this provision to AFDC families,
state welfare officials sought to increase the percentage of a stepfather's
income available to a recipient family by employing a set of largely non-
rebuttable assumptions. The assumptions involved attributions of financial
and in-kind support for stepchildren irrespective of the stepfather's actions
or intent. Because of continuing administrative circumvention, antipoverty
attorneys had to file two complementary suits on the same issue before
they were able to obtain reasonable compliance with an already fairly
stringent legislative provision.38°
Compared to the judicial fate of administrative reforms initiated
without legislative authorization, actual provisions of the Welfare Reform
Act more frequently survived legal challenge. Even unsuccessful
challenges, however, had certain benefits for welfare recipients. The
publicity around the filing of litigation not infrequently functioned as an
additional method for alerting beneficiaries to forthcoming, negative
policy changes. Most importantly, preliminary relief when obtained
delayed implementation of adverse policies. It is also noteworthy that legal
services attorneys in at least one instance -though unsuccessful in court -
were afterwards able to obtain legislative repeal of a disputed Welfare
Reform Act change. 8'
iii. Work: Damned if You Don't and Damned if You Do
All the major cases following the Welfare Reform Act, save one,
were filed by legal aid attorneys. The exception was a suit initiated by
Reagan administration officials to obtain a declaratory judgment
affirming the legality of the Community Work Experience Program
("CWEP"). 382 The state's filing of this suit was a highly unusual
development. The objective was to place public aid administrators on
the offensive in upholding the validity of CWEP. They named as the
nominal defendant in the case the California Welfare Rights
Organization. Convinced that CWEP was an ill-conceived program and
would prove unworkable, antipoverty lawyers and the California
Welfare Rights Organization were reluctant to participate in the
380. Camp v. Swoap, No. 216154 (Sacto. Cnty. Super. Ct. preliminary injunction issued Oct. 19,
1971, judgment after trial entered June 20, 1974); Riddles v. Carleson, No. 221684 (Sacto. Cnty. Super.
Ct. preliminary injunction issued Apr. 27, 1972).
381. See CAL. STAT. 1973, ch. I216, at 2912, § 37; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 (Deering 2013);
Swoap v. Superior Court, Io Cal. 3d 490 (1973). The issue involved provisions of the Welfare Reform
Act related to an adult child's liability to reimburse the state for aid paid to a parent under state-
supported public assistance programs.
382. Hall v. CWRO, No. 72-1278 (C.D. Cal. filed June 8, 1972).
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litigation. Their expectations turned out to be correct. Although initial
state projections specified that CWEP would provide work for 58,ooo
persons annually, state government tracking reports as of mid-1974
indicated that each year there had been fewer than 120o participants."'
In June 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in a case arising out of New
York held that states could establish for public aid beneficiaries
compulsory work programs not specifically authorized by the Social
Security Act.384 The CWEP suit raised similar issues. In its 1974 session,
the California Legislature acted to repeal legislative authorization for
CWEP, but to no one's surprise Governor Reagan vetoed the bill. 5'
Coerced employment remained the symbolic centerpiece of his welfare
reform agenda. The real impact of his welfare reform measures,
however, would be borne not by nonworking recipients but by those
recipients who were working on their own.
In this confusing maze of litigation, one case stood out as the most
significant challenge to the Welfare Reform Act. The case entitled Villa
v. Hall was brought as an original writ filed directly in the California
Supreme Court.3 6 The main issue concerned the new legislative
requirement that the earned income of recipients be deducted -not from
a family's recognized need standard-but from the lower payment
standard. This change was likely to save each year $ioo million in AFDC
expenditures. 8' It was what Carleson referred to as "the major piece of
the whole thing." 8 Legal services attorneys contested the revision on
federal statutory grounds as inconsistent with the Social Security Act's
stipulation that the income or resources of AFDC recipients be taken
into consideration when determining needs, not payment amounts.8 ' The
history of the suit further illustrates how the changing composition of the
judiciary affected legal outcomes.
Although the Villa case was filed in late August I97I, the California
Supreme Court did not decide to take jurisdiction until September 29,
just two days before the Welfare Reform Act was to become operative.
As a preliminary move to maintain the status quo, the Court immediately
stayed all AFDC grant revisions pending a full review of the dispute on
the merits. The stay delayed both reductions in grants to families with
working members and increases in aid to families without any outside
resources. The following day, the Court in a slight modification revised
383. See Reagan Work-for-Welfare Plan Poorly Run, State Audit Finds, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1974, at 3.
384. N.Y. State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
385. See Welfare Reform Veto, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, '974, at 6.
386. 6 Cal. 3d 227 (1971).
387. This amount was the cost consequences alleged by California in its request for review in the
U.S. Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Hall v. Villa, 4o6 U.S. 965 (1972).
388. See Carleson, supra note 242, at 340.
389. 42 U.S.C. § 6o2(a)(7) (1970).
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the order so as to avoid unanticipated confusion about the effect of the
stay on state and county authority to participate in the AFDC program."
The section of the legislation that was enjoined also contained general
authorization concerning the payment of AFDC grants. Reagan's
response to the ruling was to launch a broad attack against the judiciary
for what he termed "hasty and uninformed decisions." He particularly
criticized the State Supreme Court calling its modified stay "a feeble,
eleventh-hour attempt.., to correct its own error."39 ' James Hall, the
Secretary of Human Relations, delivered an equally strong attack. He
declared that the Court had been "used" by antipoverty lawyers.39 '
At the beginning of December, the California Supreme Court in a
unanimous opinion upheld the substantive claims advanced by the Villa
petitioners.393 The effects of the decision were to raise AFDC maximum
payments in accordance with the amounts specified in the Welfare Reform
Act while still requiring, as before, that nonexempt income be deducted
from standards of need. In issuing the ruling, the Court ordered Social
Welfare Director Carleson to make all grant adjustments retroactive to
October I, 1971. This meant that all AFDC beneficiaries, including
working recipients, were entitled to benefit increases.
The California Supreme Court's opinion was not the final judicial
word. Already the U.S. Supreme Court's docket contained a public aid
case from Texas that raised some of the same issues. In early 1972, the
nation's highest court issued its opinion in Jefferson v. Hackney.394 On the
crucial question for California, the justices upheld by a 5-4 vote the
Texas requirement that nonexempt income be deducted from payment
standards rather than need standards in computing actual grant levels.395
A week after the Jefferson decision, the Supreme Court, granted a writ of
certiorari in the Villa case, vacated the ruling of the California Supreme
Court, and remanded the matter for further consideration in light of the
Jefferson opinion."96
390. See Robert Fairbanks, Courts Bungled on Welfare-Reagan, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1971, at I, 21.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227 097).
394. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). The Jefferson case was initially scheduled for argument prior to the
confirmation of Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, President Nixon's last two appointees to
the Supreme Court. A delay in the transmission of the record on appeal had resulted in a postponement
of the argument. When the issues were finally heard by the Court, they were among the first to be decided
by the newly reconstituted Court sitting as a whole. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in the
case. He was joined in the decision by all the Nixon appointees including Justice Powell. Had the case
been heard when originally scheduled, the issues of concern to California would have been decided in all
likelihood by a 4-3 vote in favor of the welfare recipient petitioners. The delay in transmitting the record
on appeal occurred as a result of an oversight when the legal services attorney who first represented the
petitioning beneficiaries left Texas for a position in California.
395. Id. at 539-44.
396. Hall v. Villa, 406 U.S. 965 (972).
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In September 1972, almost a year after the Welfare Reform Act went
into effect, the California Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the
similarities between the Texas and California provisions required that the
Reagan proposal for deducting the income of working recipients from the
payment standard be upheld.3" The Villa reversal also signaled to the
California justices that in the future they should be very wary about
overruling state welfare provisions on grounds of federal nonconformity.
For the Reagan administration, the second Villa decision justified the
entire welfare reform effort. It meant substantial savings in AFDC
expenditures, and it legitimated the overall attempt to tighten the existing
welfare system through a reduction of benefits to working recipients.
Notwithstanding this significant judicial precedent, the state was not
able to obtain similar support for other measures directly affecting the
working poor. Neither an across-the-board income limitation on public
aid eligibility nor the $50 limitation on work-related expenses-key
provisions in the attempt to cut supplementary grants to working
recipients-survived subsequent administrative or judicial scrutiny. The
general income limitation required federal approval that HEW refused to
grant. No effort was ever made to implement the provision. The ceiling on
work-related expenses was put into effect, but shortly thereafter the
Sacramento Superior Court preliminarily enjoined application of the
limitation as inconsistent with superseding federal law. 98 In 1974, the
California Supreme Court upheld the lower court decision.3" Its ruling
followed the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding a comparable
Colorado requirement.4' Abascal's practical judgment in advising the
legislature's negotiators not to include an exception clause proved
correct. He was able to obtain an immediate injunction preventing the
implementation of the $50 limitation on work-related expenses, and the
courts eventually found the entire provision legally impermissible.
5. Setting SSI Benefit Levels
In the middle of the intense three-year period of litigation over the
Reagan administration's implementation of its AFDC reform agenda, a
second major welfare legislative battle took place. The issues concerned
the adoption of state legislation to implement the federal government's
new Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") program." ' SSI was the
enacted part of the Nixon administration's attempt to restructure the
397. Villa v. Hall, 7 Cal. 3d 926 (1972).
398. Conover v. Hall, No. 215815 (Sacto. Cnty. Super. Ct. preliminary injunction issued Oct. 8,
1971).
399. Conover v. Hall, i i Cal. 3d 842 (1974).
400. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (974).
401. H.R. i, Act of Oct. 30, 1972, P.L. 92-6o3, Title II, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1381 et
seq. (I973).
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entire welfare system. Its effect was to federalize the administration of
the adult categorical aid programs-Old Age Security, Aid to the Blind,
and Aid to the Needy Disabled. Rather than remaining county
implemented programs under state supervision, they became the direct
administrative responsibility of HEW's Social Security Administration.
This federal legislation marked the institutionalization of an
elementary change in perception about the adult categorical aid programs.
These programs were no longer pejoratively talked about as "welfare."
Instead they were viewed more-or-less as "pension" programs. At the
time, changes in social mores and preoccupation with AFDC had much
reduced, though not totally eliminated, the traditional stigma that attached
to adult categorical assistance. The administration of benefits for the
elderly and blind ever since has been fairly uncontroversial. Almost forty
years later elements of disrepute still characterize aspects of the
eligibility and benefits-receipt process for those disabled for reasons
other than blindness. Specific legislation has been enacted to prohibit
eligibility based on severe drug addiction alone."° It is also common
place for individuals to be found not disabled because they are viewed as
malingering rather than being unable to work.
In 1973, the struggle over SSI in California centered on the level of
assistance provided to the aged, blind, and disabled by the state. The
federal legislation established a nationally uniform basic allowance. It
was then left to each individual state to determine the amount of any
supplemental payments. These supplemental payments were to be
included as part of the same checks, which the Social Security
Administration would send out each month. The initial federal
legislation contained "hold harmless" provisions that insured the states
against having to meet costs greater than their existing expenditures. 3
Subsequent federal legislation mandated state supplementation for all
present recipients so as to foreclose the prospect of any reduction in
existing levels of benefits.4 4
In the battle with the Democratic controlled legislature, Earl Brian,
Jr., the Secretary of Health and Welfare (previously Human Resources),
was the most visible and prominent representative of the Reagan
administration. Since the governor's cabinet secretaries tended to maintain
a low public profile, this development, generally speaking, was unusual. It
was, however, characteristic of Brian's tenure as Health and Welfare
Secretary. A young political protdg6 of the governor, he became a member
of the Reagan cabinet in July 1972 and served until February 1974, when
402. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, P.L. 104-121, § 105, ito Stat. 852, 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C).
403. H.R. I §§ 401-02.
404. The Renegotiation Act of 1973, Act of July 9, 1973, § 212, P.L. 93-66,87 Stat. 155.
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he resigned to seek, unsuccessfully, the Republican nomination for the
U.S. Senate.
Basically opposed to the federalization of the adult public aid
categories and the loss of direct state control over administration of these
programs, Reagan hoped to constrain future state expenditures for SSI
by setting the formulas for state supplementation below those likely to be
offered by Democratic legislators. The liberally dominated legislature was,
however, intent on not permitting 1973 to become a replay of 1971.
Welfare benefits for the elderly, disabled, and blind were not as politically
volatile or controversial as support for the AFDC poor. The legislative
leadership was prepared to resist, fully and forcefully, any Reagan
proposal they deemed inadequate.
The debate over SSI benefits began in earnest in spring 1973. At
that time, under the existing categorical programs, an aged recipient
received $214 per month; a disabled person got $197; and a blind
person received $225. The proposed minimum federal SSI grant was
$13o. The Reagan administration favored boosting the support of adult
recipients to $221 for the aged and disabled and to $237 for the blind.
But the governor's proposal also contained new limitations on special
need allowances and on the amount of outside income recipients could
earn without suffering a grant reduction. These limitations would have
had the effect of decreasing monthly benefits to about 125,000
recipients. The initial Democratic sponsored measure proposed raising
the level of assistance to $275 for all adult categorical recipients. It also
included a provision which insured that no beneficiary would receive a
decreased grant. Secretary Brian termed the bill "an attempt to
bankrupt the state."4 5
By the end of the regular legislative session in September 1973, the
governor and Democratic legislators were still unable to reach
agreement. The last Democratic bill set monthly grants for the aged
and disabled at $230 and for the blind at $255. It passed the Assembly
by a vote of 62-17, but as a result of gubernatorial opposition fell two
votes short in the Senate of the two-thirds majority necessary to enact
appropriation measures. °6 The legislature adjourned without adopting
the legislation needed to implement the new SSI program scheduled to
begin in less than four months. The danger was that California would
lose all federal financial assistance for support of adult welfare
beneficiaries.
Armed with an informal opinion from California's Republican
Attorney General, Reagan maintained that his administration had
405. See Dennis J. Opatrny, The Hot Debate on State Welfare, S.F. EXAM & CHRON., May 27, I973,
at A14.
406. See Dennis J. Opatrny, Legislative Aid Boost in Doubt, S.F. EXAM & CHRON., Sept. 16, 1973, at
AI, A4.
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authority to implement SSI without new legislation. The plan which he
proposed to enact specified an average SSI grant of $221, a figure which
he claimed would hold state expenditures for public aid within existing
budgetary limitations. Leaders in the Senate and Assembly maintained
that the administration lacked the necessary authority under state law to
take such unilateral action. They also were aware that antipoverty
attorneys were prepared to file an immediate challenge to the governor's
assertion of political authority. If the legal challenge was indeed
successful, Reagan would have no realistic option but to convene a
special legislative session sometime before Christmas.
In late September I973, Abascal filed an original writ in the
California Supreme Court to prevent the Reagan administration from
implementing its version of SSI. The objective of the suit, against the
background of an impending federal deadline, was to compel the governor
to accede to legislatively developed grant standards. While there were
significant legal principles at stake, the primary goal was to invoke judicial
review in such timely fashion as to exert strong, tangible political pressure
upon the legislative process. The aim was to alter institutional power
relationships while there was still time to enact necessary legislation. This
conception of litigation signified for legal services attorneys a strikingly
new sense about the place of legal advocacy in a highly political context.
Suits were not just ways to fashion and enforce rights or to check
unwelcome legislative and administrative developments. The purpose of
litigation here was to serve as a catalyst for and a constraint on practical
political bargaining.
In mid-November, a three-judge state court of appeal panel, to which
the California Supreme Court had referred the SSI case for initial
disposition, issued its decision on the legality of the Reagan
administration's proposed plan. In a unanimous opinion, the appellate
judges held that the executive branch lacked the authority to implement
the SSI program without enabling state legislation. 7 There then followed
one and a half weeks of frantic activity during which administration
officials, on the one hand, sought to overturn the court ruling and, on the
other hand, reopened informal discussions with key legislators. Finally, at
the end of the month, Lieutenant Governor Ed Reinecke, acting on behalf
of the absent Reagan, announced the formal convening of a special
legislative session. The decision to convene the special session was made
after Democratic Assembly Speaker Moretti and Health and Welfare
Secretary Brian indicated that they had reached "verbal agreement" on
emergency legislation.
The "verbal agreement" was, in essence, a euphemism for the
administration's capitulation to the Democrat-controlled legislature. The
407. Cal. League of Senior Citizens v. Brian, 35 Cal. App. 3 d 443 (1973).
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central elements in the final bill were increases in benefits for the aged and
disabled to $235 and for the blind to $265. 40 These amounts were,
respectively, $5 and $Io higher than the Democrats had been willing to
accept at the close of the regular session. The legislators also included in
the SSI package several sections that repealed or qualified aspects of the
1971 Welfare Reform Act. The most prominent revision was the
reestablishment of the pre-197I "relatives' responsibility" liability
standards. This was legislation that framed slightly differently had been
previously twice vetoed by Reagan. On December 5, 1973, after quick
passage by the Assembly 69-i and the Senate 28-5, the SSI bill was signed
into law by Acting Governor Reinecke.4° On New Year's Day 1974, the
Social Security Administration took over operational responsibility for all
adult public assistance categorical programs including those in California.
Throughout the struggle over the California implementation of the
SSI program, Abascal and legal services lawyers worked closely with a
broad mix of grassroots welfare recipient organizations, church groups,
and federal, state and county legislative staff. The culminating organizing
and informational events were the planning and holding of two
conferences in mid-December 1973. The first was held in Berkeley on
December i i and 12; the second, in Los Angeles on December 18.4"° The
conferences were planned both to explain the new legislation and to
identify uncertainties and open issues so as to best protect the interests of
program beneficiaries.
More than 250 individuals attended the Berkeley conference. In
preparation, Abascal and Timothy Sampson, a social work professor at
San Francisco State University and a former deputy director of the by-
then defunct National Welfare Rights Organization, oversaw the writing
of a general information packet and a more comprehensive set of
materials for lawyers and lay advocates. In addition, attorneys with
SFNLAF and CRLA's Senior Citizens Law Center preliminarily trained
about a dozen lay resource trainers. Abascal and the Reverend Robert
Davidson were the Berkeley Conference cochairmen.'
Abascal invoked litigation astutely as a key element in the political
bargaining over the setting of California SSI benefit amounts. But that
was a starting point, not an ending point. Ultimately, meaningful
representation is about empowering others. Abascal well understood the
importance of educating and training affected beneficiaries and their lay
408. Assemb. B. 134, CAL. STAT. 1973, ch. 1216. The aid payment schedules were codified as CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 12200 (Deering 1974).
409. See Peter Weisser, State Raises Aid for Old, Disabled, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 973 , at 1, 32.
41o. N. Cal. Ecumenical Council, Summary of Conference on Federalization of Welfare for Aged,
Blind and Disabled, at First Congregational Church, Berkeley, Cal. (held on Dec. is and 12, 1973)
(copy on file with author).
411. Id.
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as well as legal services allies, so that not just lawyers were in a position
to be effective counselors and advocates. In the implementation of social
welfare programs, there is a constant need to monitor programmatic
developments and to counter the wielding of administrative discretion in
ways that disentitle rather than entitle eligible claimants and recipients.
The level of engagement needed requires the vigilance and participation
of a village. A single piece of litigation is rarely if ever the last word.
6. And the Beat Goes on
A good part of the difficulty confronted by antipoverty attorneys in
arguing post-Welfare Reform Act cases reflected a series of sudden
reversals in previously stated federal administrative policies. Since the
main litigation issues frequently concerned questions of federal statutory
interpretation, these changes, which always narrowed relief benefits,
were potentially highly devastating. Notices of such changes usually took
the form of informal memorandum statements prepared well after the
commencement of litigation against disputed state regulations. The
issuance of these statements was a national phenomenon and led one
Georgia federal district court to comment at some length about HEW's
present "ineptness" in interpreting its own regulations.4"' California
courts, in particular, began to view with skepticism many of HEW's
revised interpretations."3 In the past, the federal agency's opinions about
the Social Security Act had been afforded substantial deference by the
judiciary.
The reversals in federal administrative policies started at about the
time California Social Welfare Director Carleson became the HEW
Commissioner of Welfare. Carleson was appointed to his post by Caspar
Weinberger, who had succeeded Elliot Richardson as the HEW
Secretary in February 1973. Previously, Weinberger had served as
Reagan's State Director of Finance and then during Nixon's presidency
in a number of posts, most immediately before as the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, where he had the nickname "Cap the
Knife" for his cost-cutting ability. In the Reagan presidential
administration, Weinberger would serve as Secretary of Defense for
almost seven years.4 Carleson's work under Weinberger in the Nixon
administration foreshadowed changes in welfare policy and direction at
the federal level that would occur in a more sweeping way during the
Reagan presidency.
412. See Barron v. Saucier, Civil Action No. 17159 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 1973) (unpublished opinion).
413. E.g., In re Hypolite, 32 Cal. App. 3d 979 (973). Cf. Mitchell v. Carleson, 35 Cal. App. 3 d 879
(973).
414. See Secretaries of Defense, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, www.defense.gov/specials/secdefhistories
(follow Casper W. Weinberger hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
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With Carleson's departure from California, a certain relaxation in
SDSW's methods of operation began to take place, especially with respect
to litigation. For the first time in several years, disputing parties in a
welfare case were able to discuss together possible ways of resolving legal
differences. By February 1974, Abascal was meeting directly with state
public assistance officials to go over various policy disagreements. 5
There was also now a sense of ending lawsuits on a conciliatory note.
Thus, though not usual, state administrators were no longer averse to
soliciting ahead of time the opinions of antipoverty attorneys on whether
proposed regulatory changes fully met the specifics of a governing
judicial order. Legal services lawyers and Reagan state administration
officials still disagreed over many welfare issues, but the total bitterness
of the recent past had largely waned.
In engaging in an ongoing strategy of conflict with the Reagan
administration, Abascal and his colleagues did not have unrealistic
expectations. They viewed the judiciary and the legislature pragmatically
and tactically, not through rose-tinted glasses. A "grand strategy" for
expanding the rights of the poor judicially was not part of the agenda.
Furthermore, the governor's veto power insured that there were few
occasions for recipient friendly legislative reforms. Nonetheless, turning to
the courts and working with legislators who shared their concerns provided
meaningful but circumscribed advocacy opportunities for influencing
welfare policy and practice. For most of the contested provisions regarding
California welfare reform, Abascal's principal objective was to hold the
state administration accountable to governing federal and state statutory
law and to favorable court orders. The result was that Reagan was not
able to reduce individual grant payments and welfare costs as much as his
administration wanted. As a consequence, welfare recipient families had
more money available for meeting their basic living expenses than
otherwise would have been the case.
III. LAWYERS AS REPRESENTATIVES
A. THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW
The prominent mid-2oth century political scientist Robert Dahl
described the evolution of American democratic political theory as
follows: "A central guiding thread of American constitutional
development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the
active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard
at some crucial stage in the process of decision.' 4,6 In both his theoretical
and empirical work, Dahl emphasized the importance in American politics
45. Interview with Ralph Abascal, supra note 329.
416. DAHL, supra note 4, at 137.
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of mobilized groups and elected leaders as mediators. His ideas
expanded on the work of earlier interest group theorists.4"7 In Dahl's
most famous book, he conducted a case study of New Haven politics and
found that the extent to which a group was influential in political
decisionmaking varied with the issue.' 8 His chief conclusions were that
there was no dominant elite that exercised power across the board, and
that modern American politics was fundamentally pluralistic, not
oligarchic. 9
Dahl mainly looked at decision outcomes, ignoring both how issues
came to be political issues and the relative importance of different issues.
Some outcomes are more consequential than others. A fuller analysis of
who exercises power involves understanding not only which interest group
has prevailed on a specifically decided issue, but also what issues, how they
have been defined, how they have come to be on the political agenda, and
why those issues as framed (and not others) are up for decision.420 I regard
Dahl's theoretical statement about American politics as normative.
Though he intended otherwise, it is still prescriptive and not a wholly
accurate description. For the poor especially, pluralistic participation
remains a work in progress. In studying who governs, the accompanying
questions that also need to be asked are: Who benefits, in what ways, and
how much?
Notwithstanding its ideals and aspirations, the American political
and legal system favors certain group claims over others. The reasons are
mainly economic and ideological. As Anatole France ironically observed,
"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. '42' Class still
very much matters in the United States. While there are opportunities
for all groups to assert themselves, the playing field is not level. The rich,
in particular, are always in a prime position to affect both what kinds of
policy claims receive serious attention and how significant issues get
resolved. Also, ideology still very much matters. Especially with respect
to issues that most immediately affect the poor, deeply held cultural
417. E.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (19o8); DAVID TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
418. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (i96i).
419. Cf C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1959).
420. E. E. Schattschneider coined the phrase "mobilization of bias" to describe how some "issues
are organized into politics while others are organized out." E. E. SCHATTSHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN
PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 71 (i96o). For a contemporaneous critique of
Dahl's one-dimensional conception of power, see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of
Power, 56 AMER. POLL ScI. REV. 947 (1962), reprinted in PETER BACHRACH & MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER
& POVERTY 3-16 (I97o). For a breakthrough analysis conceptualizing three dimensions of power, see
STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (2d ed.) (2005).
421. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYs ROUGE (THE RED LILY) ch. 7 (1894).
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beliefs play an important part in creating the space and setting the limits
on what can be raised and argued most effectively in public.
From a political culture standpoint, the United States as compared to
Europe has been ideologically slow and hesitant in recognizing and
institutionalizing social rights to counter the inequities that occur in society
at large. Social rights include such entitlements as a right to education, a
right to medical care, a right to housing, a right to a job, and a right to
subsistence income support.42 These rights address what a society comes
to regard as essential life conditions. They aim at providing measures of
insurance against the uncertainties of society and the economy.
Social rights stand in contrast to civil rights and political rights.423 Civil
rights seek to promote individual freedom by limiting the scope and
curbing the arbitrariness of governmental actions. The right to own
property, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion are examples of
civil rights. So are guarantees regarding equality under the law and due
process of law. Political rights define accessibility to governmental
processes. The right to vote and the right to hold public office are political
rights.
The activation of civil and political rights largely relies on individual
self-initiation. The opposite is the case with respect to social rights. Their
implementation almost always involves dependence on governmental
bureaucracies and substantial public expenditures. 24 Given the extent of
governmental involvement and support that is needed, social rights push
against the grain of widely shared beliefs about American individualism-
about being able to pull yourself up by your own bootstraps, about the
goodness of a market economy, and about the evils of big government.
One important contributing reason for the stunted development of
social rights in the United States is that class consciousness has less
political saliency than in Europe. Recent polling indicates that
Americans acknowledge that there are rich people and ordinary people
with limited means, but they believe that the distinction is a transitory
condition, not the result of a caste system. A survey taken in December
201i found that 43% of those surveyed said the rich became wealthy
"mainly because of their own hard work, ambition or education." '425
422. See ROCHE, supra note 195, at 30.
423. See T. H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 78-79 (1965).
424. Charles Reich had an artful approach when he analogized governmental largess, including
public assistance benefits, to traditional property. Reich, The New Property, supra note 183. But a
government benefit is not the same as owning a piece of property or even a copyright. It invokes a
different type of relationship. Traditional property interests as civil rights establish protected areas of
social and economic activity, where individuals are free to initiate actions and make claims often in
spite of rather than with the support of the state.
425. The survey was conducted by the Pew Research Center as reported in the New York Times.
The survey also found that two-thirds of those polled believed that there are "strong conflicts"
between rich and poor, a 19% increase from a similar survey taken in 2009. In explaining this striking
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A central dilemma in seeking to advance the rights of the welfare
poor is that our constitutional law vocabulary comfortably embraces civil
rights and political rights but not social rights. Not surprisingly, Sparer's
effort in the Supreme Court to constitutionalize a right to live as a basis
for public assistance programs fell on deaf ears.426 It would have been a
totally unprecedented and remarkable landmark opinion.
Political and legal acknowledgment of an interest as a right is not in
itself a solution for a social ill. But it is a step in the right direction. The
language of rights gives notable additional weight to whatever claims are
being asserted. In writing about welfare rights, Bill Simon described the
utility of rights generally as follows: "Appeals to right occur only when
activities and goals conflict; their function is to determine whose side the
state will take."' 7 Put another way, changes in perception that an interest
is a right can be an important resource to be used against competing claims
and considerations in legislative, judicial, and administrative proceedings.
To the extent our political culture recognizes social rights, they are
viewed as statutorily based and are often somewhat controversially termed
statutory entitlements. While the relatively weak legal footing of social
rights in American political culture stymied Sparer's constitutional
ambitions, there was by the end of the 196os a significant transformation in
how recipients, lawyers, and politicians viewed public relief benefits.
Recipients came to see themselves not as suppliants but as rights
holders,45 while for lawyers and politicians the notion of welfare benefits
as mere privileges not subject to judicial review largely fell by the
wayside. Even contestable and compromised claims of rights can change
the political landscape and create opportunities for effective legal
advocacy. The statutory claims of the welfare poor had come to be taken
seriously, whether characterized as rights or entitlements."9 Though the
change in perception, a senior editor at the Pew Research Center noted "a confluence of factors...
probably including the Occupy Wall Street movement, which put the issue of undeserved wealth and
fairness in American society at the top of the news throughout most of the fall." Sabrina Tavernise,
Survey Finds Rising Strain Between Rich and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2052, at Aii, A13. It
remains to be seen whether the poll reflects any notable long-term changes ideologically and
politically.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 192-194.
427. William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Mn. L. REV. I, 29
(1985). Most writers attribute the application of rights language to public assistance benefits as first
occurring in the i96os. In a carefully researched historical inquiry, Karen Tani finds substantial
evidence of "a vibrant language of rights within the federal social welfare bureaucracy during the
193os and 1940s." She argues that "federal administrators used rights language as an administrative
tool, a way to solve tricky problems of federalism and administrative capacity at a time in which poor
relief was shifting from a local to a state and federal responsibility." Karen M. Tani, Welfare and
Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314 (2012).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 210-211.
429. Even after Congress declared that TANF, as the successor program to AFDC, was not a
statutory entitlement, courts have continued to scrutinize whether substantive conditions are arbitrary
and whether there are fair procedures prior to denying or terminating benefits. See supra note 199.
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absence of federal constitutional resonance constrained legal advocates,
there was new political and legal room for advancing and protecting the
interests of welfare beneficiaries that had not existed previously.
Other obstacles to actualizing the rights of the welfare poor still
remained formidable. In particular, the weak cultural underpinnings
accorded social rights exacerbated several additional structural dilemmas
inherent in relying on legal advocacy and legal rights arguments for
progressive social change. The first is fiscal, the second is institutional, and
the third is sociological. It is these dilemmas that most confounded the
campaign that Abascal led to counter Reagan's welfare reform measures.
As the current economic crisis confronting Europe vividly
demonstrates, public expenditures for social welfare programs can become
fiscally unsustainable.430 In Europe, benefits from such programs are
viewed as fundamental rights and as an integral part of a nation's social
contract with its people."' Under such circumstances, governmental
cutbacks are highly precarious politically. The resulting popular turmoil
can put the very legitimacy of a governing regime on the line.
In the United States, the political dynamics run counter to this. In
the face of perceived short-term and long-term budgetary crises, there is
instead intense opposition to raising taxes and taking on additional
public debt and waning electoral support for social welfare programs,
though Social Security and Medicare are still broadly popular. Concerns
about the fiscal costs of social welfare programs are real. European
nations, generally speaking, have been slow to react. In the United
States, we are prone to rein in the costs too quickly.
In promoting welfare reform, Reagan's most prominent refrain was
the need to cut costs. His argument had considerable popular appeal
because of how effectively he tied curbing such expenditures to popular
perceptions about tax relief. There is nothing unusual about arguing over
fiscal consequences when addressing legislatively the scope and level of
welfare benefits. But there also was a perverse side to the Reagan
administration's overwhelming focus on costs, most tellingly exemplified
by the extraordinary delays in complying with statutory mandates or court
rulings, and by policies and practices such as the bizarre presumption that
a pregnant woman's grant should be reduced because the fetus was getting
430. For example, a New York Times article on the economic and Euro crisis confronting France in
early 2012 quotes Nicholas Baverez, an economist and historian, as describing the real problem as "the
unsustainable social and economic model of the last three decades." The article then states, "France,
like other European countries, benefitted from cheap credit leading to a society in which nearly two-
thirds of the economic growth depended on consumption, partly financed by social transfers. Those, in
turn, were financed by public debt that has ballooned to 86 percent of the gross domestic product in
2011 from 20 percent in i98o." Steven Erlanger, France's Gloomy Economic Outlook Haunts Nation's
Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, at A4, Ao.
431. Citizenship for most Western European nations has involved an ongoing vesting of civil,
political, and social rights. MARSHALL, supra note 423, at 78.
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free room and board.432 It was the need to counter this perverse side that
largely shaped Abascal's counter-campaign.
For legal services lawyers invoking the statutory claims of the poor,
the main objective was to get as many dollars in the hands of welfare
recipients as soon as and for as long as possible. For the Reagan
administration seeking to distinguish between the deserving and the
undeserving poor, the opposite primarily was the objective. Ideological
assumptions underlay political differences over welfare reform, but the
main battles were over dollars.
In this struggle, Reagan had the upper hand. His administration was
always in a position to move quickly to impose cutback measures and to
delay implementing measures favorable to recipients. If a contested policy
or practice were found legally impermissible, there would be prospective
relief ordered, but a judicial day of reckoning for past wrongs would be
unlikely. Wishing to avoid ultimate clashes with another branch of
government, judges even in the most exasperating circumstances were
reluctant to hold state officials in contempt. They also were reluctant to
order retroactive payments to welfare recipients when told that there
would be dire fiscal consequences.433 Even when ordered to pay back
benefits wrongfully denied, state welfare officials could count on most
recipients affected not obtaining the amounts owed them. A substantial
percentage of recipient households received AFDC for relatively short
periods of time, usually not much more than two years.434 Once off the
welfare rolls, the county welfare departments lost touch with adult
caretakers, and legal services lawyers had a hard time identifying and
reaching them.435 Invoking judicial review was beneficial for welfare
432. See supra text accompanying notes 368-369.
433. See supra text accompanying note 279.
434. An Urban Institute report prepared shortly before TANF superseded AFDC as the federal
support program for low-income families found that 42% of adult caretakers received AFDC for less
than twenty-five months. LaDonna Pavetti, Who Is Affected by Time Limits?, in WELFARE REFORM: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 31-34 (Isabel Sawhill ed., 1996).
435. In the mid-I98os, California legal services attorneys as part of a settlement of four AFDC
class actions got the agreement of the California Department of Social Services to publicize the
availability of retroactive benefits. The state agreed to do an extensive media outreach. At least
$140,oo was spent on television ads and $I26,ooo on radio buys. There were also newspaper ads and
posters on display in governmental offices. The settlement also provided for the state to pay for an
audit by Price Waterhouse of individual claims for back benefits processed by eleven counties covering
about 70% of the state's population. The estimated retroactive benefits amount due was $too million.
The eventual payout in the counties surveyed was slightly more than $3 million, approximately 3% of
the projected total. Email from Tricia Berke Vinson, Directing Attorney, Legal Aid Soc'y of San
Mateo County, with attached memos dated July 3, 1985, and Mar. I 1, 1987 (Feb. 17, 2012) (on file with
author).
In the early 199os, Abascal and other legal services attorneys unsuccessfully sought to use
California's cy pres statute, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 383, to have the amount of undistributed AFDC
retroactive benefits used to further the purposes of the underlying cause of action rather than having
the funds retained by the state. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum of Points of Authorities re:
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recipients though tempered by the uncertainties and complexities of
achieving full enforcement.
Abascal expected the Reagan administration to interpret the Welfare
Reform Act provisions selectively and to use the Act's adoption as an
opportunity to instigate additional changes in policy and practice outside
its coverage. In working with state legislators to draft specific welfare
provisions, he conveyed the importance of being able to file facial
challenges to questionable legislation so as to be in the best position to
obtain immediate injunctive relief. Any time delay in bringing litigation
and getting an enforceable order worked against the interests of welfare
beneficiaries. But only so much could be anticipated legislatively.
Most of the lawsuits filed by Abascal and his legal aid colleagues were
the result of constant and vigorous monitoring of state administrative
behavior. While Abascal had no way of knowing ahead of time what
specific actions would be taken by the Reagan administration, he could
count on legal services attorneys and welfare recipient activists throughout
the state to identify almost immediately particularly pressing issues. They
needed only to survey their individual client service caseloads.
Sporadically, Abascal also relied on information provided by contacts
within local county welfare departments. In sum, there already was in
place an effective network for policing state welfare directives. No
Reagan administration action went undetected for long.
For welfare beneficiaries, having knowledgeable lawyers readily
available to respond to state welfare reform promulgations was absolutely
critical to their receiving benefits that otherwise would have been denied
them. Though the amounts paid out after successful litigation were not all
that they should have been, they were substantial overall and for
individuals living marginally, they were financially meaningful.
Along with raising serious conflicts over funding, the structuring and
implementation of social welfare programs have implications and
consequences for the safeguarding of individual autonomy. Institutionally,
any expansion of social rights or entitlements heightens the potential for
governmental intrusiveness in people's lives. From a programmatic
standpoint, there are almost always accompanying obligations and
conditions to be met.46 The more culturally ingrained is the right or
entitlement, the less invidious the obligations and conditions.
In the United States, the extent and character of such burdens
depend on the nature and circumstances of the interest at stake and
Applicability of CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 383, Coalition of Cal. Welfare Rights Orgs. v. Anderson, No.
512491 (Sacto. Cnty. Super. Ct.) (attached to cover memo from Ralph Santiago Abascal to Peter Reid
(Sept. 6, 1995)) (copy on file with author).
436. The sociologist Reinhard Bendix characterized this phenomenon as the tendency of social
rights to broaden not only the benefits but also the obligations of the citizenry. REINHARD BENDIX,
NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP 107 (1969).
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perceptions about the specific beneficiaries. Minor children have the
right to a free elementary and secondary education, but their parents
have an obligation-a relatively benign obligation-to enroll their
children in school. The terms for receiving Social Security for the elderly
also are relatively benign. Packaged as a social insurance program, Social
Security eligibility and benefit levels mainly involve having previously
paid required payroll taxes at a job programmatically covered. More
onerous conditions attach to the receipt of public assistance benefits.
These programs still carry a strong moral stigma and have much less
popular support. While midnight searches of a welfare recipient's home
are likely a thing of the past, the prospect of unannounced case worker
visits during regular business hours in accordance with the Supreme
Court's decision in Wyman v. James is not." In accepting public aid,
poor families give up expectations of privacy that the rest of America
enjoys.
A significant number of the Reagan administration's cost-cutting
measures imposed legal responsibilities not required of others on welfare
families and those associated with them. These measures were subtler than
privacy infringements. Some telling examples were the various regulations
promulgated to impute income from stepparents or grandparents as
available to meet the needs of those household relatives who received
public assistance. 4"8 Stepparents and grandparents in these circumstances
generally do not have a legal obligation to provide such financial support.
These special welfare regulations were at odds with what would apply in
non-welfare situations in two ways: They presumed the availability of
income not knowing the family's actual circumstances, and they imposed
a duty of support on relatives not otherwise legally liable. The effects
were to reduce the amount of cash aid received by the eligible family
members and to impinge on the autonomy of relatives not legally liable
for their financial support. Although these regulations had a certain
appeal as a kind of quid pro quo for receiving governmental benefits,
they were found to be unlawful as inconsistent with federal and state law
regarding the adoption of a flat-grant system based on family size rather
than individual determinations of need, and state law regarding who are
legally responsible relatives.
It was arguments like these that most comprised the legal basis for
challenging Reagan's welfare reform program. The success of such
challenges was far from certain in part because such intrusions in the
family relationships of the welfare poor that would be questionable or
unacceptable in other circumstances were not widely perceived as
unreasonable conditions for receiving welfare benefits. While important
437. See supra text accompanying notes 178, 197-198.
438. See supra text accompanying notes 370-380.
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political and legal inroads had been made to undo what tenBroek termed
California's historical dual system of family law, the legacy lived on in
the framing and implementation of Reagan's welfare reform measures
and was a manifestation of how expansions in social welfare programs
intensify opportunities for governmental interference in decisions about
family relationships usually left to adults to make on their own.
The dilemmas confronting welfare recipient advocates were not only
fiscal and institutional but also sociological. Welfare rights organizing and
legal advocacy in the I96Os and early 197os affected how the poor came to
see themselves and how a good many public officials came to view their
claims. For the courts, the recognition of welfare benefits as rights or
entitlements was a new development, but a development not universally
accepted. Reagan's welfare proposals were more counter-reformation
measures than real reforms. They harked back to I6th century English
conceptions of poverty and rekindled 19th century American conceptions
of the role of the state. Reagan's retrenchment regarding social welfare
programs, which had substantial popular appeal, seriously constrained the
options available to Abascal and other legal services lawyers in
representing the welfare poor. They had to confront social, political, and
legal circumstances as they were, not as they hoped them to be.
In a groundbreaking work analyzing social cause lawyering, Stuart
Scheingold distinguished between the "myth of rights" and the "politics of
rights."439 He characterized the myth as involving overly confident
assumptions about the willingness of courts to declare new rights, the
ability of courts to remedy rights violations, and the recognition and
realization of rights as tantamount to real social change. For Scheingold,
the myth needed to be transformed into a politics of rights, where the
ideological and symbolic value of rights contributed to a range of political
activities, not just litigation. He saw ideas about rights as helpful in
activating political consciousness, in spurring political organization, and in
facilitating a realignment of resources and values supportive of changes in
public policy.
Scheingold's distinction between the myth of rights and the politics
of rights points to the importance of examining the specific conditions
under which legal advocacy takes place. Self-perceptions about rights
provide individuals with motivation to stand up for themselves, seek help
and allies, and make demands. The recognition of rights changes the
dynamics of how disputes get resolved, whether before courts or other
political bodies. But the actual benefits of legal advocacy for a targeted
constituency are variable and contextually specific.
439. STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE (2d ed. 2004).
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In representing the welfare poor in the early 197os, Abascal and
his legal aid colleagues had to be highly opportunistic because the
underlying cultural and political conditions in support of progressive
social welfare policies were mixed at best. Although there had been a
significant change in the legal status of public relief benefits, it was a
partial and counter-majoritarian development. Conceptualizing such
benefits as statutory rights or entitlements only had a marginal effect
on reducing mainstream moral stigmas attached to their receipt.
Reagan easily capitalized on popular antipathy for those on welfare.
Fearing the consequences for the poor of a Reagan-sponsored electoral
initiative on welfare reform, Abascal and his allies in the California
legislature knew that there would have to be a welfare reform bill that
Reagan could claim as his own.
An interesting feature of the legislative fight over welfare reform was
the non-involvement of any private interest groups other than advocates
for the poor. Unlike in the adoption of the AFDC-U program in the early
I960s, large agricultural growers had no concerns about the impact of
welfare benefits on farm labor wages. Nor did any other wealthy special
interest have any distinct concerns. The legislative dispute was among
public officials over social welfare policy. The only non-state direct
participants were representatives for the counties and for antipoverty
groups. The absence of any pressure from moneyed interests made it
easier for legislators to side with poor families to the extent that they felt
they could without jeopardizing popular support in their home districts.
Welfare rights organizations also were not directly evident in the
legislative struggle. First, no one thought that mass demonstrations
would be helpful. The prospect that the publicity generated would
prove politically embarrassing for Reagan was extremely slight."
Additionally, legislators recognized Reagan had substantial popular
support for his welfare reform goal and wanted to low key their
differences with him. There was no meaningful audience for protest
actions. Second, it was far from clear that welfare rights leaders could
mobilize sufficient numbers of recipients. The heyday of welfare rights
organizing had lasted only a few years and was pretty much in a lull."'
The activist leadership remaining did not necessarily have a large or
broad enough participant base to make a difference politically. Third,
the work of reaching legislative compromise took place behind closed
44o. By contrast, recent rallies organized in support of in-home supportive services for elderly or
disabled individuals had been effective. There, the targeted beneficiary groups were relatively
sympathetic with significant middle-class ties, and the imagery conveyed portrayed elderly or disabled
persons left alone to fend for themselves. Cutbacks in AFDC for very poor families did not induce
similar sympathies. Moreover, the imagery most frequently associated with the program was that of
the welfare queen.
441. See supra text accompanying note z6;see also KoRNBLUH, supra note I8, at 63-87.
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doors. The legislators had competent policy aides. The outside help
they needed was in how best to draft specific provisions in light of
overriding federal law and other legal considerations. No matter how
well-informed, lay welfare rights leaders neither had nor would be
expected to have the breadth and depth of knowledge required.
Abascal's opportunity to influence the legislative process arose
because key legislators supportive of progressive welfare policies
needed the kind of legal expertise he and other legal aid attorneys had
developed over the preceding several years. The advent of government-
supported legal services for the poor was an important precondition.
The push for law reform as well as individual service delivery
encouraged antipoverty lawyers to consider underlying policy issues
when representing their clientele. As a result, there was now available a
group of lawyers who could bring to bear their direct knowledge and
experience regarding public relief programs, which they had gained
through representation of individual welfare recipients, not only to
litigation but also to legislative lobbying. The role that legal services
lawyers came to play in the legislative process was an entirely new
development, and Abascal was in the forefront.
The confidence legislators had in Abascal was unusual. For them, he
was not just in the right place at the right time, he was the right person.
The reason for their confidence had much to do with the specific
professional traits that shaped his overall approach to lawyering. Those
characteristics also led welfare rights leaders to trust him as their
representative both as a lobbyist and as a litigator."2 It is hard to imagine
that the events of California welfare reform would have unfolded as they
did without Abascal's personal, pervasive, and persistent presence.
After the enactment of the Welfare Reform Act, grassroots activists
from welfare rights organizations attended several large planning
meetings convened by Abascal. While they did facilitate the litigation
undertaken by helping to identify issues and by recruiting or having their
organizations serve as plaintiffs, they did not play a leading role in the
judicial aftermath. Abascal and legal aid attorneys working with him
decided what suits to file, where to file them, and how to argue them.
Like the operation of a gyroscope, the legal representation provided was
largely self-generated and self-directed. The lawyers shared with welfare
rights leaders a common mission to promote the interests of the welfare
poor and a common focus on tangible benefits, but they had a great deal
of discretion to determine what actions to take.
The effectiveness of post-Welfare Reform Act litigation for the
welfare poor was in large part a reflection of the times. While there are
always different judicial points of view, courts in the early I970s were more
442. See infra text accompanying note 457.
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open to the claims of welfare recipients than is the case today. As an
example, scant doctrinal attention was paid then to threshold jurisdictional
issues, such as whether recipients had a private right of action to enforce
federal statutory provisions if disregarded or violated by a state welfare
agency. In King v. Smith, the first major AFDC case to reach the
Supreme Court, the justices asserted without offering any actual analysis
that § 1983 created a basis for such lawsuits."3 This kind of issue is not now
apt to be as easily sidestepped.4' One new factor is that Congress explicitly
stated that TANF, the successor program to AFDC, is not a statutory
entitlement."5 Whereas there was before congressional silence on the legal
status of welfare benefits, there is now an unfriendly declaration to be
confronted. Moreover, judicial activism is today at least as much a
characteristic of right-leaning courts as left-leaning courts, notwithstanding
still widely held opinions to the contrary." 6 Given the changing makeup of
the federal and state judiciary, decisions about whether and where to bring
social policy litigation are now much weightier. For good reason,
antipoverty lawyers this century have to be far more hesitant than Abascal
and his colleagues were before turning to the courts to protect the group
interests of poor individuals.
Federally funded legal services for the poor and grassroots welfare
rights organizations began separately in the mid-I96os. By the early 1970s,
the relationship between the two in California was cooperative but
problematic. Welfare rights leaders, most of whom had been or were
AFDC recipients, worked with Abascal and other antipoverty lawyers on
welfare reform issues, but their role was principally to be supportive of the
initiatives undertaken by their legal representatives. With respect to the
collective empowerment of the welfare poor, there was a disjuncture
between what can be termed legal competence and political competence.
For most of our history, a group's legal competence -its ability to use
law to achieve policy changes-was an adjunct to its overall political
competence. With some exceptions, only wealthy interests had the
capacity to call on lawyers to bring lawsuits and help in administrative and
443. See supra text accompanying note 175.
444. For a history of the narrowing of the use of private rights of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
the intervening decades, see Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a
Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1838 (2003). As an alternative to a § 1983
cause of action, federal courts of appeals have consistently held that beneficiaries of federal spending
programs may seek prospective injunctive relief directly under the Supremacy Clause against state
laws and regulations preempted by federal statutory provisions. See, e.g., Independent Living Ctr. of S.
Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1O5O, IO58-63 (9th Cir. 2oo8) (citing consistent holdings in other
circuits). According to Matt Murray and Stephen Berzon of the San Francisco law firm Altshuler
Berzon LLP, the Supreme Court has yet to expressly confront this Supremacy Clause issue.
445. See supra note 199.
446. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizen United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv.
485.
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legislative lobbying. The exceptions usually involved organized interests
with significant preexisting collective support, for example, labor unions,
the ACLU, and civil rights groups like the NAACP. The emergence of
government-funded legal services programs for the poor with a dual
individual service and law reform mission changed this default
relationship. It held out the prospect of groups being represented legally
on policy issues without any organized collective client commitment to
political action. The hope was that access to legal representation would
facilitate grassroots activism and direct political participation."7
In the end, such was not the case for AFDC recipients. The welfare
poor as a constituency were too vulnerable ideologically and too isolated
socially and politically to garner sufficient support within the population
generally and from politicians. Welfare rights organizing had a relatively
short political life. As a movement for social change, it never attracted and
sustained the breadth and depth of support necessary for longer term
survival.
Meanwhile, legal advocacy for AFDC recipients had developed its
own momentum. For public assistance beneficiaries, having lawyers
argue for their common interests was a form of political competence.
Welfare policy provisions are highly technical. To navigate the policy
issues administratively, legislatively, and judicially called on the special
expertise and skills of lawyers. Most of the representation provided was
analogous to how tax lawyers work with wealthy individual and
corporate clients to obtain favorable and to avoid unfavorable tax
consequences. The problem was that legal competence is but one
component of political competence, not the entire package. Within a
democratic constitutional system of government, competent legal
representation alone can accomplish only so much. There are inevitably
additional political and societal developments that require attention
In countering Reagan's welfare reform actions, Abascal took
maximum advantage of the legal and political opportunities available to
represent the collective interests of families in need of public assistance.
The popularity of Reagan as a political leader, the vicissitudes of the
legislative process, the composition and predilections of the judiciary, and
a mixed relationship with welfare rights organizing were all important
factors that affected the direction and substance of Abascal's advocacy
447. For an analysis of the use of litigation for grassroots organizing, see Lucie E. White,
Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, i6 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 535, 553-57, 563 (1989) (illustrating through case studies the potential for advocacy
litigation to create "spin off" grassroots political efforts which can not only strengthen the litigation
directly, but also generates solidarity among poor people, their advocates, and their political
community); see also Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly: On the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor,
56 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 885 (i99o) (positing that "momentary political leverage" can be gained through
plaintiffs' mobilization, "even without any conventional political currency to draw upon").
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
efforts. The focus was on the operations of a safety net program that
provided subsistence cash assistance. The main practical objective was to
get as much money as legally feasible into the hands of AFDC recipients.
After President Clinton in 1996 signed his welfare reform
legislation, Abascal had occasion to express some misgiving about the
work he had done twenty-five years earlier in challenging Reagan's
welfare reforms. It was less than a year before he died. He said, "We
should have been strong advocates of getting people into work.... Had
we done that then, we would not have had this welfare bill now.",,
8
Abascal's regret and disappointment reflected the underlying
contradiction in AFDC advocacy. It was a strategy to hold the welfare
system legally accountable to its own terms so that poor families could
live somewhat better, but it was not a strategy that addressed the root
causes of poverty.
Redressing poverty involves a host of public policy fields from jobs to
education to housing to healthcare to social services to crime prevention.
Public relief programs are residual measures. They need to be there
when all else has failed. They are not a way out of poverty. With respect
to poor families, we have yet to have the collective political will to
comprehensively attack the reasons for poverty. To do so is initially an
expensive proposition, though over time there are potentially huge
benefits. In the political short run, it is still much easier in America to
provide minimal cash benefits, to blame poor individuals for their own
destitution, and to assume that the indigent need to be coerced to seek
employment.
My own view is that Abascal spent his time wisely. Developing a
jobs policy that truly helps poor people get permanent employment in a
free market economy is an immense challenge. It is a challenge that
cannot be met without sufficient popular support for a more activist
government that on multiple fronts takes seriously redressing unfairness
within the economy and the society. Should we have a more
comprehensive approach to poverty and less demeaning public relief
programs? Of course. But what we have instead is majoritarian support
for welfare reforms like those promoted by Reagan as governor in i971
and again as president in i98I and by yet again Clinton as president in
1996.
Gwendolyn Mink has written, "Real welfare reform entails rooting
out the premises, presuppositions, and stigma that drive welfare policy-
not modifying the behavior and restricting the choices of mothers who
need welfare."" 9 As a political culture over the last few decades, we have
448. Tim Golden, supra note 121. By "getting people into work," Abascal would have meant
addressing structural problems of unemployment and providing appropriate support services for
employment, not sanctioning and threatening to sanction poor parents for not working.
449. GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE 1917-
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progressed little and arguably have regressed. Without a stronger people's
movement with which to work, Abascal with exceptional competence did
what lawyers under the circumstances could do responsively and
realistically. He worked with legislators and relied on the courts to
maximize the benefits available to his clients within the existing welfare
system.
Given the pervasive difference that wealth makes in effectively
gaining and maintaining political access and the perseverance of deeply
rooted ideological beliefs, American antipoverty lawyers in the early 1970S
had an uphill battle in using legal advocacy to achieve social change for
the poor. In assessing the impact of the Abascal-led campaign against
Reagan's welfare reforms, the most noteworthy outcomes are not in the
disappointments and limitations, but in how much was accomplished in
difficult political circumstances. For the welfare poor, having Abascal
and his colleagues in place as representatives in bringing legal expertise
to legislative compromise, in policing bureaucratic actions, and in
invoking judicial review made a difference. It resulted in hundreds and
hundreds of millions of dollars legally owed the poor actually being
received by them, and that would not have happened had the Reagan
administration gone unchallenged.
Therein lays the true recurring majesty of the law. It is not in the
establishment of rights, which are rare moments, but in how lawyers for
the poor use factual and legal arguments on the ground to affect public
policies and their implementation. Social cause lawyering addresses not
only big picture issues but also a myriad of everyday policy and practice
issues, whether political or legal, that continually affect how people live
and flourish. The absence of aggressive legal advocacy is politically and
socially debilitating.
In the American democratic polity, interest group politics and
liberal ideology, both 19th and 2oth century versions, are dominant. Yet
governance is in accordance with the rule of law and the precepts of a
constitutional republic. Under such structural circumstances, effective
group legal representation is an institutional necessity, no less for
advancing and protecting the interests of the poor than for any other
definable constituency.
B. LAWYERING PROCESS VALUES: ACCESSIBILITY, RESPONSIVENESS,
AND JUDGMENT
Having commented on the social impact of and political necessity
for group legal representation of the welfare poor, I now return to the
nonconventional character of such representation. My approach is to build
on the initial discussion of how Pitkin's and Mansbridge's theoretical ideas
1942, at 190 (995).
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about political representation augment Luban's approach to social justice
lawyering. I start with Mansbridge's concept of gyroscopic representation
as most closely capturing Abascal's role in the campaign against Reagan's
welfare reforms. I then step back to integrate Pitkin's foundational
understanding of legitimate democratic representation before focusing on
three defining attributes of responsible group legal representation:
accessibility, responsiveness, and judgment. Drawing on references to the
case study, my purpose is to derive conceptual guideposts applicable to
group legal representation when, in the absence of direct client control,
social cause lawyers have good reasons for acting with independence and
discretion.
In describing gyroscopic political representation, Mansbridge
postulates that voters expect their representative to act in ways that they
would approve without external incentives-that is, without having to be
directly held accountable in a competitive election. The voters depend on
the representative's commitment to the same basic values, interests, and
concerns that matter most to them, and they assume the representative is
honest, principled, and sufficiently skilled.45 In short, they trust their
representative to act in their interest, but with a great deal of autonomy, so
long as nothing happens to break that confidence. They count on the
convictions, talent, and character of their representative.
This emphasis on the inner drive and bearing of the representative
fully resonates with the mission-linked relationship between legal services
lawyers and welfare activists and individual beneficiaries in the extended
struggle over California welfare reform. While welfare rights leaders were
in touch with Abascal and other legal aid lawyers, and while individual
recipients were recruited as parties to litigation brought, the lawyers
were on their own in determining the actual courses of action. There
were mutual expectations about what the lawyers would seek to do in
that there was no disagreement that the principle objectives were to
prevent cutbacks and, if at all possible, seek improvements in AFDC
eligibility standards and grant amounts. At the same time, no one
expected that those represented would be asked to endorse or check the
specific actions taken on their behalf. All understood that the
circumstances and the tasks played to the strengths of lawyers. Based on
past experiences, California welfare rights leaders trusted that Abascal
and his colleagues both shared their commitments and had the integrity,
knowledge, skill, and time to provide competent representation.
This was especially the case with respect to Abascal's role in working
with legislators on the drafting of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971.
Because of the need to act quickly, Abascal made all decisions without
consulting either other legal aid lawyers or welfare rights activists, though
450. Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, supra note 72, at 520-21.
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he had help from the ACLU's experienced Sacramento lobbyist. His
partners in countering Reagan and his aides were legislators and their
closest staff. For them, in the legislature's backrooms, Abascal was the
voice of welfare beneficiaries. Functionally, he became a surrogate
representative. His surrogacy was a situation-specific and time-limited
manifestation of his mission-driven commitment to representing the
interests of the poor.
In lobbying for impoverished individuals, Abascal embodied
legislative access at a level usually attainable only by the strongest of
special interests. This high degree of influence on public assistance
legislation did not last long, but for those several weeks it mattered a
great deal in tempering Reagan's welfare program.
Although Abascal and other legal services attorneys had considerable
discretion strategically and tactically, they were not acting on their own
imagined agenda but on an agenda shaped by the daily experiences of
welfare claimants and recipients. The lawyers knew from the client
caseloads of legal services offices and welfare rights organizations the
issues that most affected AFDC eligibility and benefit amounts. While
there are always competing considerations on how best to expend limited
resources, in this instance all the relevant players were on the same page
regarding substantive priorities and advocacy approaches.
Luban would view favorably the actions taken by Abascal to advance
and protect the interests of the welfare poor. The goals sought, the results
intended, and the means used were all aimed at improving the immediate
living conditions of welfare beneficiaries. In all respects, Abascal's actions
meet Luban's tests for responsible social justice lawyering when direct
client accountability mechanisms are weak.45' He also in all likelihood
would applaud the situation as an example of lawyers and mobilized
beneficiaries acting in joint cause. Yet, as I have explained previously,
Luban's analysis invokes a conventional appreciation of legal
representation. Even when lawyers act entirely independently, Luban still
assumes the primacy of client-control and agency principles of
accountability.5
Though not directed at social cause lawyering, Pitkin's understanding
of democratic political representation, which is foundational for
Mansbridge's conception of gyroscopic representation, makes no such
assumption. Instead, she mainly views the process of representation from
the standpoint of the representative's responsibilities. The effectiveness of
mechanisms for holding representatives directly accountable to those
represented is a secondary concern in her thought.
451. LUBAN,supra nOte 2I,at 340.
452. Id. at 351-53.
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In setting forth her concept of representation, Pitkin posits a number
of expectations that clearly track how Abascal and his legal aid colleagues
represented the welfare poor: that the representative act in the interest of
the represented; that the representative act independently; and that
notwithstanding the potential for conflict between representative and
represented about what to do, the actual occurrence of conflict is
unusual.453 Pitkin looks to representatives to take initiative but always in
the interest of those represented and always mindful of minimizing
conflicts with those represented. In the struggle over welfare reform,
legal services lawyers acted in line with those core conditions. But there
are also certain descriptive qualities regarding how a representative acts
that need to be taken into account.
Integral to both Pitkin's sense of the independence of representatives
and Mansbridge's framing of gyroscopic representation are a
representative's ability to act responsively and to exercise good judgment.
Neither examines in any detail what is meant by responsiveness and
judgment.454 Luban's thought on lawyer role morality and responsible
representation similarly places high value on responsiveness and judgment
as aspects of good decisionmaking yet is also non-specific about what each
entails. However, before commenting further on the meaning of these
terms in social cause lawyering, I address several other issues raised by
Pitkin and Mansbridge about the nature of representation.
Pitkin examines representation principally from the representative's
frame of reference. It is the representative's predispositions and attitudes
that matter the most. In discussing the characteristics of those represented,
she highlights that the constituent group itself has to have or has to be
conceived of having the capacity to exercise independent judgment.
Representation for her is not to be confused with paternalistically taking
care of others.455 For there to be meaningful representation and not some
453. PITKIN, supra note 64, at 209.
454. For an insightful explication of the multidimensional character of responsiveness as an
attribute in electoral representation, see Heinz Eulau & Paul D. Karps, The Puzzle of Representation:
Specifying Components of Responsiveness, 2 LEIS. STUD. Q. 233 (1977). Eulau and Karps posited a
fourfold concept of "responsiveness." The first is "policy responsiveness," which covers policy issues
of concern to a representative's voters, id. at 242; the second, "service responsiveness," which refers to
the advantages and benefits a representative obtains for particular constituents, id. at 243; the third,
"allocation responsiveness," which has to do with pork-barrel politics and anticipating district and
constituent needs and engaging in relevant bargaining, id at 245; and fourth, "symbolic responsiveness,"
which covers the significant gestures needed to generate and maintain constituent support, id. at 246.
Their article was a response to both a path-breaking empirical study of congressional and constituent
relationships which too narrowly focused on policy issue "congruence," see Warren E. Miller and Donald
E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AMER. POLl. Sci. REv. 45 (963), and a lack of
specification in Pitkin's concept of representation regarding how to determine and measure
responsiveness.
455. PrKIN, supra note 64, at 209.
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other kind of relationship, the representative needs to fundamentally
respect the decisionmaking competence of those represented.
In a similar vein, Mansbridge regards the legitimacy of gyroscopic
representation as involving respectful mutual education, not manipulation
and duplicity. In delineating the bounds of representation, she emphasizes
the importance at the outset of opportunities for dialogue and,
subsequently, relative ease in retaining or removing the representative. To
Pitkin's underscoring of respect for those represented, Mansbridge directs
attention to informed deliberation and the prospect of constituent
control as key factors in determining the character and quality of the
representational relationship.
Although Mansbridge downplays elections when distinguishing
gyroscopic representation, she does not ignore the potential effect of
elections as a check on the views and actions of a representative. Elections
provide recurring opportunities for those represented to express aggregate
preferences. Even when there is great trust in the representative, voters
are able periodically to reconsider their support. The electoral process
enables the represented to make ultimate decisions and thereby influence
a representative's behavior.
The fee clients pay lawyers serves a similar practical function in the
usual lawyer-client relationship. But in antipoverty lawyering, no residual
mechanism is available to the client for asserting comparable influence.
The poor themselves have no structured economic leverage over the
lawyers who represent them. To the extent that there are financial
pressures on how legal services lawyers behave, they come from other
sources.
Within today's literature on lawyering, questions continually are
raised about how to respond to inequalities in the relationship of lawyers
and clients. Rules of professional conduct provide some guidance but by
and large are only sporadically enforced. They also address in only very
limited ways dilemmas in group legal representation. The point is that the
formation of a lawyer's role identity involves a more expansive
understanding of professional responsibilities than is found in ethical codes
alone. Indeed, a major premise underlying client-centered lawyering is the
need for heightened consciousness and reflection regarding an attorney's
self-responsibility for fostering and managing professional relationships
that truly respect a client's independence as a decisionmaker. 456 The
development of such self-awareness is especially significant when clients
receive free services.
456. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH 147-55 (1977) (arguing that ultimate decisions should be based on providing the
"greatest client satisfaction" and that "by and large, lawyers cannot know what value clients really
place on the various consequences").
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The most problematic situations involve group legal representation.
Vulnerable constituencies are frequently in a state of flux. In social cause
lawyering, the extent of an activist group's mobilization and cohesiveness
varies greatly and is always context specific. Under such changing
circumstances, relations with lawyers are apt to become attenuated. To
counter this tendency, lawyers have to pay continuing attention to
cultivating their own self-accountability to those whom they represent.
The client dynamics of group lawyering for the poor resemble but are
not in all respects the same as Mansbridge's framing of gyroscopic
representation. The bottom line is that there is no single regularized
method for furthering ultimate client control. Its absence, however, is not
fatal. The antidote lies in the professional dispositions and developing
character of lawyers who provide services not directly paid for by clients.
The challenge is in how to inculcate the kind of underlying characteristics
that Pitkin and Mansbridge proscribe for democratic political
representation.
In my view, we need to pay more attention to what I call "process
values." These are professional role values that fundamentally shape how
a lawyer as a representative interacts with clients and brings to bear his or
her knowledge and skill. One set of concerns, which is especially critical
when there are no or only weak formal accountability mechanisms,
involves having genuine respect for the client's autonomy, maintaining
meaningful levels of professional interaction, and sharing mutual
understandings about the actual terms of the relationship. The term I want
to use to embrace these considerations as a lawyering phenomenon is
"accessibility." In group legal representation, responsiveness and
judgment are other pivotal lawyering process values.
My use of the term accessibility is not drawn from any article or text.
It is the descriptive trait used by Kevin Aslanian, a welfare rights leader
and former AFDC recipient, when I asked him to describe what was
special about Abascal as a lawyer.457 Aslanian first mentioned that Abascal
was "not arrogant or elitist." He next commented on how Abascal knew
how to disagree in a non-demeaning way. But it was his concluding
thought that has most stuck with me. Aslanian said, "The main thing is he
made himself accessible." The clear emphasis in Aslanian's phrasing was
on how Abascal held himself out and related to others.
Abascal had a way of conveying respect for others that positively
affected their interest and comfort in interacting with him. It was a
presence or bearing that put people at ease whether one was a member of
a client group, a legal colleague, a public official, or even an opponent.
457. Interview with Kevin M. Aslanian, supra note 131. For more than twenty-five years, Aslanian
has been the Executive Director of the Coalition of California Welfare Rights Organization, which is a
legal services back-up center mainly supported with funds from California's IOLTA program. There
are several lawyers on the organization's staff, though Aslanian himself is not a lawyer.
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While he had great confidence in his own sense of a situation and what
needed to be done, he was open and never closed off to the viewpoints of
others. In working with client groups and allies, Abascal invited and
supported their involvement in planning and decisionmaking. The degree
of interaction varied depending upon the circumstances, but there usually
were opportunities for meaningful interchange. The hallmarks of
Abascal's accessibility were a profound respect for and genuine openness
to others, combined with considerable candor in expressing his own views.
As a result, when Abascal did act on his own, he was not acting
unpredictably or in isolation. In the battle over welfare reform, Abascal
provided leadership and direction, but he drew on a network of support
from other legal services lawyers, from welfare rights leaders, and directly
and through them from individual beneficiaries themselves. He was not a
lone ranger sweeping in to save the poor. He utilized not only his own
formidable abilities but also the collective knowledge and experience of
clients and colleagues. For Abascal accessibility was a two-way street. It
allowed for mutual exchanges of information and opportunities for
mutually influencing one another.
While Abascal had strong relations with California welfare rights
leaders, they were not highly formalized or structured. For the most part,
they reflected his personality and temperament and his general inclination
to work collaboratively with others. The specific nature of such
collaborations, however, left significant room for him to exercise his own
discretion. Furthermore, it was unlikely that he was very explicit about the
actual terms of the relationships he forged with client groups. In the 1970s,
antipoverty attorneys addressing policy issues in conjunction with or on
behalf of client organizations spelled out little, if anything, in writing about
the purposes of the representation, expectations regarding attorney and
client responsibilities, or the duration of the representation. 5 There would
have been instead largely implicit understandings.
The informality that characterized Abascal's relationships with client
constituencies has continuing relevance for social cause lawyering.
Particularly when groups are not formally structured or are erratically
mobilized, addressing the terms of the representational relationship
formally can be awkward and potentially counterproductive. For example,
when a community coalition first comes together around a policy or
practical problem, organizational relationships are likely to be highly
fluid and with no clear leadership structure. The lawyer does not want to
appear to be favoring some members and not others. It may well be best
for the attorney to wait to see how the group develops organically before
being too explicit about managing the attorney-client relationship. This
458. Written retainer agreements were not and still are not required in California when there is no
fee involved. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6148 (Deering 2013).
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kind of situation is an opportunity for the lawyer to nurture ties with
group members without potentially chilling relationships by being
professionally rigid. The objective is to foster mutual respect and shared
openness and thereby a sense among group members that the attorney is
not a foreboding but an accessible figure who can be trusted. To the
extent certain fundamentals about the lawyer-client relationship warrant
attention, they can be raised more flexibly and sensitively in discussion at
later group meetings or in individual exchanges.
Accessibility sets the framework for the lawyer-client relationship,
but the value of the relationship largely depends on the lawyer's
knowledge and skill. Substantive expertise alone is not sufficient. What
most distinguishes the character and quality of an attorney's competence
as a representative, especially when involved in policy advocacy, are
responsiveness and judgment.
Responsiveness in some respects is the opposite of accountability,
as it requires an open-ended approach in how to respond to specific
situations and changing circumstances.459 Where accountability directs
attention to the limiting of a representative's discretion, responsiveness
presumes a broadening of discretion. In acting responsively, a
representative has to be flexible and adaptive in order to account for a
host of competing political, legal, and policy considerations. The danger
is that such openness deteriorates into unprincipled opportunism.
The need is for responsible flexibility and discriminate adaptation,
the guidance for which comes from a strong sense of purpose, like that
which drives social cause lawyering. When transformed into specific
objectives, such purpose becomes a source of standards for determining
whether representatives have acted responsively in the interests of those
represented. In fashioning and realizing those objectives, the
representative has to be discerning and self-reflective and have the
capacity to self-correct if mistakes are made or unanticipated
developments happen in the course of the representation.
Responsiveness for a representative, in effect, involves a three-step
process. The first step has to do with having a shared purpose or set of
purposes with those represented. The representative has to understand
the priority values, interests, and concerns of a represented group and
commit to seeking their accomplishment. The strength of this bond as a
guide for purposeful action mostly depends on the integrity of the
representative -that is, the representative's continuing willingness to act
consistently with the encompassing reason for the representation. The
second step has to do with the resourcefulness of the representative. An
459. See PHILLIPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE
LAW 73-113 (2001). In framing my initial ideas about responsiveness in lawyering, I have drawn on the
jurisprudential thought of the sociologists Phillipe Nonet and Philip Selznick. Note. however, that they
address the institutional competence of law in the quest for justice, not the role of lawyers.
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overarching sense of purpose needs to be formulated into concrete
objectives that address particular problems. This narrowing of focus
raises questions of substance and means. There are always choices to be
made about what policy issues to address and what approaches or
techniques to use to advance the interests of those represented. The
representative has to be flexible and adaptable. Rigidity is the bane of
responsive representation, which is inevitably context specific. The third
step has to do with the ability of a representative to learn from experience.
The flexibility and adaptability associated with responsiveness continually
call for critical assessment of situational factors and one's own role.
Standards for determining the effectiveness of actions undertaken have to
take into account direct and indirect effects, both those which further and
those which push back against the representational objectives. In what is a
reiterative process, the responsive representative is ever alert to making
adjustments in light of changing circumstances and new insights.
Abascal's approach to and later reflection on the campaign to counter
Reagan's welfare reforms exemplifies the pushes and pulls of responsive
group legal representation. From his days in law school, he was committed
to working to improve the life conditions of poor people. At CRLA, he
saw firsthand the effects of oppressive agricultural labor conditions and
arbitrary welfare policies and practices. The late i96os saw an
unprecedented increase in AFDC rolls and expenditures primarily due to
welfare rights organizing and legal advocacy. When Reagan decided to
push back administratively and legislatively, Abascal did not wait to file
lawsuits, he aggressively lobbied, first along with welfare rights leaders and
other legal services lawyers with welfare administrators, and then virtually
singlehandedly in the legislative bargaining that preceded the enactment of
the California Welfare Reform Act of i97i. His legislative lobbying on
behalf of the welfare poor was at the time a totally innovative turn. It also
was a very pragmatic turn in difficult political circumstances. But for
Abascal's initiative there would not have been the opportunity to influence
the detailed drafting of the legislation in ways that involved risks but
ultimately were advantageous for AFDC beneficiaries collectively.
In the aftermath, Abascal then launched an unprecedented, multi-
case litigation campaign using federal statutory provisions to check state
policies and practices. The extent of litigation was in response to the
intransigence, almost ruthlessness, of Reagan welfare administrators in
resisting legislative provisions and judicial rulings with which they
disagreed. The focus of the litigation overall was not on the establishment
of new rights but on forcing the state to meet and implement existing
welfare policies in compliance with the rule of law. The coordination of
multiple lawsuits, filed with the backing of welfare rights leaders and
involving a group of legal services attorneys, was yet another innovative
and pragmatic turn instigated by Abascal. The potential effectiveness of
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this strategy depended on an assessment of then-existing legal and
judicial circumstances.
Although legal services lawyers won most of the cases, Abascal
especially regretted the loss in Villa v. Hall, which involved how to
compute the earned income of working AFDC recipients when
determining grant benefits for a family.46° The case went to the heart of
public policies regarding the use of financial incentives as transition
measures to support employment of adult welfare beneficiaries. The loss
was the result of a Supreme Court decision in a case brought in Texas
that, had there not been a delay in the transmission of the record on
appeal, probably would have been decided differently. 6' It was a
fortuitous loss. While towards the end of his life Abascal expressed
concern about not doing enough to facilitate jobs for the welfare poor,
the link between welfare and employment was always an issue of utmost
concern for him. I view his later doubts primarily as manifestations of the
seriousness with which he critically examined actions he took and his
awareness of the limits, even contradictions, in what he had done.
Judgment, as I use the term here, is a process of reasoning directed at
action or policy, not abstract theoretical issues. Philosophers refer to this
type of deliberation as "practical judgment. '4,6 It is akin to the kind of
professional judgment most admired in lawyering.463 The crux of practical
judgment, and most certainly in social cause lawyering, is what the
political theorist Hannah Arendt, translating from the French le bon
sens, called "good sense."' 64
Arendt's focus was on political judgment and, in particular, how
effective exercises of judgment ultimately depend on the ability to
persuade others of the good sense of one's position. She characterized this
method of using reason to influence decisionmaking as a process of
460. See supra text accompanying notes 386-397.
461. See supra note 394.
462. Practical judgment has much in common with the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or
practical wisdom. ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book VI, chs. 5-
13, at 176-92 (J. A. K. Thomson trans., 1953). Practical judgment also has roots in Kant's conception
of reflective judgment, which he differentiated from determinant judgment. THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT
270 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949). Determinant judgment describes the process of applying an
established rule to a particular set of facts. Reflective judgment begins with the particular and involves
a search for the universal-that is, what principle, standard, or other decisionmaking heuristic might
best apply to resolving the matter at hand. Modern legal writers sometimes use the term "practical
reason" or "practical reasoning" rather than practical judgment. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum,
Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 714 (1994); Eileen A.
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717
(I995).
463. Former Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman in emphasizing the critical importance of
judgment in lawyering uses the terms practical judgment and practical wisdom interchangeably.
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
464. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 221 (1977).
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wooing.465 It is not coercive. Although having judgment speaks to an
individual's intellectual and, as I shortly explain, moral development, it is
in application directed primarily at others. Judgment is very much related
to understanding what others regard as "common sense" so as to be
persuasive with them. While judgment involves finding something in
common with other persons, good sense better captures the deliberative as
well as intuitive aspects of what it means to use judgment. There is nothing
common about good judgment.
Having written elsewhere about the meaning and teachability of
lawyering judgment, I discuss here only what I have come to regard as the
key characteristics of practical judgment as applied to lawyering. 6 6 These
descriptive features, which are overlapping rather than distinct and
separate, are (i) the contextual tailoring of knowledge, (2) a dialogic form
of reasoning that accounts for multiple points of view, (3) an ability to be
empathetic and detached at the same time, (4) the intertwining of
intellectual and moral concerns, (5) an instrumental and equitable interest
in human affairs, and (6) a heavy reliance on learning from cumulative
experience.46' The ability to act responsively and the development of
judgment are complementary.
Practical judgment is always context specific. It entails the tailoring
of general knowledge and past experiences to resolve complex problems
when there is no clear decisionmaking metric to use. In ways sensitive to
particular circumstances, practical judgment provides the insights that
give direction and coherence to the weighing and prioritizing of
competing considerations. The process of reasoning involves taking into
account how an event or situation looks from multiple points of view.
Whether engaged or not in discussions with others, one needs to have an
inner dialogue with oneself. The reason is that in exercising practical
judgment a person incorporates as part of his or her own considerations
the interests, concerns, views, and objectives others may have regarding
the specific matter.
The critical dynamic in developing good judgment is the ability to be
empathetic and detached at the same time.4 8 Empathy involves
imaginatively putting oneself in someone else's shoes. It is not the same
thing as sympathy, since it is not a matter of sharing or agreeing with
someone else's beliefs, thoughts, or feelings. It is a matter of understanding
that person from his or her standpoint as best one can. To make this
human connection fully, one needs to rely on both intellect and feelings.
465. Id. at 122.
466. See Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider, supra note 8.
467. For a fuller explication of these key characteristics, see Aaronson, Thinking like a Fox, supra
note 8, at 30-38.
468. See KRONMAN, supra note 463, at 66-74; see also RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 102-28
(1983).
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Detachment requires distancing oneself from personal attachments in
order to identify a host of considerations that may bear on what is
going on and what needs to be done. In distancing oneself, one needs to
suspend feelings but not to deny them. The process of detachment is
further complicated by the need to double distance oneself by stepping
back from one's own interests and feelings, not just the interests and
feelings of others. The effort to be empathetic and detached at the
same time induces notable internal tension.
Exercising practical judgment has a moral as well as an intellectual
dimension. The connection originates in Aristotle's concept of practical
wisdom, which he defined as follows: "Practical wisdom is a rational
faculty exercised for the attainment of truth in things that are humanly
good and bad."469 The aim is to make use of knowledge not abstractly for
its own sake but instrumentally in terms of how it can be applied
equitably for the betterment of humanity.47° Luban's conception of role
morality similarly focuses on the soundness with which lawyers make
decisions regarding what is right or wrong or good or bad under the
circumstances and in light of a lawyer's special role responsibilities.
While one can problem solve and manipulate information and situations
cleverly and shrewdly, such behavior can belie what it means to say
someone has good judgment. Destroying or burying an important piece
of evidence might win a case, but it is not going to lead anyone to say
that a lawyer who has so acted has good judgment.
Practical lawyering judgment develops over time and with experience.
Its nurturing and maturation usually require exposure to a variety of
problem situations and repetitive practice. As with all learning, few things
happen automatically. Individuals optimally learn from experience when
they explicitly consider, through self-reflection and in discussion, what has
been experienced.47' Initially, one has to work at developing appropriate
habits of mind and heart and the ability to assimilate critically, in proper
measure, new information. Eventually, how one deliberates and the core
of what one knows become deeply imprinted in one's consciousness. The
reasoning process of individuals with experience is different from those
new to a field. While a novice often needs a roadmap to identify the
surest way to get from point A to point B, the expert with experience
often sees instantly what has to be done.472 Less than optimal courses of
action are rejected without much conscious consideration. Whether
469. ARISTOTLE, supra note 462, at 177.
470. For a suggestive Aristotelian treatment of what this means for the judiciary, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 79-121 (1995).
471. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 64-66 (1995).
472. Gary Blasi calls this "forward reasoning." Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering,
Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Function of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313,345 (1995).
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individuals have good practical judgment is a statement about the quality
and character of how they deliberate and their intellectual versatility and
sensitivity to human situations, all of which take time to develop.
In the protracted battle over California welfare reform, Abascal's
judgment was continually tested in legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic
arenas. He had to constantly make judgment calls.
One example was the decision as part of the legislative drafting of
the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 to not authorize any exception to the
use of a standard flat amount for work-related expenses in determining
AFDC grants for households with a working parent.473 Abascal
persuaded California legislators to accept the Reagan administration's
$50 absolute limitation. The legislators were concerned that it would be
an inadequate amount and would significantly reduce a family's available
income for basic necessities. Viewing the specific problem, Abascal
brought to bear his knowledge about federal welfare law and the
likelihood of a successful facial legal challenge. In figuring out what to
do, he had to weigh the risks and consequences for welfare families were
he wrong, and he had to commit to filing follow-up litigation to right the
wrong. At each step of the way, he had to take into account how others
would view the matter and how to be persuasive with them. Some of the
key legislators were quite skeptical about making this concession. In the
end, it was not just his analysis that led them to follow his counsel, but
their confidence in his character and commitment to the welfare poor.
Abascal was an exceptional social cause lawyer. He was held in high
regard from the beginning of his legal career. He was very bright, and he
worked extraordinarily hard. Yet one can only speculate what accounted
for his paramount good sense.
He came from a working-class background. His father was a Basque
immigrant whose two brothers fought for the Republican cause in the
Spanish Civil War, and his mother's family was from southern Spain and
initially immigrated to Hawaii where they were agricultural workers.
Neither of his parents had much formal education. His father had a
stroke when Abascal was fifteen. As the oldest sibling, he had to assume
major responsibility for maintaining the family's income. Yet his early
years as an adult were not promising. He drifted and did not do well at
first as an undergraduate.474
Abascal eventually found his way as a student and completed an
MBA and work towards a Ph.D. in economics. He came to law school with
a solid interdisciplinary background. Compared to most new lawyers
starting out in legal services at the time, he was relatively old with more
life experiences behind him. But unlike other attorneys his age who had
473. See supra text accompanying notes 336-337.
474. Telephone conversation with Bea Moulton, Abascal's widow (Apr. 2o, 2012).
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moved laterally into legal services positions, he did not carry with him the
effects of having practiced law elsewhere. His first legal experiences all
came in working on problems of extreme poverty. Committed to seeking
social justice, he saw his role with fresh but seasoned eyes. He remained
an antipoverty lawyer all his life.
From my perspective, Abascal's legal advocacy for the welfare poor
stands as a model of how to be a social cause lawyer when the interests of
a vulnerable group are otherwise unlikely to be effectively represented in
the enactment and implementation of public policies. Abascal was
unique. For the rest of us concerned about social justice, it does not hurt
to have some conceptual guideposts.
To repeat what Pitkin said at the beginning of her book on
democratic political representation: "Learning what 'representation'
means and learning how to represent are intimately connected." '475 Those
who represent the poor need to be highly self-conscious about their
professional role responsibilities including what it means to be a
representative. At its core, such learning calls on lawyers to focus on how
to be accessible and responsive to client constituencies and how to
develop over time perspectives, dispositions, and skills for exercising
good judgment in uncertain and changing circumstances.
Yet when all is said and done, there is a cultural specificity to what
can be achieved through group legal advocacy. Constitutional ideals
notwithstanding, the American political and legal landscape is
asymmetrical. It is far harder to use legal representation to achieve
progressive social change than to uphold the existing order.
C. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ADVOCACY"76
The options available to antipoverty attorneys in the late I96os and
early 1970s were bound to the general political predicament of their
impoverished clients. Abascal and his legal services colleagues did not
have the advantages of representing a group with widespread popular
support or substantial political resources. The victories won in court were
always subject to frustration. But the frustration inherent in litigation
was also a source for improvisation. Legal advocacy for welfare
recipients was a reformist strategy limited but not controlled by existing
power configurations. The legal strategy employed during this period
evolved dialectically in response to official resistance and in ways which
built on prior developments.
The first legal cases concentrated on altering legal doctrine. The
issues ranged from extending due process safeguards to public assistance
475. PrrKIN, supra note 64, at I.
476. This final part is a slightly edited version of the conclusion to my 1975 doctoral dissertation.
Aaronson, Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform, supra note 5, at 279-81.
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decisionmaking, to eradicating moral conditions on welfare eligibility, to
efforts to secure public aid payments as a social right. Although the
attempt to embed the right to welfare in the Constitution proved
unsuccessful, public relief did achieve in case after case judicial recognition
as a statutory right. In an important conceptual and cultural development,
a social welfare benefit previously characterized as mere charity came to
be considered an interest deserving of significant legal protection.
Relying on the deference, however variable, that American
politicians and administrators afford the judiciary and principles of law,
Abascal along with other legal services attorneys utilized doctrinal
advances already obtained and predictions about prospective court actions
both in legislative bargaining and as grounds for policing administrative
practices. The results were an expansion and a preservation of tangible
benefits for the welfare poor that in the absence of legal intervention
would not have happened. For individuals who had very little else upon
which to rely, the availability of legal representation set new opportunities
in political as well as legal affairs.
Bolstering the legal competence of the poor had political
implications, but ones which tested rather than transformed American
values and patterns of power. The incremental advancements obtainable
through law contained contradictions. Welfare recipients benefitted from
access to legal assistance and from developments in American law, but so
did the political system. The actions of antipoverty attorneys channeled the
demands of welfare beneficiaries for equality and fair treatment into the
legal order. Handled as legal rather than social conflicts, these demands
led to resolutions that left existing economic and political relationships
virtually undisturbed. Indeed, the legal adjustments which took place
affirmed and reinforced the very constitutional values employed by the
society to legitimate dominant institutional arrangements. Little headway
was made in redressing the causes of poverty. The ambitions of a legal
welfare strategy were inextricably subject to the 19th and 2oth century
ideological undercurrents of the American liberal tradition and the ebbs
and flows of American interest group politics.
Lastly, legal advocacy for the poor during this period suffered from
and varied in accordance with the precariousness of a government
provided service. Political, fiscal, and caseload pressures affected legal aid
programs much as they affected the operation of public welfare agencies.
An effective legal welfare strategy required constant vigilance with regard
to official policies and practices by legal services attorneys, but such
vigilance was politically controversial, expensive, and time consuming. The
decline of welfare rights organizations and the absence of external
mechanisms for holding antipoverty lawyers accountable to their clientele
held out the continuing prospect of an erosion and routinization of the
legal services provided welfare recipients. In California, Abascal and a
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handful of attorneys developed a fairly comprehensive and sophisticated
series of actions on behalf of the welfare poor. Their sustained
representation, however, was self-defined and circumstantial. There was
little in the way of broad institutional support to suggest that what was
accomplished yesterday would be maintained today or tomorrow.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW WITH RONALD REAGAN
What follows is the transcription of a tape-recorded interview with
former President Ronald Reagan, shortly after the end of his second
term as California's Governor. The interview was conducted by Mark
Aaronson at The Leamington Hotel in Oakland, California, on March 6,
1975. The subject of the interview was the changes that took place in
welfare in California during Reagan's two terms as governor.
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
The welfare rolls and costs began to rise rapidly
during your first term in office; yet, the
administration didn't really come to grips with
this problem until sometime in the middle of
1970. Why was there this delay in terms of any
concerted effort?
Well, there was a concerted effort and the
trouble was this: We had to learn and we had to
learn about the ability of bureaucracy to resist
and how welfare was getting along. We had
programs in which we had high hopes. We
started at the very first recognizing that that was
a problem that previously the administration
before, over the eight years, had built up to the
place where they literally were out soliciting
people to be on welfare. And we could see the
increasing line. We knew where it was going and
that we were faced with the inevitable
bankruptcy, literally, of our state or going down
the thankless road of having to raise taxes at least
every year or every two years just to meet the
cost of welfare, but we started on plans.
Now, our problem was that being new and a new
administration faced with what was a nationwide
problem and no one had found the answer to it.
We started the experimental program in Fresno
that we believed would lead toward what our
goal was, which was to use welfare as a
temporary aid with the goal being to funnel
people through there and back out into private
enterprise jobs as quickly as possible.
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Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Well, you see, we had this-we got our
information from the professional welfarists. We
had to depend on them for implementing these
plans that we put forward. And you waste a year
or more and find your experiment isn't working-
your pilot program, not an experiment-pilot
program isn't working. So you try again.
And then it was that, finally, before 1970, in 1969,
we put a task force to work and we went to the
outside. We had fifteen young lawyers, who
volunteered their services.
I know about a task force in August of 1970. Was
there one earlier, in 1969?
Well, now maybe, you know, eight years runs
together. I'm trying to think when.
I know it's hard to-
I'm trying to think. I'm trying to think when
the -
There was a Special Governor's Task Force put
together in August of 1970.
Was it put together in August? I'm just confused
and I was thinking August then was when they
came out with their report.
No, they came out, I think, in December,
something like that.
Well, I know they worked about seven months
on this.
Yes.
Well, you may be right, so I'll stand corrected by
you, because I'd have to go back and check the
list.
I know I'm asking some specific questions.
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Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
And I know it's very hard to keep the exact dates
in mind.
Yeah. You'd be surprised. Things kind of flow
together through those eight years.
Yes.
Well, anyway, whenever, whatever the date,
when we finally saw the failure of our efforts and
these things like this pilot program to control
this, we turned to the task force route, which we
had used so successfully at the beginning of our
administration in so many areas of government.
After seven months this task force did, I imagine,
the most comprehensive study that's ever been
done on welfare and came up with the most
comprehensive proposal for reform that's ever
been attempted in the country.
But, having this outside help, for the first time we
were no longer dependent on the bureaucracy
itself. Now, these lawyers, for example, were able
to comb through not only the regulations, but the
Congressional acts, and the laws, and so forth
and find were some of these regulations based on
law or were these just departmental regulations
that had become kind of law through just
common usage.
And they came back with the recommendations
of what we would do administratively, what
would require legislation, and recommendations
then that would go further and require waivers
for some of the federal regulations at HEW.
Who in the bureaucracy-what in the
bureaucracy did you find most resistant, the State
Department of Social Welfare and its personnel
or were there others in the counties?
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Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
[.-] except in some of the rural-more rural
counties or some of the big, vested interests that
are created by-you know, it's like Dr. Parkinson
in his book when he said that government hires a
rat catcher, who soon becomes a rodent control
officer.
And this we found was very typical of what had
happened to welfare. Now, on the other hand, we
have to pay a debt to many people, professional
welfarists, who shared our feeling and who, being
involved in it, knew where some of the problems
laid. And so much of our task force help came
from people in welfare who-and curiously
enough, to show you what the problem was, in
some instances, who had to come, you might say,
by the back door and say, "Please. I'll help. Don't
identify me."
This is how emotional this problem was.
Were these state welfare personnel?
Both state and from the county level. See, in
California, welfare is administered at the county
level.
Yes.
So you really had three sets of regulations
overlapping. First, the great multitude were
federal regulations. Then, over the years those
have been augmented by state regulations, as
they then pass the money and the burden onto
the counties to administer, and then the counties
would pass some of their own.
And through all of this, literally, it was like, you
know, the more words you put in a basket the
more meaning and interpretation people can get
out of it. And so, between all these regulations
they literally could find out anything they needed
to do whatever they wanted to do.
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Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
So, make it plain that when I criticize the great
bureaucracy, we're indebted to some among
them, who were conscientious, public servants,
who damn well wanted to help.
One of the first major proposals was in the spring
of 197o and that concerned a cutback of $io
million in the attendant care program for the
disabled. It was one of the first across the board,
at the state level, cutback in a particular program.
What were the reasons for taking initial action in
that area?
Well, this was one of the things we found and one
of the first places where we found abuses. Now,
this would give you an example of what the
bureaucracy can do when you attempt to curtail
their empire building or their activities.
What we were aiming at was cases where family
members, for example, had discovered that they
could put in-if they had someone in their family
disabled or something-a mother taking care of
her own child could put in for income from the
taxpayers for caring for her own child. We found
one example of a couple-a married couple-
both public employees-a gross income between
them in excess of $6o,ooo-and getting an
allowance from welfare to provide for a disabled
child.
Now, we were well-aware and we made every
effort for those people-you know, the truly
disabled and the ones who had to have this
care -but this is not who we were aiming at. And
we thought that we had put out regulations and
so forth with this cutback that would make sure
that didn't happen. We hadn't reckoned on the
ingenuity of the bureaucracy.
The first thing we knew was the bureaucracy just
issued an order cutting it off to the people in
greatest need.
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Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
That would be the State Department of Social
Welfare in this instance?
Yeah. And the implementation of it. Now, wait a
minute. I wish I had Swoap here with me,
because would this have been at the state or at
the local administrative level?
Well, there was a state announcement of the
regulation.
Well, the state, yes.
Then it would have to be implemented by the-
But I think it was at the implementation level, so
this would have been, I think, where welfare was
being implemented, at the county level. But at
any rate, suddenly you had television, as if by
magic, on news programs the most helpless,
pitiful looking, quadriplegics being displayed on
television and stating their case that their
attendant was being taken away from them like
the first of the month. And you know, there's a
person that was so helpless and desperate, I had
to say, you know, "What am I going to do?"
Well, I got home one night and it came very close
to home. One of the civil servants working in our
house in Sacramento is the sole support of both an
invalid mother and invalid aunt. She couldn't
work and support them if she couldn't have help
in providing someone to be with them during the
day to take care of them. I came home. My wife
was waiting for me at the door. Nancy said she has
just told me this story. They just received a call
telling them that as of Thursday they can no
longer have an attendant. And so she feels she's
going to have to quit government service and try
to get two kinds of jobs so that she can afford to
hire someone.
Well, I went over, back to the office, and I was
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Ronald Reagan:
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Ronald Reagan:
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Ronald Reagan:
I understand that. Because of time, I'm going to go
rapidly on to some other questions. Who were your
major advisors on welfare at various times during
your eight years in office? Who did you rely on
most for assistance in the kinds of actions you were
proposing to take?
Well, you went through your secretaries of health
and welfare.
Oh, golly. What was his name, the first one? Who
was it?
Jim Hall?
No, before Jim Hall. Well, it was Vandergriff.
And before him though-oh, what's his name?
Oh, he ran for attorney general in '66.
Oh, you mean Spence Williams.
Yeah. Spence Williams was the first. And then
came Lucian Vandergriff. Then came Jim Hall.
And following Jim Hall was Earl Brian. But it was
under Jim Hall that we began to. The other two
had led in the various efforts and experiments that
had failed or the pilot programs. And I don't
blame this on them, as I say. It just fell to their lot.
By the time Jim Hall came along we had all the
lessons of what had failed and what we were up
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mad as hell. We'd been having these other cases,
we'd been seeing this stuff on television and I
called a press conference and I went into the
press conference and I said, "We have to rescind
this order, not because we don't believe in it, not
because it isn't right, but because we've found we
don't have the means to enforce on the welfare
personnel the administering of this as we had
proposed it be administered. They are sabotaging
it by taking the help away from the very people
who need it most and whom we never intended
to take it away from." And so I said, "We hereby
rescind the order."
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Mark Aaronson:
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Ronald Reagan:
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against and this is when we went to the task force
route under him.
So you would usually rely on the Secretary for
Health and Welfare for most of your personal
advice?
Yeah.
How did your relationship with the State
Department of Social Welfare change over the
eight years? That would have been a department
under that secretary. Did your degree of contact
with that department, your sense about it, change
as your administration progressed?
Well, it was typical of so many other
departments. We were engaged in a war with
bureaucracy, and there was no question they
were not sympathetic to our efforts to reduce the
size and costs and power of government. And
this was typical of them, but as we met frustration
after frustration, we began getting tougher in that
particular area and getting people in there that
would. The secretaries always were sympathetic
to what we were trying to do. And out of the task
force came this kind of personnel and there were
some changes in personnel in the department.
So, you felt the department was more responsive
to your program when Robert Carleson, who was
on that task force-
Bob Carleson. Earl Brian in the health field.
In '71 you had your welfare reform proposals you
were developing and President Nixon had his
concerning the Family Assistance Plan. And
there was also, at the same time, a major
controversy between the federal government and
state government on cost of living adjustments
under what was called § 402(a)(23), and you and
President Nixon met around April i, 1971, at San
Clemente.
[Vol. 64:933
April 2013] LEGAL ADVOCACY AND WELFARE REFORM
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Mark Aaronson:
Shortly thereafter, the state did comply with the
cost of living adjustments. This was some two
years after the initial statutory deadline. What
was the relationship between what happened at
San Clemente in your discussions with President
Nixon and your administration's decision to
comply with the cost of living increases under
previous federal statutes?
No, that meeting at San Clemente was actually a
meeting in which we were given a briefing,
probably the first briefing that any state had been
given. We were given a briefing on the
governments Family Assistance Plan, the
government's approach to a Family Assistance
Plan.
So that meeting was mainly about the Family
Assistance Plan?
Yeah.
There was no discussion of the pending problem
of federal funds? The federal funds were going to
be cut off for the AFDC Program unless
California was in compliance. There had been
several court rulings and there had been an
administrative ruling by HEW, but it had been
stayed for a period of several months.
I can't recall any discussion about that. I really
can't. I better check the files on all of this. I
think, unless I'm badly mistaken, I think that was
the meeting at which we heard for the first time
the plans of a new federal program. And at the
time, the way it was presented we were optimistic
about it.
I think that was the major purpose of the
meeting, but if the two events are happening at
the same time I was wondering if the other came
up at all.
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Ronald Reagan:
That was coincidence. Yeah.
Okay. What was the reasoning behind your
support for the Community Work Experience
Program and the various cutbacks as part of
welfare reform in benefits for the working core?
What did you see as the reasons behind those
two aspects of welfare reform?
Let me sum it up this way as to what I think was
the whole finding of our task force and what was
our philosophy. First of all, with everyone seeing
there must be some whole new approach to
welfare, my own interpretation literally went
back to all right, what is the basis of welfare and
why was it passed and why do we have welfare.
And I found nothing wrong with the basic
philosophy. That is that you've got two groups of
people. You got one group that is permanently
going to be dependent on you unless you throw
them out in the street to die. Those are the
disabled or the aged and so forth. All right. Do
for those as much as you possibly can. Hopefully,
afford even some of the luxuries that make life
worth living for those people.
The second group you have to consider
temporary. These are the people who, through
some reason, whether it's lack of motivation, lack
of training, whatever it might be, are unable to
maintain themselves out in the competitive labor
market. Now, the original concept of welfare,
borne out of The Depression, was that this was
temporary, that these were people that were
temporarily unable to take care of themselves.
You were going to take care of them and you
were going to try to help solve their problem and
make them self-sufficient, self-sustaining.
Now, the Work Project thing-oh, first of all, on
the part-time, the people who had some outside
income, part-time working or whatever it was
and not enough so that we augmented it with
welfare. Under the regulations that were
[Vol. 64:933
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designed to protect the sensitivity of welfare
recipients, we were told that we had to accept
their word for their eligibility. We could not
check on them in any way. Now, a government
recognizes the right to check on you and me or
anyone else whether we paid our taxes or not.
They don't take our word for what our income
was. They check with our employer and match it
against it. We asked for that same right.
What we discovered mainly was no one in the
United States knew how many people were on
welfare, no one. They only knew how many
checks they were sending out and we had reason
to believe that there were many people drawing
it. We found a county, for example, that had 194
full-time county employees, who were also
drawing welfare. We didn't think this was what
welfare was set out to do. So we got, as part of
our reforms, the right to check, and we found, in
checking, the first IO,OOO names we ran through
we found 41% of them had actually misstated
their outside income and the adjustments were
made on the basis of misstatement of fact.
Now, the matter of the Community Work Project
was we believed also that welfare had come up in
size to such a place that if you add to welfare the
no necessity to work for it, you have made it
much more attractive than employment that
might be available. So thinking back to the WPA,
which was not, as so many people remembered as
a boondoggle. WPA was very practical. We said
why should not government get useful services
performed that it would have performed if it had
the manpower and the resources. But let us say
we have the manpower and the resources: These
are the able-bodied, welfare recipients being paid
from public funds. And so we had to fight like
hell to get HEW in Washington under Elliot
Richardson to give us a waiver. And they would
not give it to us statewide. They specified only
thirty-five counties, and we had to negotiate that.
It was like bargaining with them and they
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wouldn't let us have such big counties as Los
Angeles.
And our experiment was that, number one, the
communities would have to submit to us projects
that were meaningful, that had some reason for
doing. We weren't just going to go for telling
them they had to go and rake leaves and then un-
rake them again or dig holes and fill them up.
Useful projects -monitors in school corridors
and playgrounds, crossing guards-I can't think
of all of them, but legitimate projects. Then these
able bodied were going to receive an order in
these counties to report, and they only had to
work eighty hours a month, half-time, so there
was no fear that their grant might amount to less
than minimum wage or something. And also,
because we wanted to allow time, if their
problem was job training or job seeking, time for
that. The rest of the time was to be spent in
either job training or looking for a job.
Then we assigned personnel to this project that
we called Job Agents, formerly caseworkers, but
now Job Agents, whose whole job was to find
employment for these people. And what really
happened was we never did have more than a
few thousand people at a time in the Work
Projects because these Job Agents were so
successful once we got them reporting for work
and a chance to see them, and they themselves
now were motivated because they were going to
have to work anyway. But in one year we
funneled 57,000 welfare recipients through that
program into private enterprise jobs, and this was
how the program worked.
Now, some of the legislators, who objected to it
and called it slave labor, they discovered only,
you know, 3,000 people or something in the
Work Projects and they said it's a failure. They
stopped short of seeing how many were passing
on through the program and getting jobs.
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Mark Aaronson:
Ronald Reagan:
Were you worried that some of the cutbacks on
the benefits to the working poor would result in a
disincentive to work and that if they didn't find a
job there would be some circumstances given the
pyramiding of welfare state benefits, they'd be
better off not working. For example, there was
proposed a 150% limitation in terms of standard
of need for the amount of grant.
No, we weren't. What we think-and I still don't
think we have been successful in this regard-I
don't think anyone in the country has-we've
come closer than anyone with our reforms. HEW
in Washington had its objectives rejected. Our
own legislature, which held out for five months,
as you know, and wouldn't even let me present
the reforms to them in a joint session. The
compromises we had to make kept us from this
fact that one of our problems is that welfare with
all of these regulations, with the additional
goodies that were added on had simply become
more attractive than employment.
There was no incentive to get a job. We found
such things, for example, in the regulations: Here
is, let's say, a woman with children on the Aid for
Dependent Children program is getting $335 a
month grant. Now she gets a job in an office at
$55o a month. Every citizen, I'm sure, would say
well, automatically, no more welfare, but the
regulations had grown to the point that she could
wind up still collecting her full welfare, which
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They also never paid any attention to the
thousands and thousands of welfare recipients,
who just disappeared and never asked for
another welfare check. In other words, these had
to be people who were cheating and once they
knew they had to report for a job, they couldn't,
because they were cheating, and they just
disappeared and we've never heard from them
again. So we had a double break there.
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also made her eligible for food stamps and for
Medicaid.
Now, here's a woman working in an office and
her income isn't $550. Her income is $885 a
month. She's got-because of the manner in
which they said, well, for eligibility, out of your
$550 she can buy a new car and the car payments
are considered transportation to work.
Mark Aaronson: I think there are always those kinds of examples.
But did you have any sense how prevalent they
were? You always have those kind of, you know,
extreme cases.
Ronald Reagan: Yeah. I just gave you 194 in county employees.
But, what happened was now what happens to
the other gals in the office, who see her much
better off than themselves, and they're making
$550. Now, they never were on welfare. They
can't get on welfare while they're working. So
suddenly, when the job market was good, the gal
would say well, why don't you talk to my
caseworker. And a caseworker-and there were
those who would do this-would say to the gals,
"Well, you quit your job and I can get you on
welfare." Now, under the same terms, she comes
back to work to the same job, gets her job back
again, and now she's making more than $8oo a
month.
People thought that we were just picking out
horror stories. The Examiner thought that in San
Francisco. The Examiner sent a reporter out to
see whether we were telling the truth, and they
sent him out to get on welfare. He went out one
day and came back and wrote his story. He had
gotten on welfare four times, under four different
names in the same office on the same day, and
The Examiner joined our crusade. Then, I must
say, they followed up and they found all sorts of
things that they dug up.
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Can I ask one last question?
Yes. I was just going to say we-
Okay. And that is what do you regard as the role
of the courts in reviewing welfare policies and
practices of state government?
Well, I think that all too much the courts have
been in the same-have had the same attitude.
There are too many of them that have had the
same attitude there that they have had with
regard to crime itself in the permissiveness and
the leniency. Can I give an example? It just
happened not too far from here and not too long
ago.
Two men and their families moved here from
Dallas, Texas. They had been welders down there.
They decided they wanted to live in California.
They worked for the same company there. They
came up, and they were neighbors. They lived in
the same neighborhood here. They couldn't get
welding jobs here so they applied for welfare.
Well, under our new system of checking and our
reforms, we checked with their employer and he
said, "Not only are their jobs still open," but he
said, "I have openings for forty more welders."
Now, here are two men in California applying for
welfare, trained welders, and there's a man in
Dallas, Texas, where they voluntarily came from,
who is looking for forty-two welders like
themselves. So we denied them welfare. They took
the case to court. They sued us. And a judge ruled
that to not give them welfare interfered with their
constitutional right to travel and live where they
wanted to live.
Now, it's very precious that you and I have the
right to vote with our feet, to move across the
state line, to live wherever in this country we
want to live. But I'll be damned if we have a right
to live there knowing that the only way we can
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subsist if we decide to live in that place is on the
largess of our fellow citizens.
So I went to one of our lawyers after that case
and I said, "Look, I want to ask you-give you a
hypothetic." I said, "In a few months I'll no
longer be Governor." I said, "My main
occupation was motion picture actor. So, when
I'm no longer Governor I can be an unemployed
motion picture actor." I said, "Suppose I decide
that I want to go back and live in the small town
where I grew up, in Dixon, Illinois. Now, they
don't make movies in Dixon. There are no jobs
for movie actors, but under his decision am I
eligible to go back to my hometown and say I am
an unemployed motion picture actor and apply
for welfare and they have to give it to me?"
And he said, "That's exactly what the decision
meant."
Now, we lost that case. I claim that the judge was
wrong-that this is a wrong interpretation of the
Constitution. Any common sense or reason says
to you that you can't say to the people of the
United States you can just go out and search for a
place that cannot possibly provide you
employment and then move there and stop
working for the rest of your life and your
neighbors take care of you. But this is what a
judge really ruled.
Is there any evidence that you found that people,
in fact, systematically do move with that kind of
consideration in mind?
Well, whether they-oh, I don't think that they
knew they couldn't get jobs as welders. I will give
them that. I'm quite sure they were sure that they
could come to California and they would have
money and they wanted to go to work here. But
instead of when they couldn't get work here,
instead of doing what citizens have always done
in the past and moving back and getting their old
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jobs back, they applied for welfare. And now, a
judge has said you can do that.
What we did find was there's no question that
California had a chalk mark on its door. Sixteen
percent of the people in the United States
drawing welfare were getting it in California.
And we knew people that came here had
relatives on welfare. They left particularly some
of the rural states where welfare was not as
generous as it was here. We also know that with
the reforms there was a letting up of that kind of
traffic, because suddenly the word was out.
I could tell you a humorous one here that one of
my own cabinet members, who owns a farm in
Oregon came to me and showed me a letter
written by his foreman. The foreman was giving
him all the news. He sold seventeen calves and he
bought a load of alfalfa and he'd done this and
that. His P.S. at the bottom of the letter was, he
said, "I was thinking of quitting the job and
coming to California and getting on welfare," but
he says, "I heard your Governor has fixed it up
so we can't do that. Must be a mean old bastard."
I was very proud of that.
Third Person: Excuse me. We're going to have to stop you.
After the tape was turned off, Governor Reagan continued to speak
for about two minutes on his welfare reform proposals. What he wanted
to emphasize was that his proposals had raised substantially by some 43%
to 46% the benefits received by those whom he called the neediest. That
a major effort on his part was to redistribute the kind of welfare benefits
that California was giving out so that those who were not so in need
would no longer be receiving benefits, and those who were the most
needy would be getting higher benefits than they did before, particularly
since these previous benefits were totally inadequate given the kinds of
cost circumstances that exist in the United States.
This is the standard emphasis that he continually made throughout
about his welfare reform program. The distinction between the needy and
the non-needy is never one that is specifically clarified, and I did not have
time in this interview to specifically pursue that subject.
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Now I will turn to some general comments about the interview
itself. Governor Reagan was about twenty minutes late. He had been
tied up in Walnut Creek. When he arrived, I was already in the office of
the Rotary Club. He immediately shook my hand and sat down at a table
across from me, and we began our questioning. At all times he was
attentive to the kinds of questions that I was asking. He looked at me
directly. He spoke in an easy conversational style with great charm and
at times humor.
My sense was that for the most part he was providing answers that he
had given on other occasions. There were, however, specific questions,
which I did ask that did require him to contemplate his answers, and it
seemed to me that he was making an effort to recall in his own mind
specific events and circumstances. Although he was being careful in terms
of the amount of information he was revealing, I did not get a sense that he
was giving me a response that in any way was not related to how he
specifically felt about the subject matter.
It was interesting that in granting this interview to me he delayed
making his appearance at a Rotary Club convention that was to follow
the interview. He also avoided some polite formalities beforehand with
members of the Rotary Club and other civic association types in the City
of Oakland. There also were considerable demands being made, as I
understand them, from both local newspapers and local television
stations. Nonetheless, for some reason, a reason that I have no way of
quite knowing, he felt that it was important that he speak to me and that
I was very definitely firmly scheduled in his rather rigorous schedule. The
individual that arranged this was Peter Hannaford, someone I had not
met before. At the end, I thanked him very much for arranging this
opportunity.
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Stanford Community Law Office and former San Mateo County Legal
Aid Executive Director. The panelists were Stephen Berzon, senior
partner at Altshuler Berzon; the Honorable John Burton, Chairman of
the California Democratic Party and former California legislator and
U.S. Congressman; Professor Cruz Reynoso (U.C. Davis School of Law),
who is also a former California Supreme Court Associate Justice and a
former CRLA Executive Director; and Professor Florence Roisman
(Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law). I am
profoundly grateful for the participation of all the panelists, their
thoughtful comments on my manuscript and social justice lawyering
today, and their fond, moving, and at times humorous recollections of
Ralph and his down-to-earth character and extraordinary work as a
preeminent lawyer for the poor.
I presented at the UCLA/University of London Sixth International
Clinical Conference (Lake Arrowhead, CA, October 27-30, 2005) an
earlier version of the narrative regarding the multi-pronged actions taken
by Ralph and other legal service lawyers and activists during the early
1970S to counter California welfare reform proposals as initiated by
Governor Ronald Reagan. Five years later, at the UCLA/University of
London Seventh International Clinical Conference (Lake Arrowhead,
CA, November 4-7, 2010), I delivered a paper raising the conceptual
concerns now addressed in Parts I and III of this Book. I truly
appreciated the rich exchanges that took place at those lively, scholarly
conferences and the helpful responses from other participants to my
presentations. I also want to express my gratitude to the conference
organizers for inviting me to participate.
In updating the original research and drafting this manuscript, I was
fortunate to have the assistance and support of several hardworking
compatriots. Professors Ascanio Piomelli (U.C. Hastings) and Paul
Tremblay (Boston College Law School) carefully read the first Part. I
then used their respective written and oral comments to clarify its
analytic assumptions and direction. Looking back on events that had
taken place more than three decades ago, Kevin Aslanian, Dan Brunner,
and Jay-Allen Eisen provided important additional factual details as well
as particularly illuminating perspectives. I also had the help of two
superb student research assistants, Allison Zamani (J.D. 20io) and
Jennifer Kunz (J.D. 2012), both of whom were exceptionally diligent,
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resourceful, and thoughtful. In addition, Grace Takatani from the U.C.
Hastings Law Library staff went out of her way to track down and
confirm newspaper citations. Lastly, I am especially indebted to Tom
McCarthy, director of the U.C. Hastings Scholarly Publications, who
personally promoted, reviewed, and assisted in editing the manuscript,
and Editor-in-Chief Dane Barca and Executive Production Editor
Stephanie Alessi along with the student editors of the Hastings Law
Journal.
This work began as my doctoral dissertation in political science at
the University of California at Berkeley. I am even more appreciative
now than I was back then for the openness and candor of all those whom
I interviewed. Any mistakes in historical reporting are mine. Though I
have changed the analytic focus of the dissertation, I still owe much in
my approach and critical thinking to the members of my doctoral
committee: William K. (Sandy) Muir, Jr. (Political Science Department),
Philippe Nonet (Center for the Study of Law and Society), and especially
the late Michael Paul Rogin (Political Science Department).
I dedicate this Book, as I did the dissertation, to my best friend since
law school, the love of my life, Margie Gelb.
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PAUL CORT, J.D ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
JAM ES CREIGHTON, J.D ..................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
M ARK D 'ARGEN1o, B.A ., J.D .................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JOHN D EAN, J.D ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
ANN D IEM-PATT ON ........................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
TERRY KAY D IGGS, B.A ., J.D ........................................................................... ............. Assistant Professor of Law
ROBERT D OBBINS, J.D ., LL.M .......................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
M ARY PAT DOOLEY, B .A ., J.D ............................................................................. ............ Assistant Professor of Law
ALICE D UEKER, J.D .......................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JENNIFER DUNN, J.D ........................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
D EREK ELETICH, J.D .......................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JAM ES B. ELLIS ................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
RANDALL S. FARRIMOND, B.S., M .S., J.D ......................................................................................... Assistant Profesior of Law
TAM ARA FISHER, B.A ., J.D ........................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
JOHN FORD ......................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
ROBERT FRIES ..................................................................................................................................... As sistant Professor of Law
M ICHAEL GOW E ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
JOSEPH G RATZ, J.D ............................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
CHARLES TAIT GRAVES, J.D ............................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
JONATHAN G ROSS, J.D ....................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
PAUL G ROSSMAN ............................................................................................................................... As sistant Professor of Law
JAN G RUEN ........................................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
G EOFFREY A .HANSEN, B.A ., J.D ............................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
H ILARY HARDCASTLE, B.A ., J.D ., M .L.I.S ....................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JAM ES HEAD, B .A ., J.D ..................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
CANDACE HEISLER, B.A ., J.D ........................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
H OW ARD H ERMAN, A .B., J.D ............................................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
JENNIFER HERNANDEZ ....................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
D ENNIS HIGA ..................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
ANGELA HOLLOW ELL-FUENTES ........................................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
SARAH HOOPER ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
ROBERT HULSE, B.S., M .S., J.D ........................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
M ATHEW HULT .................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
A BRAR HUSSAIN ................................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
TERI JACKSON, B.A ., J.D ................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor o f Law
PEEYUSH JAIN .................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
M ARIA-ELEN A JAM ES, B.A ., J.D ....................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JULIA M EZHINSKY JAYNE, J.D ........................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JAN JEMISON, B.S., M.B.A., J.D .......................................................... Director of the Legal Education Opportunity Program
and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
STEPHEN JOHNSON, J.D ..................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor o f Law
JEANNE JORGE-G ROVE ...................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
KENNETH KANN, B.A ., J.D ................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
ANNE KENNER, B.A ., J.D .................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
S. M ICHAEL KERNAN, J.D .................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
ARLENE KOSTANT, B .A ., M .A ., J.D ................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
CLIFFORD T. LEE, J.D ........................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
JONATHAN U . LEE, J.D ...................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
CECILY M AK, J.D ............................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
BRIGID M ARTIN, J.D .......................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
CHRISTOPHER M ARTZ ........................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
HON. KEVIN M cCARTHY, B.A ., J.D ................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
M ARY M cLAiN , J.D .......................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JASON M EEK, J.D ............................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
ALAN M ELINCOE ................................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
THERESA DRISCOLL M OORE, B.A ., J.D ............................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
SADHANA D .N ARAYAN .................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JESSICA NOTINI, B A ., J.D ................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
DANIELLE O CHS-TLLOTSON, B.A ., J.D ............................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
M ARJA-L SA OVER BECK ................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
ROGER PATTON, B.S., J.D ................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
TAM SEN PLUME ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
DAVID PRIESS .................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
RACHEL PROFFITT ............................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
SHEILA PURCELL, J.D ........................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
ERIC Q UANDT ..................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
M ARTIN QUINN, B.A ., J.D ................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
JENNIFER A . REISCH, B .A ., J.D ........................................................................................ ...... Assistant Professor ofLaw
KEVIN ROMANO, JD .......................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
M ATTHEW ROSEN, J.D ....................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
KATIE ROSS ....................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
DOUGLAS SAELTzER, J.D .................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
ROBERT SAM M IS, B.A ., J.D ............................................................................................................... Assistant Professor o fLaw
JONATHAN SCHM IDT, J.D .................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
JAM ES SCHuRz, J.D ............................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
N INA SEGRE ....................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
ERIC SIBBTrT ...................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
JONATHAN SOGLIN ............................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
ROCHAEL SOPER ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
LINDA SPATH ..................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
M ARK SPOLYAR ................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
JAMES SUTTON .................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
K Im Sw AIN ........................................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
N ICHOLAS TARG . ................................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor ofLaw
SHEILA TH OMAS ................................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
RONALD TYLER, B.S., J.D ................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor o fLaw
CLINTON W AASTED, J.D .................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
BRUCE W AGM AN, B.S., J.D .............................................................................................................. Assistant Professor ofLaw
JAMES W A STAFFE, B.A ., J.D . .......................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
CRAIG W ALDMAN .............................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor of Law
LISA W ALKER ..................................................................................................................................... Assistant Pr ofessor of Law
JEFFRE Y W HITE .................................................................................................................................. Assistant Professor o fLaw
THOMAS W iLLGIN . ........................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JEFFREY W ILLIAM S ............................................................................................................................ Assistant Professor of Law
JEANNE W OODOFORD .......................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor of Law
JOHN S. W ORDEN, B.A ., J.D .................................................................................. ............ Assistant Professor ofLaw
LING ZHU, J.D .................................................................................................................................... Assistant Professor ofLaw
HASTINGS ALUMNI ASSOCIATION:
BUILDING COMMUNITY AND SUPPORT
T he mission of the Alumni Association is to strengthen
and nurture the bond between Hastings colleagues and the
school by providing outstanding opportunities for personal
and professional growth through a lifetime connection to one
another and to Hastings.
As a graduate, you are part of the I8,ooo member-strong
Association, and we invite you to participate in the school's
thriving community of alumni, students and scholars. The Hastings
family spans the globe and includes living alumni going back
more than seventy years. Tap into this network-you will be
amazed by the depth of resources and knowledge available.
As members of the Association, our alumni give their time, talent
and resources to build a strong and vibrant Hastings community.
They are essential to maintaining Hastings at the forefront of
legal education.
To find out more about how you can make a difference, contact
the Alumni Center at (415) 565-4615 or email us at
alumni@uchastings.edu. Or, visit the Alumni Center at
200 McAllister Street, San Francisco.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW
ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
200 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California 94102-4978
Tel: (415) 565-4615 - Fax: (415) 581-8844
Email: alumni@uchastings.edu
htp://uchastings.edu/alumni/index.html
